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ABSTRACT
This thesis is concerned with the development of government policy in the Scottish 
Highlands from the Crofters' Holdings (Scotland) Act of 1886 to the mid 1920s. It 
begins with an analysis of the politics of the 1886 Act encapsulating an examination of 
the input of crofters, proprietors and politicians to the contents of the Act. The 
contemporary polemical reactions to the Act and the historiographical debate 
surrounding the Act and its legacy are given consideration.
The Crofters' Commission, set up in 1886 to implement the Act, is examined in depth. 
Particular attention is paid to the use of the Commission by the Government in the 
turbulent years from 1886 to 1888. The reforms of the Commission in 1887 and 1888 
are also scrutinised. The reactions to the Commission by the various social and political 
groups in the Highlands are summarised. A brief statistical analysis of the work of the 
Commissioners in setting fair rents and granting enlargements of holdings concludes 
this section.
Parallel developments in the period from 1886 to 1895, such as the debates on 
emigration, development of the infrastructure and reform of land tenure are detailed. 
The context here is the differing perspectives of the Conservative and Liberal Parties 
who were both in office during this period. The origins of the suceeding policy of land 
purchase are discerned.
The role of the Congested Districts Board, set up in 1897, is analysed. Firstly, its 
actions in attempting to carry out the policy of land purchase under a Conservative 
government from 1897 to 1905 and subsequently the second phase of its work under a 
Liberal Government from 1906 to 1911, are analysed. Attention is given to the work of 
the Board on the ground in attempting to interest crofters in the policies of land 
purchase and migration. The negative response of crofters to both initiatives is 
discussed. The effects of the ongoing debate on the Small Landholders (Scotland) Bill, 
which provided for the abolition of land purchase and the CDB, in the Highlands are 
put in context. A detailed political analysis of this debate, and the role of the 
representatives of crofters and proprietors complements the examination of the work of 
the Board.
The final two sections of the thesis are concerned with the policy of land settlement. 
The short working life of the Small Landholders (Scotland) Act, 1911 is analysed. The 
problems caused by the ideological origins of this piece of legislation are the particular 
focus. Statistical evidence is employed to measure the relative success or failure of the 
operation of this Act in the period from 1911 to 1919. The improved performance of 
land settlement under the Land Settlement (Scotland) Act of 1919 is presented as a 
contrast. A comparitive statistical analysis demonstrates the quantitative improvement 
clearly. However an examination of the qualitative aspects of the results of post war 
land settlement leads to a more complex understanding of the success of the policy. The 
political context of the immediate post war period provides the backdrop to this section. 
The stringent fiscal atmosphere and the renewed sequence of land raids and strident 
rhetoric by applicants for land are the two most important features of this period.
The overarching themes concern the political tension and debate between the various 
pieces of legislation. The statutes of 1886 and 1911 were based on the concept of 
protected tenancy; whilst that of 1897 was based on the concept of land purchase. The 
1919 act contained elements of both ideas. The prevailing interpretation of the role of 
landowners in policy in this period is revised. The diversity of conditions across the 
Crofting Counties is also a constant theme. Some attention is given to the political 
legacy of the policy developments of this period.
CONTENTS.
1. The Making of the Crofters' Holdings
(Scotland) Act  1 .
2. The Crofters' Commission, 1886 to 1912..........  33.
3. Liberals and Unionists: Variations in
Highland Policy, 1886 to 1895....................  66.
4. The Conservative Government and the
Congested Districts Board.......................  101.
5. The Liberal Government and the Congested
Districts Board.................................  131.
6. The Small Landholders' Scotland Bill, 1906
to 1911.........................................  161 .
7. Land Settlement, 1911 to 1919..................  188.
8. Land Settlement from 1919......................  219.
9. Conclusion....................................  256.
10. Bibliography..................................  285.
TABLES.
2:1 - Average Rent Reductions, 1886 to 1892.....  47.
2:2 - Fair Rent and Arrears Decisions, 1886 to
1895......................................  49.
2:3 - Fair Rent and Arrears Decisions, 1896 to
1912......................................  50.
7:1 - Land Settlement in the Crofting Counties
April 1912 to December 1919..............  211.
8:1 - Ex Service Demand for Land Settlement,
1919 to 1924.............................  221 .
8.2 - Land Settlement in the Crofting Counties,
1912 to 1925..............................  243.
8:3 - Hebridean Land Settlement, 1912 to 1925.... 244.
APPENDICES
1. The Course of the Land Agitation in the Highlands,
1886 to 1895....................................  269.
2. Memorial to the Prime Minister with reference to 
Crofter Legislation, May 1908..................  275.
3. Dramatis Personae..............................  278.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.
I am grateful to The Cross Trust, The Carnegie Trust for the Scottish Universities, 
The Scottish Education Department and the University of Glasgow for funding the 
research on which this thesis is based.
I have benefited from the assistance of the staffs of the Bodleian Library, Oxford, the 
British Library, Churchill College, Cambridge, (Political Archives Centre), 
Edinburgh University Library, Glasgow University Library, the Highland Regional 
Archive, the Mitchell Library, Glasgow, the National Library of Scotland, the Public 
Record Office, the Scottish Record Office and the Staffordshire County Record 
Office.
I am grateful to the following owners of private muniments who have facilitated 
access to carry out research; The Duke of Argyll, Sir Donald Cameron of Lochiel, 
Mr Neil Hunter of Hunterston, Mrs Sheena Linzee-Gordon of Cluny, Mr John 
MacLeod of MacLeod, Mrs F. Raven-Smith of Ardtomish, the Marquis of Salsibury, 
and the Viscount Thurso. Mr John MacLeod of MacLeod was unique among the 
owners of private archives consulted here in imposing a charge for the use of his 
muniments; namely £50 for the first day and £15 for each suceeding day (plus VAT).
I have benefited enormously from the stimulation of my superviser, Dr Allan I. 
Macinnes and the assistance of Professor A.A.M. Duncan, Professor R.H. Campbell 
and Mr Kevin Pringle. The developing Scottish History Postgraduate Community at 
Glasgow University, especially Fiona Watson and John Young, contributed in their 
different ways to the enjoyment of research.
I owe an immeasurable debt to my parents for their support during, what must have 
seemed, an extended career as a student.
ABBREVIATIONS
AJBP - A.J. Balfour Papers.
BL Add MS - British Library Additional Manuscript.
BLO - Bodleian Library, Oxford.
BoAS - Board of Agriculture for Scotland.
CAB - Cabinet.
CBP - Campbell Bannerman Papers.
CDB - Congested Districts Board.
Es - Enlargements.
EUL - Edinburgh University Library.
FR - Fair Rent.
HJ - Historical Journal.
HLLRA - Highland Land Law Reform Association.
HRA - Highland Regional Archive.
ILP - Independent Labour Party.
KLTR - Kings and Lord Treasurers' Rememberancer.
NHs - New Holdings.
NLS - National Library of Scotland.
NS - Northern Scotland.
PD - Parliamentary Debates.
PP - Parliamentary Papers.
PRO - Public Record Office.
PWLC - Public Works Loans Commissioners.
RD - Real Demand.
SCRO - Staffordshire County Record Office.
SEG - Skene, Edwards and Garson.
SHR - Scottish Historical Review.
SGM - Scottish Geographical Magazine.
SJA - Scottish Journal of Agriculture.
SLA - Scottish Liberal Association.
SLC - Scottish Land Court.
SLFP - Scottish Landowners Federation Papers.
SLPF - Scottish Land and Property Federation.
SRO - Scottish Record Office.
TGSI — Transactions of the Gaelic Society of 
Inverness.
WEGP - W.E. Gladstone Papers.
1CHAPTER ONE.
The Making of the Crofter's Holdings (Scotland) Act.
The 1870s and 1880s saw rural issues maintain prominence on the British political 
agenda. The decline in the prices of wheat, barley and oats over this period led to 
changes in the relationship between farming tenants and landowners. The most 
significant of these were reductions in rent and the development of tenants' rights in 
legislation of 1875 and 1883. These were designed to give a modicum of protection 
in a period where tenants’ incomes were more vulnerable than they had been in mid 
century. They had come about after the development of a farmers movement, under 
the umbrella of the Farmers' Alliance, formed in 1879. * These developments also 
had an effect on the relationship between farmers and their agricultural labourers. 
The purported "Revolt of the Field", a series of protests in the 1870s aimed at 
securing increased wages for labourers, put additional pressure on farmers in a 
difficult era. Further, the agrarian aspects of the Irish nationalist movement helped 
to define the outlook of governments to agrarian protest in a society dominated by a 
smallholding population. In Wales, where rural society was also dominated by small 
tenant farmers and small scale proprietors, the land question was important. A 
tenants' movement demanded the extension of the principles of the Irish Land Act of 
1881 to Wales. A Welsh Land League was formed in 1886. They used the example 
of the Crofters' Holdings (Scotland) Act of 1886 in their propaganda. ^  In Scotland 
the collapse of the wheat price was less significant than in the high farming areas of 
England, but it did have an effect. Generally, it was a time of falling rents which 
placed stress on estate finances. The farmers movement was evident in Scotland, 
particularly in the North East, but it had petered out by the mid 1880s. ^  This was the 
general political background which lies behind the particular aspect of agrarian 
politics to be analysed here.
Although the main concern below will be with the post 1886 era, it is important to 
scrutinize the background to that period in more detail. The years from 1886 to 1919 
would see four major pieces of legislation which can be seen as a debate between 
contending policies on tenurial relations in the Highlands. The Crofters' Holdings 
Act of 1886 was the critical statute which dominated the course of the debate over 
the succeeding forty years. It defined the crofting area and established security of 
tenure, compensation for improvements and the right to adjudication of rental.
2Governments of both parties were subsequently forced to wrestle with the profound 
effects of this act on the crofting community. Loyalty to the 1886 regime among 
crofters would be a major obstacle for those interested in implementing alternative 
policies.
The immediate politics of the 1886 act extend back to the beginning of the 1880s and 
go through various stages, increasing in intensity from the involvement of local 
government, to analysis by Royal Commission and subsequently policy formation by 
the Cabinet after informal consultation with favoured proprietors. An examination of 
these politics will provide clear indications of the themes to be pursued in the 
remainder of this thesis.
The series of incidents which have become known as the "Crofter's War" 
preoccupied governments of both parties throughout the 1880s. The agitation arose 
from a complex interplay of economic and cultural forces in the post famine 
Highlands. There were a series of disjointed outbreaks of agitation in Wester Ross 
and Lewis in the 1870s. However, the most concerted phase of the agitation, lasting 
from 1882 to 1888, began in Skye.^ This chapter will examine the impact of the 
agitation on government policy in the Highlands in the period from 1882 to the 
passing of the Crofter's Holdings (Scotland) Act in the Summer of 1886. The 
responses of the Government to the various demands of crofters and proprietors as 
well as political worries about the effect of special treatment for crofters on tenurial 
relations in the rest of Scotland will form the focus of the analysis. The making of 
the Crofters' Act can be divided into three periods. From 1882 to 1883 the crofter 
issue developed from an administrative to a political issue. Its impact shifted from 
local to central government. The establishment of the Napier Commission in 1883, 
and the course of its work over the next year helped to establish the question as 
regionally specific. Although its direct impact on the content of legislation was 
minimal, its importance in raising this question cannot be underestimated. 1884 was 
dominated by an attempt by the government to marginalise the crofters movement by 
encouraging proprietors to build a partnership with their tenants through concessions 
on the issues of rent, compensation for improvements and extra land. A growing 
realisation that this would be insufficient saw the onset of the final period from 1885 
to the eventual passing of the Act in mid 1886.
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The celebrated crofters of Braes, near Portree in Skye, asserted their historical 
"right" to graze their stock on Ben Lee. This was land which the proprietor, Lord 
MacDonald, now used for the grazing of his own sheep. The crofter’s defiance of 
Sheriff Officers' attempts to uphold proprietorial legal rights culminated in the 
despatch of a force of police to Skye. The ensuing confrontation between the police 
and the crofters was the first to have an impact on local and central government. ^  
Initially, the Commissioners of Supply for the County of Inverness-shire were the 
first to have to deal with the consequences of the events in Skye. Before the reform 
of Scottish Local Government in 1889, which saw the creation of a system of elected 
County Councils, it was the Commissioners who were responsible for policing the 
county. By late 1882, as the agitation spread from Braes across Skye to the Western 
district of Glendale, the County authorities became concerned that their police force 
was inadequate to maintain law and order in Skye. At this time the entire county of 
Inverness was policed by 135 men. An additional 35 could be found, but it would 
take time to train them for the difficult duty of policing the disturbed districts of 
Skye. In November the Police Committee resolved that they were "quite unable to 
enforce the law and secure the maintenance of peace in the County without aid from 
the central government". The Lord Advocate was unimpressed by this view. He 
informed Sheriff Ivory, the Sheriff Principal of Inverness, that he considered the 
county authorities to be responsible by statute for the policing of the county. Aid 
from the central government would go no further than the Home Secretary 
authorising them to recruit extra police from whatever source they considered 
appropriate. In the event 40 extra policemen from Glasgow were drafted in to help 
deal with the situation.6
In 1882 the crofter s'agitation was an administrative problem. Certainly, it was 
serious enough to cause problems in the relationship between local and central 
government, but it was not yet the political problem it would soon become. 
Essentially, this was because the crofters were not organised. There was no structure 
by which they could articulate their demands. This was remedied to a certain degree 
by the formation of a formal crofters' movement. The London and Edinburgh 
Highland Land Law Reform Associations and the Sutherland Association provided a 
forum for sympathetic political activists in urban Scotland and beyond to raise the 
grievances of the crofters and present them to a wider audience. The crofters 
themselves temporarily acquired a political voice through the sittings of the Napier 
Commission in 1883. However, it was not until 1885 and their enfranchisement that
they could have an independent political impact. Nevertheless, through the voice of 
the Crofter s'movement and the actions of sympathisers in parliament, such as 
Charles Fraser-MacKintosh, MP for Inverness Burghs, and Donald H. MacFarlane, 
at that time sitting for Wicklow in Ireland, the government began to be made aware 
of the grievances of the crofters.In late 1882 and early 1883 as the agitation took a 
firm hold in Skye moves were made to persuade the government to grant a Royal 
Commission to examine crofting conditions. This was the first of a series of political 
moves in which the origins of the legislation of 1886 can be discerned. However, as 
will be seen from the discussion below, legislation was far from the mind of the 
government at this stage.
As early as August 1883 MacFarlane had appealed to the government for a Royal 
Commission. He pointed to the insecurity of the crofter who could be legally evicted 
at only 40 days notice. He contrasted this with the position of the Irish tenants who 
had received a measure of protection from parliament in 1881. The Lord Advocate, 
speaking for the Government argued that "no adequate ground" for the setting up of 
a Royal Commission had been demonstrated. Before such a step could be 
contemplated a clear legal problem and some suggestion as to an alteration in the 
law to deal with it would have to be identified. In an intimation of one of the themes 
of the debate on crofter legislation he argued that the crofting population was not 
purely an agricultural population but could independently improve their position 
without Commissions or legislation, through wage labour.^
Despite the public appearance of a categoric refusal of a Commission, the 
Government considered the issue with some care in private. The Ministers involved 
in the issue were the Home Secretary, Sir William Harcourt, Lord Rosebery, who 
was a junior minister in the Home Office with special responsibility for Scottish 
affairs, along with the Lord Advocate, J.B. Balfour, and the Solicitor General. The 
Lord Advocate was strongly against a Commission. He feared it would only 
encourage agitation and the non payment of rent. More importantly there were 
political objections to a Commission. There was a reluctance to consider special 
treatment for the crofters. There would be difficulties in defining the geographic area 
to be covered by a Commission. It was argued that the crofter problem could best be 
dealt with in the general legislative framework dealing with landlord tenant relations. 
Whilst a fear of giving special recognition to crofters existed, there was also an 
awareness that it would be dangerous to refuse a Commission and then in the face of 
mounting agitation to concede one at a later date, when demands would have 
escalated. By November, Harcourt had come round to the view that a Commission
5was unavoidable. He reached this view not through profound sympathy with the 
crofters' case, but on the political grounds that a Commission would be a safer 
option at that time than in the future. He retained the worries of the summer over the 
geographic remit and the possibility that such a move would "open the floodgates of 
the Highland land question". The Prime Minister agreed but wished the matter to go 
before the full Cabinet before a policy decision was reached.** Gladstone had 
accepted the idea of tenant right based on a history of customary rights in the past  ^
«*\Dst notably with regard to Ireland, where he used such arguments in the internal 
government debate leading up to the Irish Land Act of 1881. At this date there was 
no sign of such thinking being applied to Scotland. Indeed, Gladstone did not 
espouse it in a Scottish context until early 1885 in the debate leading up to the first 
Crofters' Bill.^
There is no conclusive evidence but, given the tone of the government thinking the 
previous autumn, it seems likely that when Harcourt announced in Parliament in 
March 1883 that a Commission would be appointed his objective was to try to take 
the heat out of the agitation. This view is strengthened by the fact that the Home 
Secretary added that both the remit and the geographical scope of the Commission 
should be as general as possible.
The Commission was to be chaired by Lord Napier, a Border laird, retired diplomat 
and amateur social scientist. His colleagues were Sir Donald Cameron of Lochiel, at 
that time Tory MP for Inverness-shire; his fellow landowner Sir Kenneth MacKenzie 
of Gairloch, a noted Liberal; Charles Fraser- MacKintosh; and two Gaelic scholars 
Alexander Nicolson, Sheriff of Kircudbright, and Professor Donald MacKinnon, the 
first holder of the Chair of Celtic at Edinburgh University. Representatives of the 
Crofters movement argued that the Commission lacked a true crofteisrepresentative. 
Lochiel, MacKenzie of Gairloch and even Fraser-MacKintosh were all labelled as 
landowners. The HLLRA had recommended Alexander MacKenzie the Inverness 
journalist, historian and geneologist for the Commission on account of his active 
sympathy for the crofters. Harcourt chose not to act on this suggestion. MacKinnon 
and Nicolson, as scholars, were not expected to provide a radical input. Had it been 
widely known in 1882, MacKinnon would surely have been distrusted due to the 
recommendation Harcourt received on his behalf from Lady Gordon Cathcart, the
6proprietor of Benbecula, South Uist and Barra. Nicolson took his seat on the 
Commission after declaring his Liberal allegiance to Harcourt and laying the 
problems of the Highlands at the door of "Tory Lairds, factors, and their 
subordinates”. Many proprietors were unhappy at the political composition of the 
Commission, Lochiel being the sole Tory.^
The contemporary worries concerning the Commission were political. 
Retrospectively, it is possible to identify its most important characteristic as the 
antiquarian and historical interests of many of its members. Apart from Nicolson and 
MacKinnon, Fraser-MacKintosh was a noted antiquarian and Napier was a keen 
student of history and anthropology. This was important because much of the crofter 
rhetoric during the agitation had focused on their historical case for the restoration of 
lands which had been removed from their use by proprietors over the previous 
century and more. There had been an important upsurge of interest in the History of 
the Highland land question in the early 1880s; especially with the publication of 
Alexander MacKenzie's book on the Highland clearances. This work was as 
important for its polemical denunciation of the actions of proprietors as its scholarly 
analysis of the clearances. This was not without relevance to the origins of the 
agitation. The historical emphasis became more important once the crofter evidence 
to the Commission began to be heard. Crofter delegates were not discouraged from 
giving their own versions of the course of events in their townships over the 
preceding generations, in an attempt to justify their demands for more land and a 
more secure tenure. Further, the concept of the township, which had been usurped by 
the clearances was rehabilitated by the 1880s. Volume III of W.F.Skene's Celtic 
Scotland, published in 1880, was devoted to this theme. John Stuart Blackie had 
given considerable attention to historical aspects of the land question in his evidence 
to the Napier Commission.^
One of the most important political questions, once the composition of the 
Commission had been decided, was the geographical area which it should cover. To 
limit the area of its remit to the districts where the agitation was strongest would 
limit its political impact. There were problems of definition if it was to include all 
areas where there were ’’crofters" and "cottars". These were vague terms which had 
different meanings in different parts of the country. Napier himself was concerned 
about the status of Caithness. This was a low lying county "not inhabited by the 
Celtic race". On the other hand, its population complained of the same grievances as 
those in the North of Skye, who were among the most vocal crofters. There were 
other fringe areas such as Highland Perthshire, Upland Banff and Aberdeen-shire
7and Southern Argyll-shire where it was a matter for debate whether crofting 
conditions existed or not. In the end, it was left to the judgement of the 
Commissioners to decide their itinerary. One factor to be borne in mind was the need 
for a reasonably prompt report. An exhaustive inquiry, spread over a long period 
would defeat the object of the government. The Commission displayed an awareness 
of the political dimension to this debate by carrying out the "heavier portion" of its 
work in the Hebrides first.
The work of the Commission in its tour of the Highlands, taking evidence from 
crofters, proprietors and others did not pass without controversy. There was claim 
and counter claim concerning the role of the crofters movement. There is no doubt 
that there was activity by activists like John Murdoch and Alexander Mackenzie in 
encouraging people to give evidence and assisting in the preparation of it. This kind 
of activity gave the crofters movement an opportunity to establish contacts and 
organisation in the grass roots of the crofting community. A strength which it had 
lacked until then .^  As well as the claims that the HLLRA was interfering unduly 
and distorting the evidence of the crofters, there were claims that crofters who 
criticised estate managements in their evidence were the victims of reprisals. These 
allegations struck a raw nerve in the proprietorial community. They responded by 
denying the truth of such claims vigorously. At the forefront of this denial was a 
delegation led by the Duke of Argyll, and including representatives of Skye, South 
Uist and Ross-shire estates, who stated their case to the Lord Advocate at the Home 
Office.^
A number of points can be made to clarify the position at the end of 1883 when the 
Napier Commission returned to Edinburgh to write its Report. The agitation had 
developed from its disparate origins to have an impact on local government in the 
Highlands. With the help of articulate and well connected activists in Parliament and 
continued agitation on the ground the crofter question impinged on the attention of 
the Liberal Government. A demand for a Commission was voiced and eventually 
granted by the Government in the hope that it would have an effect in quelling 
agitation. One of the major problems faced by the government in setting up the 
Commission was how to limit its sphere of operations to an intellectually and 
politically defensible area, and yet cover a wide enough area to ensure maximum 
impact in the disturbed districts of the Highlands. The compilation and publication of 
the Napier Commission's Report was the start of a vigorous debate on the most 
efficacious method of dealing with the crofters' question which culminated in, but 
was not ended by, the passing of the Crofter's Holdings (Scotland) Act.
8The Royal Commissioners had not achieved a unanimity in their view of the 
evidence after the completion of their investigations. Social and political divisions 
were evident. The two major landowners, Lochiel and MacKenzie of Gairloch, 
despite their political differences, had reservations concerning the progress of the 
Commission. Lochiel had cast doubt on the value of much of the evidence he had 
heard from crofters, and felt sure that he would not be able to accept the 
fundamentals of the Report once it was written. Napier's ideas were paramount and 
he counted on the support of Nicolson, MacKinnon and Fraser-MacKintosh. Lochiel 
was aware of the dangers of sacrificing principle for the pursuit of superficial 
unanimity. As a Tory, his signature would be used by the Liberals to point out that 
the report had cross party support. In the end, both he and Kenneth MacKenzie 
signed the report but appended dissents from the most critical section of the report 
dealing with land.*** Napier had done his best to bring all the Commissioners 
together. He had been aware that this was likely to be difficult with regard to land, a 
subject on which the members of the Commission held "divergent views". ^
The details of the Commission's Report with regard to land were striking. This 
section was largely penned by Napier, in the absence of agreement among his 
colleagues. He had been impressed with the complaints of crofters on the insecurity 
of their tenure. He was also impressed with the importance of increasing the size of 
the individual holding and improving the quality of agriculture in the crofting areas. 
He aimed to accomplish these ends with a system of improving leases, township 
organisation and assisted emigration, backed up by limited security of tenure. 
Tenants with holdings of more than £6 annual value were to have a secure tenure and 
given leases of 30 years duration which would contain a programme of improvement 
for the holding. Tenants in holdings of less than £6 annual value were to remain 
outside the scheme and be catered for by a scheme of voluntary emigration. To 
include them, Napier felt, would perpetuate the ills he was trying to eradicate. A 
recreated township system was to be the centrepiece of the scheme. The township 
was to be responsible for the "possession and administration" of common pasture. 
All settlements of three or more holdings with common pasture, or a history of such 
within a 40 year period, were to be constituted as townships. Napier had been as 
impressed as, Lochiel was unimpressed, with crofter evidence to the Commission. 
This is clearly seen in his reasoning for the recreation of the township. He argued 
that it was valid because it had a "basis of operation in the customs of the country" 
and a "distinct existence in the sentiments and traditions of its component 
members".*® There were provisions to govern vacant holdings and subdivision,
9which were designed to eradicate congestion over a period of time. Vacant holdings 
of less than £3 annual value were not to be relet, but used for consolidation. 
Holdings of less than £20 annual value were not to be subdivided. Subdivision of 
larger holdings was not to result in the creation of new holdings of less than £10 
annual value. ^
Lochiel and Kenneth MacKenzie both dissented from the idea of the township. They 
argued that it would be inflexible and damaging to proprietorial rights. Lochiel also 
made a pertinent point which he would echo many times over the next few years. He 
queried the geographical boundaries in which the scheme was to operate. He pointed 
out the diversity of conditions in many Highland Counties, but argued that the parish 
was too small a unit of definition. An additional problem was the lack of conformity 
between estate and parish boundaries.^ There was a clear theme of social and even 
moral, as well as agricultural, improvement running through this section of the 
Report. It was stated that the aim was "to stimulate the people to shake off the torpor 
which besets them" and to help form "habits of industry and self respect".^ This, 
according to Napier, would be the long term solution to the Highland problem. 
Further, it would be a solution transcending governments and legislation. The Irish 
land act of 1881 was constantly in the background to the ongoing debate on the 
Highland land issue. Napier's scheme was a rejection of the application of the 
principle of this statute to the Highlands. This was implicit in the Report with its 
rejection of comprehensive security of tenure and rent revaluation. In private 
communication with Harcourt, Napier stated this explicitly. He did not believe the 
"three Fs" were appropriate to the Highlands, and believed the scheme which he 
presented for a partnership between tenant and proprietor based on leases and 
corporate townships would form a more useful alternative. In short, Napier was 
aiming to create economic, rather than tenurial security.
II
Whilst the Report of the Royal Commission may have been a novel contribution to 
the debate on Highland land, its impact on policy was minimal. The next section will 
examine the debate from the publication of the Report to the first attempt to pass a 
crofter's bill in 1885. The positions of the crofter's movement, the government and 
the proprietors will be scrutinised.
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The nature of the scheme proposed by Napier, as well as the political divisions 
within the Commission, ensured that the government were not responsive to its 
contents. Nevertheless it did provide a focus for the debate for a period. It also had 
an impact on the course of the agitation. Initially, it led to a period of calm as the 
expectation of government action spread through the crofting community. This hope 
was soon dashed, as no sign of government action was evident. The situation in Skye 
had reached a critical stage by the autumn of 1884. Under pressure from the strident 
Sheriff Principal, William Ivory, the government agreed to send troops to the island 
to bolster the authority of the police. The county authorities had also pressed for this 
but were not keen to acquiesce in the Home Secretary’s suggestion that they match 
the government's contribution by providing extra police for the operation.
The essential problem was that the Commission's Report had received a cool 
reception in private and in public. Both the Lord Advocate and the Home Secretary 
agreed that legislation would be needed to carry out the recommendations of the 
Commission. The government was reluctant to consider such an eventuality in 1884. 
They felt that it was within the power of the proprietors to undertake voluntary 
action to deal with some of the outstanding grievances of the crofters. They could 
deal with insecurity of tenure by offering leases. The government were not sanguine 
about the prospects of persuading crofters to emigrate in the current climate of high 
expectation of government action. The Prime Minister agreed with Harcourt and 
J.B. Balfour on the recommendations. He regarded the Report as "neither wise nor 
acceptable". He went on to directly contradict Napier's view of the Highland land 
question by suggesting proposals akin to those of the Irish land legislation of 1881 
"could be introduced with advantage1".^5 The government would spend the rest of 
the year attempting to persuade proprietors to initiate voluntary concessions.
Crofter impatience with the government on the implementation of the Report 
expressed itself through renewed agitation in the Highlands.^ In parliament, their 
supporters pressed the government to act on the Report. Harcourt replied to a motion 
put forward by Fraser-MacKintosh and MacFarlane by enlarging on his theme of the 
need for voluntary effort from the proprietors. Lochiel also contributed to the debate 
by pointing out the difficulties of drawing up an effective land bill. The issues of 
geographic definition and the problem of the cottars and squatters were serious 
obstacles to a b ill.^  It was this debate which made it clear to the crofters that the 
government were determined to take no action along the lines suggested by the 
Napier Commissioners. It marked a new phase in both the debate on Highland policy 
and in the agitation in the Highlands.
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Despite the political irrelevance of the Commission by the end of 1884 there was, 
nevertheless, a considerable debate surrounding the ideas which it had proposed. 
Criticism of the Report came from all quarters. For the crofters, Alexander 
MacKenzie, at that time editor of the Celtic Magazine, welcomed the Report as an 
admission of the validity of the crofters grievances, and as a justification of the 
agitation. However, he derided it as hopelessly inadequate on the grounds that it 
offered incomplete security of tenure and no real mechanism for the wholesale 
extension of the crofters land. He also opposed the idea of emigration as a valid 
option. Of course, this was predictable. The crofters' movement was particularly 
keen to oppose any suggestion of emigration. If it went ahead it posed a considerable 
threat to their own central contention that there was an abundance of available land 
in the Highlands, merely a lack of structures for ensuring crofter access to it.^®
From a completely different perspective the Duke of Argyll was equally emphatic in 
his denunciation of the Commission's Report. He condemned its analysis of the 
structure of land holding as "a strange reversal of the truth". Napier had contended 
that there was a lack of variation in the size of holdings in the Highlands. He pointed 
to a number of very large holdings and a large number of very small holdings, with 
very few of an intermediate size. The Duke attacked Napier's methodology, 
criticising it for a crude selection of facts and for basing his conclusions on 
information from a small number of parishes. He further noted that the Commission 
had failed to take into account the county of Argyll which contained the greatest 
variety of size of holdings. However, the central contentions of the Duke’s rebuttal 
were twofold. He argued that Napier had made a fundamental error in his basic 
conception of the crofting problem. To regard the crofters as mere small farmers, 
neglected the important part of their time which was taken up with wage labouring. 
This was a point which Sir John MacNeill had made in his survey of the Highlands 
for the government in 1851. The Duke's point was that it was not peculiar that so 
many tenants had such small holdings, but that so many labourers had such large 
holdings. Secondly, Napier had argued that the case of the Highlander was worthy of 
special attention because he had had his land forcibly removed over the course of the 
preceding century, and that there was a valid case for restoring it to him. The Duke 
regarded this as a sentimental view. He was sharply critical of the kind of evidence 
which the crofter delegates had led before the Commission. He was equally critical 
of Napier for allowing himself to be seduced by the picture of a pre clearance 
paradise in the Highlands. He argued that changes in the land holding structure of the 
Highlands were not singular, but part of a general progressive movement which was
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evident across E u r o p e . ^  The Duke's argument was the latest in a long line of 
writings which he had presented on the land issue. He had always stood out against 
the prevailing movement for tenant right. He presented the running of his own 
estates as a model for improvement. His management of the Island of Tiree, which 
included a concerted attempt to consolidate holdings, was an example of the way to 
modernity in the Highlands. He was scathing about the crofter's standard of 
agriculture and social development under classic crofting conditions. He had 
resigned from Gladstone’s Cabinet in 1881 in protest at the Irish land l e g i s l a t i o n . ^  
He was, not surprisingly given his own position, a forthright defender of the 
inalienable right of the landlord to control his estates without interference. His views 
are certainly worthy of attention. However, two factors should be borne in mind 
when considering them. Firstly, his analysis rested heavily on conditions in the 
county of Argyll and more particularly on the management of his own estate. 
Secondly, the early 1880s was not a good time to emphasise the labouring element of 
crofting life. The fishing industry was in recession and responding with structural 
changes which would affect crofters incomes from this source. ^  The slump in the 
wider British economy had reduced the opportunity for crofters to gain employment, 
on even a temporary basis, in the industrial areas of Scotland. These economic 
indicators serve to emphasise the importance of land to the crofting community. It 
was land which would be at the centre of the debate, and at the forefront of the 
governments developing policy on the Highlands for the rest of the period with 
which this chapter is concerned.
In the face of this diverse criticism of his proposals, it was left to Napier to take up 
the defence of his brainchild. He found this to be a solitary and thankless task. The 
government had rejected his Report in private and had implicitly done so in public 
by moving on to a new strategy of attempting to entice landowners to offer voluntary 
concessions to crofters. Donald Cameron of Lochiel had condemned the report as 
"hardly worth considering". He also suggested that Napier himself was well aware at 
an early stage that the government were not going to be receptive to his ideas. It was 
even suggested that in this knowledge Napier had compiled a Report giving 
expression "to a dream of an ideal and blessed condition of things".^ Despite this 
suggestion, Napier was not slow to defend himself against the Duke's attack. He 
rejected the notion that the process of depopulation in the Highlands was part of a 
general and identifiable process. The Highlands were peculiar and special, restitution 
of land to the crofters was possible and relevant. In the Lowlands the depopulation 
had occurred through "natural causes and arbitrary will". In the Highlands the 
question was still a live one; "the two factors in the quarrel stand face to face; on the
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one side is the vacant land, on the other the craving multitude". This was the factor 
which ensured that the Highlands merited preferential treatment. He also rejected the 
Duke's contention that the crofter should be seen primarily as a labourer. 
Characteristically, Napier took his argument from history. He suggested that the 
crofter was descended from the sub tenants of the tacksmen. Further, the land was 
central to the crofters life and a variety of agricultural activities were centred on it. 
This placed it apart from the allotment of the labourer. Psychologically, the crofter 
regarded himself as a tenant of the land not a wage labourer; "the field, the humble 
homestead, the common hill form the permanent centre of his life". He went to 
conclude that the informal nature of the Commission, where the ordinary crofter 
could give evidence in the same forum as the proprietor and his factor, was a 
constructive contribution to social harmony in the Highlands. The article is 
instructive for the hint which Napier gave as to his view of the political fate of his 
Report. He was now arguing that the lack of unanimity in the Commission was one 
of its strengths. It could not be accused of being a captive of one party or another. 
This was in contrast to his private correspondence with Harcourt in which he 
lamented the lack of harmony in the Commission. Napier's defence of his proposals, 
and the original Report was firmly rooted in the view of Highland history which he 
had acquired, or had confirmed, through the crofter evidence to the Commission. 
This encapsulated the proposition that an ideal, or at least commendable, social 
condition had been disturbed recently by the clearances and ought to be restored. ^
This exchange of views was important in the context of the question of whether the 
crofters should be treated as a special group worthy of preferential treatment. As has 
been noted above the government in 1882 at the outset of the agitation were reluctant 
to admit this. The granting of the Napier commission and its choice of districts to 
examine, from Ardnamurchan to Caithness, were an implicit admission that the 
crofters and the Highlands were a special case. The government, in rejecting the 
Commission's Report, were signalling that they did not wish to take this admission 
too far. They were, by the end of 1884, of the view that crofter legislation was 
something to be avoided^ «dthough Gladstone had hinted that it was not completely 
out of the question when he privately raised the possibility of granting compensation 
for unexhausted improvements as an alternative to the Napier Commissions 
proposals.Nevertheless, before this extreme was reached the Government were 
determined to find alternative solutions. By late 1884 their attempt to initiate 
proprietorial movement on the crofter question began to bear some fruit.
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III
The prime mover in the events which would lead to a conference of proprietors in 
Inverness in January 1885 was Donald Cameron of Lochiel. He was aware that the 
government had rejected the Report of the Royal Commission. He was also well 
aware that the agitation had not ceased with the publication of that Report. In 
response to this he considered that the government was moving slowly to the idea of 
legislation. He was determined that the proprietors should evolve a coherent position 
on the areas where they would find government interference acceptable and other 
areas where they would prefer to act alone. The alternative was a bill which the 
proprietors had had no input and which may act against their best interests. ^
Lochiel was aided in the task of setting up the Conference by the young Easter Ross 
landowner, R.C. Munro Ferguson, who had recently been elected to Parliament for 
Ross-shire, as a Liberal. A preliminary meeting was held at Beaufort Castle, home of 
Lord Lovat, an avowed Conservative, prior to the convening of the main meeting at 
the Caledonian Hotel in Inverness on 14th January 1885. They went to considerable 
lengths to persuade the government that there was a genuine desire amongst 
proprietors to come to terms with their tenants. They attempted to give the 
impression that land legislation was impossible. The only possible bases for 
legislation were the Napier Commission Report, which had been rejected, and the 
Irish Land Act, which was not relevant to the Highlands because, amongst other 
reasons, the value of tenants improvements was derisory. The only other possibility 
would be for the government to buy land and establish crofting communities. 
Clearly, this was a political non starter in Scotland in the mid 1880s. ^
The landlord body was not united. Firstly, there were divisions on the value of 
having a meeting and then there is every indication of a forthright debate on the 
Resolutions which had been prepared by Lochiel and Munro Ferguson and refined at 
the preliminary meeting. Despite the scene of these preliminary meetings, Lord 
Lovat wrote privately to another Inverness landowner that he considered a meeting 
"injudicious". He feared that it would only provoke opposition and harden attitudes 
in the crofter’s movement. ^
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The proposals which the landlords adopted at the Inverness meeting were threefold. 
They undertook to offer, where possible, more land to crofters. Secondly, leases of 
19 or 30 years, along with revised rents and compensation for improvements were to 
be volunteered to crofters who were not in arrear of rent. Thirdly, they reminded the 
Government that the Napier Commission had made a host of other 
recommendations, on fishing, transport, communications and emigration, which 
were far less controversial than those relating to land. It was in these areas which the 
proprietors envisaged a role for the government as a provider of loans to crofters and 
proprietors to aid with the development of the Highlands. Some landlords had 
already taken steps along these lines. The Duke of Sutherland, in response to 
demands from his tenantry had considered offering leases, arbitrated rents and low 
interest loans for improvements. The scheme was overtaken by events as the 
government attempted to legislate in 1885 and 1886.^
Some proprietors were sceptical of the relevance or necessity of these changes. 
Lochiel in setting up the meeting had been critical of the small number of proprietors 
who, by such actions as rent increases, had provoked agitation and soiled the 
reputation of the generality of landowners who, in Lochiel's view, were conducting 
the management of their estates in a responsible manner. In this category he included 
William Fraser the owner of the Kilmuir estate in North Skye. Fraser ranked high in 
the demonology of the crofter's movement. Close behind him was W.L. Winans, a 
North American who had purchased and rented swathes of land in central and west 
Inverness-shire to facilitate his indulgence in questionable sporting pursuits. ^  
MacLeod of MacLeod was also a sceptic. Like many landowners, his view was 
heavily prejudiced by the condition of his own estate. He pointed out to Lochiel that 
his resolutions were irrelevant. Crofters' improvements were not worth any 
compensation. More land and leases would not help as crofters did not have the 
financial capability or the technical aptitude to manage a sizeable piece of land. 
Reduced rents would be superfluous as existing crofter rents were already too low .^  
Despite the criticisms of such men they were still careful to send a representative to 
the meeting to ensure that they would be fully informed of the proceedings and their 
interests could be protected. In the case of Fraser and MacLeod, and the other major 
Skye proprietors, it was Alexander MacDonald, the Portree solicitor who handled 
their affairs. He received instructions to be cautious and not to commit himself to 
any scheme. Fraser believed peasant proprietorship would be preferable to wholesale 
intervention of the state. MacLeod instructed him to remind the meeting of the good 
relations between crofters and estate management and the continuing contribution of 
the estate to the social welfare of the crofters. ^
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Reaction in the press to the Resolutions of the Inverness meeting was predictable. 
Newspapers which had traditionally been supportive of proprietors, such as the 
Inverness Courier and the Northern Chronicle were impressed with the magnanimity 
of the landowners' offer to the crofters. Other titles which were more favourably 
disposed to the crofters were distinctly unimpressed with its conditional nature. The 
Celtic Magazine condemned them as "worthless" and "at least two years out of 
d a te "  Elements of the Scottish, as opposed to the Highland, press were able to 
take a more balanced view. The Glasgow Herald, while emphasising the importance 
of the meeting, was unsure how far the proposals would satisfy the crofters. They 
pointed to the lack of a land court and the question of the provision of facilities for 
stocking increased land, which the proprietors wanted to leave in the hands of the 
government, as potential problems.^ Certainly, the proposals which emerged from 
the Inverness meeting fell far short of the published demands of the Crofters' 
Movement. The London HLLRA had organised a conference in Dingwall in August 
of 1884. The proposals which were adopted at this meeting became known as the 
"Dingwall Programme". They included, immediate legislation to deprive the 
landlord of the power of eviction. The granting of the "three Fs" to be administered 
by a Land Court. The proprietors were never likely to approach this level of political 
concession. But it was noted at the time that the meeting was significant because it 
marked the first real concerted attempt by landowners to state their case. Until early 
1885 the Crofter s'movement had been allowed to take, and hold, the initiative in the 
agitation.
The significance of the Inverness meeting has been greatly underestimated by 
historians. They accord it little importance in the origins of later crofter legislation. 
James Hunter largely repeats the HLLRA view that it was too little too late. I.M.M. 
MacPhail mentions it only briefly in his account of the origins of the Crofters' 
A ct.^  However, 1884 had seen little government action to deal substantively with 
the crofter question. The year had been dominated politically with the publication 
and subsequent rejection of the Napier Commission Report. As has been noted, it 
was partly through government encouragement that the Inverness meeting had been 
called in the first place. Lochiel had informed Harcourt of his proposals for the 
Inverness meeting in December of 1884. After the meeting Harcourt sent the details 
of the proceedings to the Prime Minister. Harcourt explained that he had told Lochiel 
and the Duke of Argyll that it was probably too late for voluntary action. On the 
other hand, he felt there was no point in granting more land by legislative means. 
This would not help the crofters if they could not find the money to stock the
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additional land, and the government were resolutely opposed to providing money 
for the crofters. They felt that any loans to crofters to purchase stock could not be 
properly secured due to the fluctuations in the price of stock. The practice of 
common grazing also did not help in this regard as it made it difficult to establish the 
ownership of stock.^ J.B. Balfour, the Lord Advocate, advised the government that 
legislation could be contemplated granting security of tenure. This would necessitate 
a structure for the setting of a fair rent. Further, since crofters had largely undertaken 
their own improvements it was equitable that they should be compensated for them. 
This was not considered a very critical concession to make because of the low value 
of most crofter improvements.^
IV
So, by early 1885 it was clear that the government were committed to the idea of 
legislation for the crofters along the lines detailed by the Lord Advocate in his letter 
to the Home Secretary. The motivations for this are unclear. It has been argued that 
the crofters’ legislation was the result of a three cornered relationship between the 
government, the proprietors and the crofters' movement. The historian who offers 
this argument is dismissive of the contribution of the government and the 
proprietors. He argues that the factor which prompted the government to legislate 
was the threat of the crofters "physical repossession of the land and the eviction of 
the landlords' larger sporting tenants".^ Certainly, the government were worried 
about the agitation. However, it is important to appreciate that the crofters' demands 
were limited. They were not demanding the end of landlordism, rather, the 
redefinition of the landlord tenant relationship. The granting of some extra land, 
security of tenure, fair rents and compensation for improvements, demands which 
could all be accommodated within the existing social structure, fell far short of the 
usurpation of the landlords' social position. The government were determined to 
attempt to restore law and order, although they were worried about the prospects of 
doing this without running the risk of "increased agitation and excitement".^
The government weighed carefully the submissions of the landlords following the 
Inverness meeting. In private, as well as in public, they were dismissive of the role of 
the HLLRA. They contended that their views were far in advance, and hence not 
representative, of the majority of crofters. The other major problem for the 
government in dealing with the crofters' movement, certainly, before the electoral 
successes of November and December 1885, was to find a leader who could be
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regarded as representative of the movement. Charles Fraser- MacKintosh had 
hitherto been regarded as a respectable exponent of the crofters’ case. As the 
agitation proceeded doubts were entertained about his ability to convey the views of 
the generality of crofters.^
Certainly, it is correct to argue that the proprietors were slow to evolve a response to 
the agitation. However, it is possible that the reason for this is concerned with the 
limited nature of the agitation. Only a small number of landowners were seriously 
affected by the actions of the crofters. The agitation was confined to a number of 
specific areas. It is possible that many landowners felt there was no need to evolve a 
joint position because the agitation was either irrelevant to them or a mere irritant. 
The limited nature of the agitation ensured that it was not perceived as a threat to 
their social position. They had to be prompted by the government and men with a 
reputation for public service, such as Lochiel, before they convened at Inverness. 
Those who were affected by rent strikes and other tactics, such as Fraser of Kilmuir, 
received scant sympathy from other proprietors. "Landlordism" was not a monolithic 
force. It is also unhelpful to stereotype proprietors as a "vastly rich elite". ^  
Certainly there were immensely wealthy men among the Highland proprietors. 
However, many landowners were as far removed in wealth and social position from 
the likes of the Dukes of Argyll and Sutherland, as the crofters were from them.
Indeed, it can be argued that the threat of ill considered government action was what 
the landlords feared most. It was this which stirred them to action. One of the most 
important elements in the discussion between government and proprietors over 
legislation was the area to be covered by legislation. The reluctance to regard the 
crofters as a special case went back to the earliest days of the agitation. There was a 
fear that if special land legislation was applied to a crofter area, however defined, it 
would inevitably be applied to the rest of Scotland at a future date. Both the 
landlords and the government were keen to avoid any unnecessary alterations in 
general tenurial relations in Scotland. This was one of the best arguments for 
voluntary action in Lochiel's view. It was more flexible and could be applied as the 
need arose. A second worry in this area arose from the landlord^ proposals. They had 
demanded action to relieve poverty and encourage development in the Highlands, 
through emigration and government expenditure. The government did not appreciate 
why the Highlands should be regarded as worthy of special treatment in this regard. 
As Harcourt stated;
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The objection ... is, that if they are good enough for the 
Highlands they are good enough for the United Kingdom, and there 
is no possible reason why the state should emigrate a pauper in Skye 
more than a pauper in Spitalfields.^
This was an academic question as the government had no intention of legislating 
along these lines. The Highlands could be defined in terms of a special system of 
land tenure, although this was not an easy task. Some Liberals, including R.C.Munro 
Ferguson, the MP for Ross and Cromarty, felt it to be impossible. Harcourt and 
Balfour were unclear on how to resolve this difficulty. In a similar fashion to his 
basing of Irish land legislation on a supposed historical basis of customary rights to 
land, Gladstone proposed to extend this principle to the Highlands. He argued that 
the people had an historic title to the land which had been usurped by the proprietors 
for material gain. He regarded this as a "wrong" which ought to be redressed despite 
the passage of time since the clearances. He argued that the rights of property in the 
Highlands were not absolute but came with "engagements" in the shape of this 
history.
For it is, after all, this historical fact that constitutes the crofters' title 
to demand the interference of Parliament. It is not because they are 
poor, or because there are too many of them, or because they want 
more land to support their families, but because those whom, they 
represent had rights which they have been surreptitiously deprived to 
the injury of the community.
Clearly, a Victorian Liberal conscience, such as that of Gladstone, required an 
exceptional set of circumstances to justify an interference in property rights. The 
Prime Minister suggested that any new law could be applied to parishes with an 
established history of common pasturage within the previous century. When this 
definition became public it led to complacency among proprietors in the fringes of 
the Highlands, such as Caithness, that they would not be affected by the Bill. 53
By the end of January, once the views of the proprietors had been digested and the 
agitation showed no signs of decreasing the government began to consider the 
provisions of a crofter bill. The expectations of the crofters movement, fuelled by the 
"Dingwall Programme" had risen to new heights. Elements in the government argued 
that a Bill along moderate lines "would at all events clear the air and show the people 
what they have a reasonable prospect of ge t t i ng" .Th i s  was based on the
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assumption that the crofters would be satisfied with far less than the demands of the 
HLLRA. In some ways this was surprising. The government had seriously 
underestimated the crofters' expectations in 1883 and 1884 when the Napier 
Commission was appointed and when it reported.
If it had ever been in doubt, the rejection of Napier's proposals was confirmed in the 
drawing up of this bill. By mid February, Harcourt, with the assistance of Rosebery 
and J.B.Balfour, was ready to submit his bill to the cabinet. He warned the Prime 
Minister that an announcement would have to made as soon as possible as to the 
governments intentions. ^  When the Cabinet considered the draft Bill there was 
some dissent. The Marquis of Hartington, the Secretary for War condemned the 
measure, based on security of tenure, rent revaluation and compensation for 
improvements, as "too much". Demonstrating the diversity of the Liberal cabinet, 
Joseph Chamberlain derided it as "too little".^ Chamberlain was well known for his 
anti landlord views. At Inverness in the course of the 1885 election campaign he 
called for the institution of landlordism to be carefully examined. He condemned the 
Highland landlords as "irresponsible" and their conduct of estate management as a 
mixture of "extortion and exaction" . ^  By late March, or early April, the Bill had 
been refined and came before the Cabinet once again. Even at this late stage the 
discussion still centred on the geographical line within which it would operate. 
Gladstone's "historicist" definition was finalised. Harcourt was given the authority to 
present his Bill to Parliament when the opportunity arose. ^  Rumours reached the 
Highlands of a moderate measure "far short of the crofters expectations".^ 
However, it was not until the middle of May that the Bill was presented^ to 
Parliament by the Lord Advocate. Balfour spent much of his speech defending the 
concept of special legislation for the Highlands. He pointed out that in the rest of 
Scotland land was held by tenants who entered into free contracts with landowners. 
In the Highlands, historically, freedom of contract did not prevail. Other 
peculiarities included the smallness of the holdings, the practice of tenant 
improvements and common pasturage. The 1885 Bill granted security of tenure to all 
crofters. Valuators were to be appointed to fix rents. Compensation for 
improvements was to be made available. However, no compulsory provisions for 
granting more land to crofters were included. This was justified by the apparent 
willingness, as signified by the Inverness resolutions, of proprietors to voluntarily 
give more land to their tenants.
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Reaction to the Bill was diverse. Perhaps the most common description of it was 
"moderate”. Although in some cases this adjective was used more in criticism than 
approbation.^ At the extremes opinion was predictably polarised. Supporters of the 
crofters’ movement, such as the Oban Times and the Scottish Highlander, described 
it variously as "inadequate" and "worthless".Dedicated critics of the crofters' case, 
such as the Scotsman and The Northern Chronicle, attacked, not only the details of 
the legislation, but the very idea of legislating on behalf of special g ro u p s .T h e  
crofters'movement attacked the Bill because they felt it was descended directly from 
the proposals which had been made by the proprietors in Inverness in January. The 
principal criticism which was made was that the Bill made insufficient provision for 
the settlement of the principal grievance of the crofters; the need for more land .^  
Nevertheless, the Conservatives were "perplexed", to use Arthur Balfour's 
expression, to know how to respond. Balfour had been delegated by the Conservative 
party, at the suggestion of some of the Highland proprietors to coordinate the 
opposition to the Bill. However, he was aware that outright opposition would not 
advance the Conservative cause in the Highlands. Further, there was the possibility 
that the Bill would take the heat out of the agitation and make it easier, politically, 
for the government to enforce the law with vigour. All this went against the 
Conservative grain, which was to oppose a Bill which violated property rights and 
perpetuated crofting conditions.^ These tactical considerations were also evident at 
the local level in the Highlands. The Commissioners of Supply in Inverness- shire 
discussed the possibility of sending a petition to the government in support of the 
Bill. This horrified some of the more partisan Tories in the County, such as Major 
Fraser of Kilmuir and Lord Lovat.^ However, the Bill did not reach the statute 
book. The Liberal government fell unexpectedly on the 8th of June. Irish nationalist 
MPs, dissatisfied with Liberal coercive measures in Ireland, supported the 
Conservatives on an amendment to the Budget and brought Gladstone's second 
administration to an end
The Conservatives were forced reluctantly to enter a period of minority caretaker 
government. New electoral rolls had to be prepared for a general election, the first 
under the new franchise granted under the third Reform Act, which would be held in 
November and December. There has been some speculation as to Conservative 
intentions of bringing in their own Crofters Bill in this period. Even if some thought 
was given to the subject, no substantive proposals emerged. The first Secretary for 




The 1885 elections have been hailed by historians as the most significant the 
Highlands had ever seen. The Crofters’ movement put up candidates in all the 
crofting counties and the Northern Burghs. 5 crofter MPs were returned. The result 
caused much annoyance in Liberal as well as Conservative ranks. In Ross and 
Cromarty, the defeated Liberal, R.C. Munro Ferguson, declared that he had been 
defeated by the votes of "illiterates". Leading Liberals were warned not to oppose 
Crofter candidates at future elections.
Gladstone resumed office at the beginning of February, he had a majority courtesy of 
the 86 Irish nationalist MPs pledged to support him after his conversion to Home 
Rule. Gladstone's short lived third administration was dominated by Home Rule and 
the Liberal split. However, a Crofters' Bill was the main piece of Scottish legislation 
on the agenda. The new Scottish Secretary, G.O. Trevelyan, urged the Prime 
Minister to act quickly. The ground had been prepared by the Bill of the preceding 
year and there was every chance of getting the Bill through if room could be found 
for it on the Parliamentary timetable. The controversial issues, such as the 
geographical limits of the Bill had been settled in 1885. This allowed the cabinet to 
deal promptly with Trevelyan's Bill, which was closely modelled on Balfour’s. The 
Bill received its first reading on the 25th of February, only three weeks after the 
formation of the government. ^
The Bill appeared to muted comment compared to its predecessor. The only 
appreciable differences were the establishment of a permanent Land Court compared 
to the Valuators of 1885 and the provisions for enlargements to the grazing land of 
crofters were stronger. The latter innovation did not impress the pro crofter press, 
which lamented the inadequacies of the Bill, but to a lesser degree than in 1885.71
The Crofter MPs, of whom so much was expected, proved to be impotent in the 
debate on the new crofter's bill. The debates in 1886 were not as vigorous as those of 
the previous year. The issues had been well aired then and there was little appetite 
for a full rehearsal of the arguments. Certainly, they were able to put pressure on the 
government to have the enlargement provisions of the Bill strengthened. However, 
the government was able to successfully resist such pressure. By the time the Bill 
passed its parliamentary stages and received Royal assent in June, prior to the fall of 
the government, organs of the crofters' movement were condemning it as useless. 
The Crofter MPs had probably arrived in Parliament a year too late to meaningfully
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influence the content of crofter legislation. This is in addition to their small voting 
power. Certainly, they had the reciprocal support of the Pamellites. However, the 
latter were unlikely to indulge in any action which would endanger the vulnerable 
Liberal administration which held the prospect of Home Rule for Ireland. ^
The Crofters Holdings (Scotland) Act of 1886 was modelled on the Irish Land Acts 
of 1870 and 1881. Crofters were defined as those year to year tenants, ie, those 
without a lease, paying rent of less than £30 and residing in a crofting parish. Those 
parishes, within the seven crofting counties, which could demonstrate the existence 
of crofters with common grazing in the period since 1806 qualified. The Act granted 
security of tenure to all such crofters, subject to the conditions that they paid their 
rent on time, maintained their holdings and buildings to an acceptable standard and 
did not subdivide or sublet their crofts. A Crofters’ Commission was set up to set fair 
rents and adjudicate on arrears.^ The Commission also set the levels of 
compensation for unexhausted improvements when a crofter left his holding. The 
Act also allowed a croft to pass at death to an heir at law. The crofter could not 
assign his tenancy to any other individual. The enlargement provisions allowed a 
group of five crofters to apply to the land court for extra grazing land. This land had 
to be contiguous to their holding and be under the same landlord. A host of 
conditions on the types of land available for enlargements ensured that these 
provisions were largely redundant. It is important to realise that the act created 
crofters not crofts. If an individual fulfilled all the necessary conditions on the 25th 
of June 1886, the day the Act received Royal Assent, he would be admitted to its 
protection. If these conditions only became applicable at a later date he could not be 
defined as a crofter. Crofter status could only be passed on to a legal heir and not to 
any third party. So, the Act created a highly static position. The crofter area was 
unlikely to expand under this regime, indeed, it could very well contract.
One historian has described the reaction of the "propertied classes" to the new act as 
"inevitable and unimportant...shrieks of alarm".^ Certainly some outrage was 
evident. MacKintosh of MacKintosh described the Act as "detestable" and Fraser of 
Kilmuir declared that he would rather have his estates bought over completely than 
suffer the dual ownership proposed by the B ill.^  However, most were resigned to 
the passing of the Bill*1fie events of 1885 had prepared them for the inevitability of a 
crofter Bill. Even such a resolute opponent of the concepts behind the Bill as the 
Duke of Argyll felt that its passing could help to restore normality on his estate.^
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V I
The Crofters' Act has been viewed in a number of different ways by historians. 
Indeed, an interesting historiographical tradition has arisen. Essentially, there are two 
schools of thought. Those who have considered it in the context of the legacy of the 
clearances and the rhetoric of the crofters' agitation of the 1880s, are impressed with 
its contribution to social justice. Thus, Eric Richards can claim ihat the Act 
represented "unambiguous gains for the crofters at the expense of the landlords; the 
crofters act was a great victory for the common people". James Hunter, in a similar 
vein, argues that it represented a watershed in which the power of tie proprietor 
went into terminal decline. Iain Fraser Grigor argues that the critical factor in the 
making of the act was the crofters agitation and that it represented "a tremendous 
achievement for the crofters";
From the rich and the powerful, the common people of the Highhnds
had forced concessions to meet the grievances of generations.^
What has been demonstrated here has a different emphasis. Certainly, the crofters' 
agitation was not unimportant. It had helped to move the issue through its different 
phases. From being seen as an administrative problem to being considered 
politically; or from being perceived as a component of the genenl, nationwide, 
tenurial framework, to being recognised as a special case worthy of exceptional 
treatment. This was their biggest achievement over the landlords. Their most 
sophisticated and politically aware spokesman, Cameron of Lochiel, \ms perpetually 
concerned about the problems which this type of recognition would leid to in the 
future. The process by which the government was convinced thai tie agitation 
concealed greater grievances and that it could be quelled only by legi;laton is more 
complicated than a simple reaction to the lawlessness of the crofters' war.
The government were aware that neither the crofters' movement, north* landlords, 
represented a monolithic force. Most of 1884 was taken up with an attempt to 
discover what level of concession would satisfy the generality of the croters, rather 
than silence the vocal activists of the crofters movement. A further anc pa-allel trend 
in this period was an attempt to discover if voluntary concessions by th  landlords 
would be enough to obviate legislation. The dialogue with respectabfe bndlordism 
helped to isolate these proprietors, like Fraser of Kilmuir, who werecoisidered to 
have contributed to the agitation by their harsh estate managemert. fhus, it is
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difficult to see the Crofters Act as merely a product of a two dimensional conflict 
between a justly aggrieved crofting population and a vindictive set of proprietors. 
The Act was the product of a government calculation of what was necessary and 
possible. The hiatus created by the fall of Gladstone's second administration, the 
period of Conservative caretaker government and the subsequent re-election of the 
Liberals, did much to take the heat out of the question. The 1886 Bill had a rapid 
passage through parliament. Even the arrival of the Crofter MPs could not deflect the 
government from its course.
Other historians, who have taken a more critical attitude to the rhetoric of the 
crofters movement, are less impressed with the Act as an instalment of social justice. 
As has been noted, the Act created a static structure of land holding, with only 
limited opportunity for development. These historians have been able to see beyond 
the "justice rhetoric" of the croftei s'movement to a more complex appreciation of 
the legacy of the Act. Although the Act may have made eviction almost impossible, 
this was a phyrric victory. The forces which had generated the clearances had gone 
into reverse and the exploitation of crofters land for commercial purposes was a 
muted threat. The new development of commercialised sport posed a much less 
direct threat to the crofters and their land.^ These historians have been concerned to 
note that the Act, and the subsequent resistance to its fundamental alteration, served 
to perpetuate congestion. The method by which the croft was deemed heritable, and 
the prohibition of subdivision, created a dilemma for the crofting community. It 
meant that the new structure could only provide for a portion of the succeeding 
generation of crofters.
For better, or worse, the Crofters Act was the defining feature of the next 40 years of 
Highland history. To properly understand its legacy, an investigation of to what 
extent the policy developments over that period represented a refinement of the 
status quo or a challenge to it, is critical.
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CHAPTER TWO.
The Crofter's Commission, 1886-1912.
Section 17 of the Crofter's Holdings (Scotland) Act, 1886, provided for the 
appointment of three Commissioners whose job it would be to administer the Act. 
The Commission had an active life of approximately twenty five years. This was 
much longer than other institutions, like the Congested Districts Board which will be 
examined in later chapters. Its very longevity makes it stand out. Consequently, it is 
important to place the various phases of the Commissions' work in the context of the 
ongoing debate on Highland policy which characterised this period.
Over the next twenty five years they travelled throughout the crofting counties fixing 
fair rents, granting enlargements, awarding compensation for improvements and 
dealing with the other legal and administrative points which were bound to arise in 
the working of an act for which there was so little precedent. It is the intention of this 
chapter to look at some of the political issues which surrounded the Commission, 
notably, the question of its geographic movements. This issue is at first sight 
mundane, but the debate raises questions of how the government intended to use the 
Commission as an element in its Highland policy. An opportunity is afforded to 
examine the accusations of collusion between between influential landowners, 
particularly the Dukes of Sutherland and Argyll and Lady Gordon Cathcart, the 
proprietor of Benbecula, South Uist and Barra, and the Secretary for Scotland who 
had the final authority in the movements of the Commission. The first amendments 
to the Act which took place in 1887, and which concerned the circumstances in 
which a crofter could have the protection of the Act removed for non payment of 
rent before the Commissioners had sat and declared his fair rent, raise further 
questions worthy of scrutiny.
The proposals advanced for the reform of the Commission in 1888 will also be 
explored. This issue arose under pressure of criticisms of the slow progress of the 
Commission. The changes in the role of the Commission, and the nature of its 
activities as time passed, and the reactions of both crofters and proprietors to the 
Commission are further issues to be analysed. Finally, some attempt will be made to 
examine the decisions which the Commissioners made with particular reference to 
fair rent adjudications and applications for enlargement.
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The appointment of the three Commissioners was governed by section 17 of the Act. 
One had to be a Gaelic speaker and another an advocate of the Scottish Bar of at 
least ten years standing. Although the two men who served as Chairman of the 
Commission, David Brand and Neil Kennedy, were also the legal members there was 
no provision that this had to be so. The legal member was to receive a salary of 
£1200 and be required to give up practice at the Bar; although if he was a Sheriff the 
Treasury demanded that the total sum he would be allowed to draw from his double 
capacity would be £2000. The two lay members were to receive a salary of £800 and 
were required to give up all private business. *
The first Chairman of the Commission was David Brand who was currently Sheriff 
of Ayr. This was a classic Liberal appointment. Brand, the son of a Glasgow 
merchant, had no connections with the Highlands, familial, professional or 
intellectual. He had been an active Liberal, notably in Gladstone's "Mid-Lothian 
Campaign" prior to the general election of 1880, and had served as an Advocate 
Depute in the second Gladstone ministry. The other appointments provided some 
balance, both in terms of Highland connections and knowledge of agriculture. Mr 
Peter MacIntyre, a farmer from Easter Rossv provided the requisite knowledge of 
Gaelic. William Hosack a land valuator and agent, currently practicing in Oban, was 
the third member. William MacKenzie, a well known figure in journalistic and 
Gaelic circles in Invemess^was appointed Principal Clerk of the C om m ission. ^
These appointments were made, and the Commissioners met for the first time, before 
the Act received Royal Assent in June 1886. This haste may have been stimulated 
by an awareness that the Commission would soon face a huge workload. However, 
there may have been a political element in the decision to make the appointments 
before the Government changed. Because of the lack of precedent for their work 
the personnel appointed to the Commission would be all important in determining its 
nature. This is not to argue that the commission was seen by the incoming 
Conservative government as partisan, indeed, throughout its existence the 
Commission in general, and Brand in particular, retained the confidence of 
Governments of both parties.^
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The first potentially controversial issue to face the Commission was the confirmation 
of Crofting Parishes under Section 34 of the Act. The qualifications were the 
existence, in the 80 years prior to the Act, of year to year tenants paying less than 
thirty pounds rent, and holdings with a right of common pasturage. Difficulties were 
confined to the fringes of the Crofting Counties, the Marquis of Breadalbane 
protested about the inclusion of the parishes of Kilbrandon and Kilchattan, and 
Kilninver and Kilmelfort. Similarly the Earl of Cawdor questioned the decision 
concerning Arderseir and Petty. ^  The greatest controversy came from Orkney. The 
island proprietors were violently opposed to their determination as crofting parishes. 
The dispute in all these cases concerned the status of the crofters' right of common 
grazing. The Orkney proprietors argued that there was no right "merely a tolerance". 
The Secretary for Scotland agreed that no written agreements had existed in this or 
in many other cases, and that although no "right" in legal terms could be recognised, 
the usage would have to be accepted as a de facto right. ^
The initial political issues which faced the government concerning the new Crofter's 
Commission were; where should it begin its work and what were to be the criteria 
which would govern its movements? Because the Commission was not merely an 
administrative body, but an instrument of public policy, and because the Highlands 
had been in a state of unrest for a number of years, there were political issues for the 
government to ponder here. If the government hoped that the Commission would 
have a calming influence in troubled areas clearly it would be sensible to give areas 
like Skye, Tiree, the Outer Hebrides, and Western Sutherland immediate attention. 
One drawback from this approach was that the government left itself open to 
accusations of rewarding lawlessness, and ignoring the claims of crofters who had 
conducted themselves peaceably. This point was made with reference to 
Shetland, and more generally when the Commission spent time in Skye and Tiree in 
1887.®
There were competing claims for the early attention of the Commission. Skye, due 
to the intensity of the agitation and the likelihood that proprietors would soon take 
legal action for the recovery of arrears, and Caithness due to the promptness of the 
applications. A factor as simple as the weather may have precluded an autumn visit 
to Skye. In the event the Commissioners began their work in Eastern Sutherland. The
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low value of arrears and general absence of lawlessness suggest that this area might 
have been low on the Commission's agenda. Some suspected the Duke of 
Sutherland's influence with Lord Lothian, Balfour's successor as Secretary for 
Scotland, to be the crucial factor.^
It has been argued that in the longer term the Commission helped to pacify the 
Highlands, but in the short term uncertainty about its movements fuelled the 
agitation.** Certainly, the early movements of the Commission provide enough 
evidence to suggest that as well as a judicial role the Commission also had a 
"policing" role to play. In March 1887 they began work in Skye and after leaving 
Skye work was continued in Tiree. Both islands had seen military expeditions in the 
course of the previous twelve months. Arthur Balfour made clear in a confidential 
memorandum to Alexander MacDonald, factor to Colonel Fraser of Kilmuir, who 
was considering legal action for the recovery of arrears, that it would be politic for 
them to wait until the Commission had adjudicated in the fair rent applications 
before they took such drastic action^ adding that he could not see any circumstances 
in which the Government would be likely to sanction the use of military forces to 
help with the recovery of rent. Balfour was well aware that military force could do 
little to deal with the rent issue, which was the most pressing consideration, only the 
Commission had the facilities for such a task. Brand later pointed out that this had 
been one of the most important contributions of the Commission, describing its 
ability to bring "tranquillity" in place of "agitation and discontent". William Ivory, 
Sheriff of Inverness, thought that even just giving notice of the Commission's 
intention to visit a particular area would "please the crofters and induce them to be 
quiet
The Commission had given the government wider scope in its policy towards the 
Highlands. Military force had been useful in the past but in many ways it was a 
limited instrument of policy, tending to create resentment and alienation and 
certainly lacking the problem solving capacities of the Commission.
One problem was that the Commission could not be in more than one place at a 
time. From 1886 to around 1892 its correspondence is replete with letters from a 
comprehensive selection of proprietors asking, demanding, and in some cases even 
pleading that the Commission should be sent to their estates forthwith. In a 
historiographical sense this is interesting. Contemporary writers described the 
Commission as a scandalous usurpation of proprietorial rights. Reginald MacLeod 
lamented their "despotic power" and described their cancellation of arrears as
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"confiscation". Scott Moncrieff Penney, describing the sections of the Act referring 
to the Crofters Commission, describes them as "iniquitous", and pointed out that the 
Commission has the power to cancel debts which are due to the proprietor "for the 
enjoyment of his property". Modem writers describe the Commission in terms 
which imply that its decisions were a victory for the crofters against the will of the 
proprietor. This is stated despite the clamour by landlords for the Commission to 
adjudicate on their estates. One argues that the Crofters Commission was 
"responsive to Crofters' demands ... especially when these demands have been 
vociferously expressed." ^  Certainly, the various proprietors who asked for the 
Commission to be sent to their estates were acting pragmatically. Demanding a visit 
of the Commission did not amount to an admission that rents were too high or the 
burden of arrears too heavy. Sir John Campell Orde, the proprietor of North Uist, 
and one of the most prolific correspondents to the Commission, argued that the 
crofters on his estate were determined to pay nothing until the Commission had 
decided their fair rent:
It is plain to me that in the great majority of cases, the applications are
made with a view to get quit of the arrears, and the crofters have a
distinct interest in letting them increase.
He attributed this tendency on the part of the crofters to the "liberal" view of rents 
taken by the the Commissioners in their Skye decisions. Some felt that a possible 
way round this problem would be to limit the Commissioners powers with regard to 
arrears to those which had arisen before the passing of the Act, because,
As long as crofters are lead to understand and believe that that their
arrears will be struck off by the Commission, they will not pay. ^
In Lewis, Lady Matheson's factor found that the crofters were "resolved not to pay 
until the Commissioners come, and they say so openly". The proprietrix felt that 
"were a single township even dealt with, the present discontent would be much 
allayed". On the Cromartie estate in Ross-shire, the factor made a similar complaint 
to the Commission when requesting their presence on the estate. There can be no 
doubt that these proprietors, and Lady Matheson in particular, faced massive 
problems with arrears of rent. But demands were being made by others who did not 
face the same kind of difficulties. Campbell of Jura, on whose estate there were only 
14 holdings to be dealt with asked in April 1888 if the Commissioners could be sent 
to the island. He claimed that no rent was being paid and felt that nothing but the
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decision of the Commission would satisfy the crofters. Demands were made on the 
Commission from proprietors in all the Crofting Counties. In effect, the Commission 
was in an impossible position. Its movements, regardless of their nature, were sure to 
occasion displeasure from some quarter. Despite pressure to go to Orkney 
throughout 1887, when they eventually did go in 1888, among the responses were 
angry letters from MacLeod of MacLeod expressing regret that the Commissioners 
should have gone there instead of Skye.^
The issue which underlay this controversy was that of whose influence was being 
brought to bear on the Secretary for Scotland? Dugald MacDonald the Aberdeen 
Solicitor who represented the South Uist crofters before the Commission, stated 
quite bluntly that the crofters had gained the impression that the Secretary for 
Scotland’s power to fix the sittings of the Commission was "only a new form of 
landlord tyranny". He made wider allegations, pointing out that it was the 
proprietrix, Lady Gordon Cathcart, who had made the fair rent application, as she 
was perfectly entitled to do. In this, and in the fact that the Commission had been 
sent to South Uist at a time when the majority of Crofters were allegedly absent from 
their holdings at the fishing, he detected a landlord conspiracy. This latter allegation 
was proved to be unfounded when the vast majority of crofters attended the sittings 
of the Commission in person. Such allegations did not impress the Commission, the 
proprietrix's agent, who condemned MacDonald as an agitator, or indeed the 
Government when they were raised in parliament. ^  Nevertheless, applications by 
proprietors to fix fair rents tended to cause problems leaving crofters with the feeling 
that they had not been consulted. Crofters on the Island of Coll may have been 
expressing similar sentiments when they argued somewhat dramatically, that a 
"sinister influence" had been brought to bear on the Commission with regard to the 
matter of a visit to Coll. Brand was quite clear in his statements as to the issue of the 
proper criteria for deciding movements, pointing out in 1887 that "public interest 
must come above the wishes of individual landlords".^
The evidence for direct proprietorial influence is circumstantial. However, the Dukes 
of Argyll and Sutherland would appear to have been influential with Lord Lothian, 
the Secretary for Scotland. The Commission spent a good deal of time in Sutherland 
and went to Tiree directly after Lord Lothian received a letter from the Duke of 
Argyll requesting such a visit. The Duke then took advantage of the facility for 
proprietors to apply for fair rents to be set, in an attempt to induce the Commission 
to visit Tiree in 1887. Other proprietors were equally lacking in influence, notably 
Sir John Campbell Orde, whose many letters to the Commission failed to elicit such
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a direct response. Skene Edwards and Bilton, agents for Lady Gordon Cathcart, also 
appeared to carry weight with the Scottish Office, they were asked to lay before the 
Secretary for Scotland information as to the most convenient time for the 
Commission to visit South Uist and Barra. ^
Every proprietor who wrote to the Commission seemed to think that his case was the 
most pressing. However, the most persistent and concerted pressure on the 
Commission came from an organised group of Skye proprietors. They were not 
dissuaded from their demands by the fact that the Commission had spent a 
considerable amount of time in Skye during 1887. In November 1887 they presented 
a memorial to the Secretary for Scotland. Familiar arguments about deliberate 
withholding of rent on the part of crofters who had not yet had their fair rent fixed, 
and the unfairness of the Commission leaving Skye without dealing with all the 
applications were aired. The memorialists went on to argue that the government 
should be consistent in its attitude to arrears of rent on the part of crofters, and 
arrears of rates and other public burdens on the part of proprietors. The military 
expedition in the winter of 1886-7 had been concerned with collecting arrears of 
rates, the proprietors pointed out that;
It is a notorious fact that that for the last three or four years landed 
proprietors in Skye received almost no rent from crofters, while at the 
same time they are forced, under threat of legal proceedings, to pay 
the rates, taxes and other public burdens, including interest on 
mortgages exigible from their estates, just as if they had recovered 
their rents in full.
In conclusion, they pointed out that the agitation had begun, and had been conducted 
with the greatest intensity and the greatest cost to proprietors in Skye. Therefore, 
demonstrating that "the crofter cases in the Island of Skye should be first disposed 
of." In 1888 they renewed the pressure with appeals from a number of individual 
proprietors to Lord Lothian. ^
These problems were caused by an unforeseen side effect of the policing role of the 
Crofters' Commission. For this policy to be effective the Commission had to cover 
as wide an area as possible as quickly as possible. This meant that areas had to be 
left unfinished as it was more important that the Commission should move on and 
establish its presence in as many areas as possible. This pattern is clear from the 
early movements of the Commission. After Sutherland they went to Skye in the
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Spring of 1887, left without finishing all the cases, proceeded to Tiree, another 
troubled area but one in which the Commission's work was completed at one visit, 
before going to South Uist, where its work was left unfinished, North Uist, 
unfinished again, before proceeding to Caithness from where the first applications 
had been received. There was method in these meanderings though, the Commission 
would have its maximum effect if it sat prior to a rent deadline, if it missed such a 
deadline its effect would be blunted. For example, they decided that despite not 
having completed all the cases in North Uist in September 1887 it was more 
important that they should proceed to Caithness before the Martinmas term .^  
Further, by adjudicating in a proportion of the cases in each area they would set a 
standard by which crofters and proprietors could come to private agreements. 
Section 5 of the Act made specific provision for such agreements. However, this 
hope did not come to fruition in many cases. One case where agreement was 
reached was on the Skaebost estate in Skye.^
Lachlan MacDonald of Skaebost was an exceptional proprietor, capable of grand 
gestures to his tenants - invitations for them to value their own crofts, and 
cancellations of arrears. However, as a small and wealthy proprietor with an income 
independent from his estate he could afford such generosity. Large landowners 
dependant on big rentals with heavy arrears could not.^0 This is not to say that more 
fair rents could not have been "settled out of court", this did happen in places like 
Lochaber, or Strathpeffer. It was not so likely on estates where the agitation had 
been conducted with vigour, creating a climate of mistrust between the estate 
managements and the tenants. ^
A second problem resulting from the tendency of the Commission to leave areas 
unfinished was the fact that it created two classes of tenants; those who had had their 
fair rents fixed and those who had not. This situation caused some bitterness within 
the crofting community. It was reported that jealousy had arisen on the part of 
crofters who felt that they had not received such favourable attention from the 
commissioners as others, and further, that there would be difficulty in getting
payment of rent from those crofters whose cases had not yet been heard by the
•  •  22commission.
It is possible to conclude at this point that the movements and activities of the 
Commission in the early years after the passing of the Act were governed by factors 
wider than ease of administration. The Commission was a component of public 
policy and as such it was involved in the task which the Conservative government
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saw as their principal one with regard to the Highlands; that of keeping the peace and 
stifling the demands of the crofters for more reforms of the land laws. Other aspects 
of this policy included their attempted emigration schemes, programmes for the 
development of the Highlands through the extension of the communications network 
and the provision of employment through public works.
II
As with any new piece of legislation, the 1886 Act had teething troubles. One 
concerned the period between the application to the Commission by a crofter with 
arrears and the decision of the Commission in his case. This had caused problems 
from an early date. In a case in Portree Sheriff Court in October 1886 it had been 
declared that a landlord had no powers to undertake proceedings for recovery of rent 
in this period. Ivory felt this to have been an "unfortunate decision". He feared it 
would induce crofters not to pay rent until the Commissioners had sat. The case 
reached the Court of Session where it was decided that although the Act protected a 
crofter from eviction in this period it did not prevent the landlord from taking action 
to recover the debt.^ Further problems were encountered over Section 1 which laid 
out the statutory conditions which had to be fulfilled by crofters if they were to 
receive security of tenure. The sixth of these conditions was that a crofter would lose 
the protection of the Act if he was declared a notour bankrupt. Quite soon there were 
accusations that some landlords were using this provision to deliberately deprive 
crofters of the protection of the Act, before the Commissioners had even had a 
chance to determine their fair rent. The tactic allegedly being employed was that the 
proprietor would institute proceedings whereby a crofters effects, including his 
stock, would be sold to raise money to settle his debt of overdue rent. This would 
have the double effect of putting him in a position where he was declared a notour 
bankrupt, and also making it difficult for him to continue working his holding. These 
accusations concerned the government, who felt that such proceedings were contrary 
to the "spirit and intention" of the ac t.^  Investigations by the Commission pointed 
to Caithness as the area where most of the problems were taking place. In particular 
the estates of Thrumster, Forse, and Latheron. The events on these estates had lead to 
the crofters becoming "very indignant" and the government clearly saw the need to 
legislate.However, there were other pressures on the government. Arthur Balfour, 
the Secretary for Scotland, summed up the situation neatly;
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To deprive landlords altogether of the power of recovering their rents 
and and arrears during the two or three years which will probably 
elapse before the Crofters Commission have completed their work 
would be manifestly unjust At the same time to give them 
unrestricted power to deprive their crofters of all benefits from the 
Act may lead not only to great injustice, but also to considerable local 
disturbance and political difficulty.^
1887 saw an amending act to give the Commission powers to sist (temporarily halt) 
proceedings for the sale of a crofters effects for the recovery of arrears. The 
Commissioners were duty bound to consider the circumstances in which the arrears 
had arisen. Modem writers on this issue have interpreted this Act as a direct response 
to the threat of proprietors pursuing their tenants for the recovery of arrears prior to 
the adjudication of the C o m m i s s i o n . ^  This was a component of the Government’s 
calculation, but it was only one of a number. The hope was not only that the 
Commission would grant sists, and thereby prevent any local difficulties, but that it 
would quash, and be seen to quash, applications for sists from crofters who were 
deliberately withholding arrears. It was not only the Government which espoused 
this position, Brand advocated it strongly;
A few instances of refusal by the Commissioners to sist proceedings 
for arrears which they were satisfied that the tenant ought to pay up, 
in whole, or in part, will tend to prevent the improper withholding of 
rents.
So, again, it is possible to argue that the Crofters' Commission and the Government 
were not simply responding to the demands of crofters, as some modem writing 
writing has implied. The Government was using the Crofters' Commission as an 
authoritative body among proprietors, and crofters, to help in its re-establishment 
of "normal" social relations in the Highlands.
If this policy was to be successful the Commission had to proceed very quickly, and 
it soon became apparent that, as originally constituted, it was incapable of doing so. 
In its first year of operation the Commission received 8906 applications to fix fair 
rents but only managed to deal with 1767. By the time of the issue of its second 
annual report it had a backlog of 7621 fair rent applications.*^ Under the Act the 
Commission could only sit as one court, with all three Commissioners present, or 
alternatively, under Section 23 of the Act the Commissioners could delegate the
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duties of the Commission to two Commissioners. The value of this was that the 
hearing of evidence and the inspection of holdings could take place simultaneously. 
In Sutherland and Skye all three Commissioners sat in Court, but by the time they 
reached South Uist, in the late summer and autumn of 1887, they found it necessary 
to use the provisions of Section 23. However, even this was not sufficient to speed 
the Commission up to the required degree, and as we have seen they were under 
pressure from proprietors.
The government considered a number of proposals. Firstly, the appointment of two 
additional commissioners, the object being to enable two courts to work 
simultaneously^ vith  an eye to maintaining continuity one of the present 
Commissioners was to sit in each court. The second proposal before the government, 
one made by G.B. Clarke, the Crofters MP for Caithness, was to cancel the clause in 
the Act which provided that two Commissioners should form a quorum. This would 
enable each of the present Commissioners to sit in a court by himself aided by two 
assessors. Lord Lothian, the Secretary for Scotland, privately considered a third 
scheme; appointing three new Commissioners, who, with the addition of the three 
existing ones, would form three Commissions of two members each. One of these 
Commissions would concentrate solely on applications from the Islands. He felt that 
this would commend itself to all parties. It is interesting to note that Brand strongly 
favoured the first of these schemes arguing that it would "double the rate of 
progress". In the event the proposal which was embodied in the Act was Clarke's.*^
It is difficult to say from the available evidence why this course of action was taken. 
Lothian did admit that it was the proposal favoured by the Lord Advocate, and it was 
the cheapest option, and hence attractive to the Treasury. Retrospectively, it was felt 
to have been a good decision, leading to;
a certain consistency of procedure, and uniformity of judgement
which greatly added to the weight of the C o m m is s io n e r s .* ^
Not all those with experience of the Commission agreed with this perception. In fact, 
opinion was varied. The next section of this chapter will examine the reactions of 
different groups to its work. The varied newspaper comment, the differing reactions 
of crofters and proprietors, and the interesting reactions of estate managers and 
factors will all be considered.
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III
Reaction to the Commission began even before it held its first sitting. Initial 
criticism came from a predictable source. The Scottish Highlander, an Inverness 
newspaper, run by Alexander MacKenzie and more a mouthpiece of the HLLRA 
than a newspaper of record, condemned the composition of the Commission as 
"objectionable” and labelled the individual Commissioners "landlord nominees". 
However, when the Commissioners' initial decisions were made known the attitude 
changed somewhat. The reductions of rent and the cancellation of arrears in Skye 
were held to be a justification of the agitation and were generally welcomed. It is 
most difficult to gauge the reactions of Crofters to the decisions of the Commission. 
The Commission felt that the fair rents fixed in Skye were giving "every 
satisfaction" The Oban Times, a paper with a similar perspective to MacKenzie's, 
followed the same editorial line.^  However, the Scottish Highlander carried many 
reports of meetings of Crofters where the Commission and all it works were 
condemned. The objectivity of these reports can be questioned. The Scottish 
Highlander of July 14th 1887 contained a report of a mass meeting of clrofters and 
cottars at Kilpheder in South Uist. The local policeman at Lochboisdale made 
enquiries and discovered that this "mass meeting" was in fact attended by only a 
dozen people. Similar sources suggest other meetings were exaggerated by the 
press.^
Prior to their initial decisions no one was sure what form the decisions of the 
Commission would take. Arthur Balfour, on the strength of reports he had received 
from the Highlands did not feel that the crofters were over rented. On the other hand, 
there is no doubt that the Commission was a major part of the Crofters* expectations 
for justice and that its decisions were keenly watched all over the Highlands. ^  One 
author has gone so far as to argue that it created the belief among crofters that "the 
millenium had come".^ From the evidence of Ivory's intelligence gathering network 
it is possible to gauge the differing reactions. In Uist the Commission did appear to 
have the desired calming influence. In Skye where the agitation had been more 
intense and the expectations possibly higher, the reaction was more mixed. It was 
reported that the rent collections conducted following the fixing of fair rents were 
not an unqualified success.
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One factor which played a part in determining the differing reactions to the 
Commission was the nature of the hearings in that particular area. The Commission 
was a highly informal court, neither the crofters nor the proprietor had to be 
represented by a lawyer. Indeed, on some estates the presence of lawyers was 
resented by the estate m anagem ent. Part of the reason for the ambiguous reaction 
to the Commission in Skye was the presence of Alexander MacDonald acting for 
many of the proprietors. He attempted to show that the arrears were due not to 
inability to pay, but to the malign influence of agitators. This line of reasoning 
was unhelpful as it did not elicit the information required to fix a fair rent. However, 
when the Commission reached Caithness they noted that the cases were disposed of 
much more quickly and without the confrontational attitude which had prevailed in 
other areas.'*® This was due to the diverse nature of the agitation. Skye was notable 
for the high intensity of the agitation throughout the 1880s. The atmosphere of 
distrust between the estate managements and the crofters of that period carried over 
into the sittings of the Commission.
It would seem that the reactions of the crofters, difficult to gauge though they are, 
were ambiguous. The novelty of the Commission engendered high expectations 
which may have been the source of this ambiguous reaction. Crofters may have 
expected the Commission to treat groups of cases generally with uniform reductions, 
rather than the sophisticated case by case approach which they adopted.'**
Proprietors reacted to the the Commission largely with equanimity, extreme 
reactions were very much the exception although they did exist. More often 
landowners complained of details of the Commission's procedure, for example its 
tendency to leave areas unfinished, and the complications this caused for rent 
collections. The factor for Lady Matheson, communicated in 1891, in some detail, 
how the districts of Lewis not yet dealt with by the Commission had yet to pay and 
that this was unjust to both the proprietor, and the Crofters who had had their rents 
fixed in 1888 and had been paying regularly since then Generally, proprietors did 
not question the legitimacy of the C o m m i s s i o n . ^  They did not plague the 
Commission with appeals, as their Irish counterparts did with the Land Court set up 
under the Irish Land Act of 1881.^
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It is interesting to note that factors reacted much more strongly against the 
Commission. George Malcolm, factor on the Ellice Estates around Invergarry, and 
Secretary of The Highland Property Association, was forthright in his opinions,
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condemning the Commission as "autocratic William Gunn, factor on the 
Cromartie Estates in Ross-Shire, complained, in a lengthy diatribe to the 
Commission, that the reductions in the Coigach area of the Estate were "excessive to 
a degree".^ One possible explanation for this hostility was that factors had a more 
intimate knowledge of the circumstances of each individual tenant, and were more 
aware of the inevitable dishonest or unscrupulous tenant being dealt with favourably 
by the Commission. Secondly, factors may have seen their own role on the estate 
being usurped. Previously, it would have been they who would have picked out 
deserving cases for rent reductions. After 1886 the Commission was playing that 
role.
IV
A frequent accusation made against the Commission was that its decisions were 
arbitrary. Certainly, in their fair rent decisions the Commissioners did not append 
any reasoning to their final order. The number of cases precluded such detailed 
explanations. Both contemporary writing and those involved in estate management 
who had been involved in cases before the Commission made this point. One argued 
that "it merely follows its own will regardless of all fixed law" ^  Brand did not wish 
to see the establishment of fixed rules for dealing with the cancellation of arrears 
because cases tended to "vary greatly in their particular circumstances" ^  In 
December 1886, Brand issued a statement on the sixth section of the Act, which 
governed the fixing of fair rents. He intimated that the Commissioners would take a 
case by case approach and fix a rent which was fair for the holding at that particular 
time, rather than fair in terms of the wealth of the tenant or the proprietor. However, 
the task of coming to an accurate valuation of crofter^ improvements, on which no 
rent was liable, was far from easy, as crofters had a tendency to exaggerate their 
v a lu e d  One factor which did play a part in the Commissions findings with regard 
to fair rent was the current value of stock. Many crofters claimed that the difficulty 
they had in paying rent stemmed from their inability to realise the value of their
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stock at market. However, there was a danger in this method, a fair rent fixed by the 
Commission was set for seven years. Critics were not slow to point out that with 
fluctuations in prices, fair rents could quickly cease to become fair. This argument 
was also used to counter the claim, often made by crofters that reductions were 
demonstrative of rack renting.
Nevertheless, there was general satisfaction with the fair rents in the longer term. 
After seven years had elapsed crofters could apply to the commission to have the 
rent revised. It is interesting to note the small numbers of crofters who made use of 
this facility. In the first year of septennial revisions, 1894-5, there were only 333 
applications out of a possible several thousand. With improvements in stock prices 
and the ongoing benefit of the initial rents and arrears decisions of the Commission, 
the rent issue became less important as time passed. The agitation had not ceased 
with the advent of the Commission but it had acquired a different character.
Despite the accusations of inconsistency and the basing of decisions on transient 
criteria, like stock prices, there appears to be a measure of consistency about the fair 
rent decisions of the Commissioners. Over the years 1886-7 to 1892-3, when very 
large numbers of fair rent decisions were issued, the averages are quite constant. The 
lower figures for 1890-1 and 1892-3 can be explained by large numbers of cases in 
Sutherland where reductions were small. But this is consistent in itself because the 
reductions in Sutherland were consistently the lowest.







1892-93 1012 21 .9
TABLE 2:1 Average Rent Reductions, 1886 to 1892
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A second argument used to counter the idea that the reductions were a uniquely just 
response to crofter demands was to note that farming rents were also being reduced 
by proprietors. Certainly, on some estates difficulty was being found in the letting 
of large sheep farms. This either led to a reduction in the sheep farming area of an 
estate, usually with deer taking over, or to proprietors making voluntary abatements 
in rent to large tenant farmers. 52 This fact was held to prove that the crofter's cause 
was not unique, and that they were suffering in a "common cause".55 it is 
interesting to note in this regard that the farmers of Wester Ross advocated the 
setting up of an independent tribunal, similar to the Crofter’s Commission to fix fair 
rents for farmers. 5^
A final factor should be borne in mind before considering in detail the decisions of 
the Commission. When it announced a percentage reduction in rent, the old rent 
which they quoted had itself often been subject to reduction through the voluntary 
actions of proprietors. It can be established that this happened on the Lochalsh 
Estates of Sir Kenneth Matheson and on the Cromartie Estate. Small leaseholders in 
Glenurquhart, on the estate of the Countess of Seafield benefited from a revaluation 
carried out by her factor. The exercise was based on the current decisions of the
Commission. 5 5
A more comprehensive appraisal of the overall impact of the Commission can be 
gleaned from its Annual Reports. These provide a record of every fair rent and 
septennial revision case which they adjudicated on, giving the old rent, the fair rent, 
the decrease, the percentage reduction, the amount of arrears, the amount to be paid, 
the amount cancelled, and the percentage cancelled. These are aggregated according 
to townships, then according to estates and finally according to county. The first two 
aggregations are useful in providing local detail but do not give a general picture, the 
county figures are problematic as the counties themselves contained areas with little 
in common; for example Ross-shire stretched from the fertile farming area of the 
Black Isle and Easter Ross penninsulas to the overcrowded, marginal land of Lewis; 
Inverness-shire contained similar diversity. Therefore, it is instructive to rework the 
fair rent figures slightly. To this end the seven crofting counties can be usefully 
divided into 10 areas. A number of the counties have sufficient homogeneity to be 
treated as a unit, thus, Argyll, Caithness, Orkney and Shetland; the other areas either 
cross county boundaries or are contained within them, the western Highlands, the 
eastern Highlands fall into the former category and the Inverness - shire islands, 
namely Skye, Harris,and the Uists, West Ross and Lewis, North Sutherland and the 
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Area_____________Holdings % Reduction____% Cancellation
Caithness 995 32.7 55.8
N. Sutherland 1210 8.1 33.3
W.Ross & Lewis 3935 29.8 72.0
W. Highlands 1336 21 .1 40.8
Inv'shire Islands 3411 30.6 71 .2
E . Highlands 1465 19.4 49.7
C. Highlands 91 21 .6 69.2
Argyll 440 31 .7 62.8
TABLE 2:2 Fair Rents and Arrears Decisions, 1886 to 1895,
These figures confirm a number of important points. The Hebrides show the highest 
reductions of rent and the highest cancellation of arrears. These areas also had not 
only the highest percentage reductions but also the highest actual reductions as well, 
Lewis being particularly notable in this regard with over £30,000 of arrears 
cancelled. Caithness had a high reduction in rent but a comparatively small 
cancellation of arrears. It was noted at the time of the Commission's first visit to 
Caithness, in late 1887, that the arrears were of recent origin.^ Averages can 
conceal the truth though, the figures for most of the Caithness estates were low but 
the estate of Clyth contributed a large number of holdings and had high figures in 
both columns. The incidence of rack renting existed in a few localised areas. As well 
as Clyth, the estate of Kilmuir in North Skye and Iona and the Ross of Mull in 
A r g y l l . ^  The fact that the latter two examples contributed a high number of cases 
pushes up the level of rent reduction in their respective regions. Even within these 
more meaningful divisions great diversity existed. In Wester Ross there were estates 
with high figures in both columns, such as Lochcarron, and estates with equally low 
counts, such as Gairloch. The low reductions on the latter estate disconcerted the 
Crofter's movement who had always claimed that it was "rack rented". They 
resorted to allegations of collusion between Sir Kenneth MacKenzie and the 
Commission.^
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The general conclusion which can be drawn from this table is to back up Brand's 
initial rejection of a universal system of principles to govern fair rent decisions. The 
most important boundary in these decisions is that between estates. Further, the 
Commission clearly realised that it would be worthless reducing rents if arrears were 
not cancelled. A heavy burden of arrears would nullify the benefit of a fair rent. 
Thus, even in areas where the rent reductions were low, like Lochaber, the 
proportion of arrears cancelled was high.
The decline in the workload of the Commission and the fact that the rents and arrears 
problems were no longer so pressing after the mid 1890s is demonstrated in table 
1:3. The column to note here is the number of holdings that were dealt with, very 
few compared to the early years of the Commission.
Area____________Holdings % Reduction % Cancellation.
Caithness 22 14.2 68.7
N.Sutherland 0 0 0
W.Ross & Lewis 21 10.3 60.6
W.Highlands 14 188.2 40.8
Inv1shire Islands 108 17.5 31 .1
E.Highlands 57 15.1 51 .8
Argyll 27 12.3 42.0
C.Highlands 12 21 .6 69.2
TABLE 2:3 Fair Rent and Arrears Decisions, 1896 to 1912.
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Although the fixing of fair rents and adjudication of arrears was the largest task 
facing the Commission, it did have other functions. The Act provided the 
Commission with powers to grant enlargements of crofts or common pasture. These 
provisions were widely condemned as inadequate. The fact that there were no 
powers to create entirely new crofts was often lamented. ^  The realisation that the 
enlargement clauses were ineffective quickly became apparent. In 1888 the 
Commission issued a report on the matter. By then no enlargements had yet been 
formed. It was concluded that the major difficulty was section 13 of the act. It laid 
down conditions governing the scope of available land. They included the following; 
it had to be contiguous to the holding in question, not under lease at the time of the
51
application, not likely to cause material damage to a farm or deer forest, harm the 
amenity value of a residence or steading, or take land from a farm rented at less than 
£100. The Commissioners pointed out that there was "no adequate means of 
enlarging holdings” within the scope of the act. A second difficulty was the poverty 
and agricultural ineptitude of crofters. This caused problems under section 12(2) 
which required applicants to satisfy the Commissioners that they could pay as fair 
rent for the lands requested and be able to stock and cultivate them properly. ^
It is noticeable that despite the rhetoric on the iniquitous nature of deer forests, only 
20 applications were received to take land from a deer forest. This was a a point used 
by the government to blunt the arguments of those who complained of them. ^  This 
suggests that modem authors who have written of "social conflict” between crofters 
and proprietors over deer forests, and crofters' "bitter opposition" to afforestation, 
may be uncritically accepting contemporary rhetoric on this issue. ^  The crofters’ 
movement attempted to draw attention to the issue of afforestation. As well as 
rhetoric, dramatic stage managed demonstrations, such as the Park Deer Forest raid 
in 1887 were employed to this end. Of all applications for enlargements, 67 per cent 
came before 1897 and the bulk of these by 1892. Crofter interest in this facility 
declined when it became evident that little could be gained from i t . ^
As argued above, the role of the Commission in its early years was highly politicised 
and it was a central component of the governments' Highland policy. A number of 
authors have made the point that immediately after the passing of the Act in 1886 
major instances of disorder occurred. The government despatched a military force 
to Tiree when it became clear that the police were unable to handle the situation on 
the island following a land raid. A military expedition was sent to Skye in late 1886 
when a collapse of local government threatened due to arrears of rates. 
Deforcements occurred when steps were taken to recover arrears from crofters. 1887 
also saw land raids in Assynt and Lewis and the use of the military in an attempt to 
deal with them. In all these cases the disorder preceded the visit of the Commission 
to the area in question. As noted above the disorder was a major reason for the nature 
of the Commission's movements. Further, the post 1886 agitation was focused not on 
rent but on "more land" for crofters. The Commission was not best equipped to deal 
with the latter. While the Commission played an important role in the quelling of the 
agitation, other factors were relevant. Post 1886, disorder was not perceived
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favourably by public opinion. The grievances of the crofters were generally felt to 
have been settled in 1886. Thus, it was much easier, politically, for the government 
to deal with disorder. Nevertheless, the Commission had a positive effect on the state 
of law and order in the Highlands. The position in 1912 was a considerable 
improvement on that of 1886 when the "Queens writ did not run".^
The high profile work of the Commission was not sustained as time passed. As 
conditions in the Highlands changed the role of the Commission changed 
accordingly.^ The first point to note is that the workload of the Commission began 
to drop off in the early to mid 1890s. Applications to fix fair rents formed the bulk of 
the work of the Commission. In 1886-7 the Commission received 8906 applications 
for the fixing of fair rent, 1767 of which were disposed of. The number of 
applications received dropped off considerably after 1891, and around this date the 
Commission had reduced the large backlog of cases to more manageable 
proportions ^  The applications for septennial revisions did not fill the gap in the 
work of the Commission left by the decline of new applications for fair rent.
It was this situation which led some to suggest that the Commission no longer had a 
role to play and that its functions could be transferred to the Sheriff Courts. This idea 
was resented by those involved in the Crofters cause. They argued that the 
Commission should be sustained because it held the trust of the Crofters and because 
it was both more efficient, as it was composed of specialists, and cheaper than the 
Sheriff Court. The Commission was also adapted to the needs of crofters in a way 
that the Sheriff Court was not. When a hearing was required the Commission went to 
the area and the evidence could be heard in Gaelic. All these factors helped to 
establish the credibility of the Commission in the eyes of the crofters. One problem 
with the Commission was that it had no powers of enforcement. It had to rely on the 
powers of the Sheriffs of the relevant counties to enforce the decisions. The 
Highland Land League advocated strengthening the Commission in this particular, 
and giving it responsibility for all questions related to crofting.
Nevertheless, the Commission at this time was a body in search of a role. Successive
governments used it in a consultative role. Sheriff Brand was the Chairman of the
Royal Commission (Highlands and Islands) from 1892 to 1895. The Commission
was employed by the government in the early 1900s to write factual reports on the
Social condition of Lewis, in 1902, and Uist in 1904 Brand was also an ex officio
> •
member of the Congested Districts Board from its creation in 1897. The Commission 
carried out much liason work with the Board in connection with the organisation of
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the estates which the Board had purchased. In particular they spent much time, in 
1904 and 1905, dealing with the estates of Glendale and Kilmuir in Skye. The 
Commission had a great deal of expertise to be tapped after nearly twenty years 
experience of administration of the Act. The Congested Districts Board was largely 
composed of ex officio members, and apart from its Secretary, had only one full time 
employee, a factor, who had to divide his time between all the properties of the 
Board.
Another important role for the Commission in the 1890s was the administration of 
the Crofters Common Grazings Regulation Act of 1892. This was a permissive 
measure which empowered the Commission, in conjunction with crofters, to draw up 
rules for the effective stewardship of Common Grazings. An amending Act was 
passed in 1908 which gave the Commission power to fine those who broke the rules. 
In 1910 an officer was appointed to aid the Commission in the administration of this 
legislation. The problem of overstocking and poor agricultural practice had been 
one of the central concerns of the Commission. In their first report the Commission 
noted the harmful effects of continuous cropping. During their early sittings the 
Commissioners attempted to impress upon crofters the self defeating effects of 
o v e r s t o c k i n g . ^  This was a problem for estate managements as well, and one which 
they found difficult to deal with prior to the 1891 A ct.^  However, this was a 
persistent problem. In their final report the Commissioners refer to the 
mismanagement of common grazings as "the greatest source of trouble in the 
Crofting area".^ The Commission was well aware that this was a problem for 
proprietors as well. Certainly, crofting agriculture was not of the highest standard, 
but estate managements had a role to play here as well. Most estates would have 
regulations governing soumings, drainage and other technical points, which it was up 
to them to enforce. This issue is one of the constants of Highland history, referred 
to by writers on more recent periods, but largely ignored by historians, many of 
whom have been concerned to establish the virtue of the crofter in all his actions. ^
Despite this important liason and technical work, when William Hosack retired in 
1902, the Government felt, and Brand agreed, that the workload of the Commission 
was not sufficient to occupy the time of the Chairman and two full time 
Commissioners. Therefore, Hosack's replacement was appointed on a reduced salary 
of £600.77
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So far it can be argued that there had been two phases to the work of the 
Commission. A highly politicised phase from 1886 to around 1894, followed by a 
technical and consultative phase from 1895 to 1906, There was, however, a third 
phase of the Commission, from 1906 to its eventual abolition in 1912. In this period 
the Commission was essentially living on borrowed time. Its abolition had been 
advocated in 1906 and would have been carried out then had it not been for the 
external political circumstances which delayed land reform until 1911. The Liberal 
Government was aware from the outset of the need to reform both the Crofters 
Commission and the Congested Districts Board. From 1905 the Commission was 
effectively paralysed due to Brand's ill health; this particularly affected appeals to 
the Commission which had to be heard before all three Commissioners.^® By the 
time of Brand's death in 1907 the situation which had pertained in 1902, when 
Hosack retired, was amplified. As the work of the Commission had decreased even 
further since 1902, it was proposed that instead of appointing a new Chairman, the 
senior Commissioner would be elevated to the position of Chairman, at a salary of 
£1000, and another Commissioner would be appointed, again without the prohibition 
on private business, at a salary of £600. The Chairman's position could be 
terminated at any time after six months notice and that alteration of duties would not 
constitute a claim for compensation or additional remuneration.^
It can be seen then that as a component of public policy the Commission's role 
changed over time as conditions in the Highlands, and the political priorities of 
governments were altered. There was no real opportunity for the Commission to 
carve out a new role for itself. It had no real independence, the Secretary for 
Scotland could decide its movements or ask it carry out tasks which were not 
specifically allotted to it in the Act. In the context of internal governmental politics 
the Commission had lost influence by the early 1900s, as the importance of its task 
declined. It has been noted how appointments in this period were made at a lower 
level than when the Commission was in its prime. Further, Brand made numerous, 
but ultimately unsuccessful attempts to persuade the Treasury to grant William 
Hosack a civil service pension.®^
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V
Studies of rural Scotland in the late 19th and early 20th centuries have noted the 
decline in the power of the landowner.8* It can be argued that the Crofters' 
Commission was significant iftthis declining power, it ended the free market in rents 
and had a decided effect on estate management in the Highlands. It was the central 
component of what Day has called the first, of three, phases of public policy in the 
1886 - 1919 period, and which was concerned primarily with the welfare of existing 
tenants.8^ Many argued that its existence was a disincentive to proprietors to commit 
expenditure on behalf of their crofting tenants.83 The setting of a fair rent altered the 
relations between the landlord and his tenant, prior to the adjudication the proprietor 
may have allowed a certain leniency in the rent collection if he believed the crofters 
to be poverty stricken. However, once the crofter has applied to the Commission and 
the fair rent has been fixed the relationship is put on a different footing, a third party 
has intervened and given official sanction to the rent, and the obligation on the 
crofter to pay is heavier.8"*
The Commission's effect on landlords was, in their own words, to reduce his interest 
in the holding "to that of receiving the rent and preventing the illegitimate or 
deteriorating use of the holding in question" and the effect of the Act was to 
"displace the estate management" on the issue of grazing rights.8^ Nevertheless, 
security of tenure brought benefits to the proprietor as well, the Commission did 
much to quell the agitation which had troubled landowners throughout the 1880s. 
Rents were more secure after the Act and the work of the Commission than before. 
Further, the obligation of the Crofter to pay his rent and keep his holding in a good 
state of repair was enshrined in the Act and could be enforced by the Commission.8^
It is the contention of this examination of the role of the Crofter's Commission as a 
component of public policy, that despite the continuity of the legislation governing 
it, its role changed with changes in government and changing conditions in the 
Highlands. When the Highlands were in an unsettled state in the late 1880s and early 
1890s the Commission had a policing role to play, and its work had a high profile 
within government policy. Indeed, in the mid to late 1880s Scottish affairs in 
general, and the Highlands in particular were high on the government's agenda. This 
is demonstrated by the creation of the Scottish Office in 1885 and Arthur Balfour's 
promotion to the cabinet in 1886, the first Scottish Secretary to achieve such 
prominence. However, as time passed and priorities changed the role of the 
Commission changed. The failure of the 1892 to 1895 Liberal administration to carry
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any substantive land reform measures saw the nature of the debate change. The 
principal role of the Crofter’s Commission had been to administer the 1886 regime, 
but by the 1890s this was coming under attack. From 1892 to 1912 the Crofters' 
Commission continued its work as the debate on Highland policy proceeded. The 
1890s and early 1900s saw the Conservatives attempt, unsuccessfully, to interest the 
crofting community in the idea of purchasing their holdings. The Commission was 
conscripted to help in this task in cooperation with the Congested Districts Board, 
created to carry out this policy in 1897. From 1906 the Liberals reacted against this. 
They returned to power determined to develop and extend the tenure they had 
initiated in 1886. The reasons for this were multifarious, and not always strictly 
relevant to conditions in the crofting counties. This was the political context in 
which the Commission, its crisis management role completed, moved into a more 
technical and consultative phase. In this period it was consciously downgraded by 
the government, and ultimately absorbed in 1912. It is not strictly correct to say that 
it was abolished, as its judicial role was continued, and indeed, extended, both 
geographically and administratively, by the Scottish Land Court from 1912. The 
Commissioners felt that the biggest change they had seen in the Highlands was the 
improvement in housing consequent upon security of tenure. Their biggest regret 
was their inability to deal with the related problems of the cottars and subdivision, 
especially in Lewis, where these problems were particularly pressing.**®
The Crofter’s Commission had been a bold and innovative experiment in public 
policy, it and the 1886 Act in general had been a response to an emergency. 
Nevertheless, its conduct during the emergency was sufficiently balanced to acquire 
and retain the trust of crofters, a notable achievement in an era when the "crofting 
community" viewed the machinery of government with some distrust. The positive 
perception of the Commission helped to secure the legitimacy of the 1886 regime in 
the H ighlands.T he simplest final point to make is to note the immense amount of 
work undertaken by the Commission, bearing in mind both the pressures it was 
under in the late 1880s, and more generally the difficulties of travel in the late 19th 
century Highlands.
57
1 . SRO, Department of Agriculture and Fisheries, Crofting 
Files, AF 67/2, Draft letter from the Scottish Office to 
the Treasury, 17th May 1886; Treasury to the Scottish 
Office, 31st May 1886; Directions for letters to the 
Commissioners, 16th June 1886.
2. Scots Law Times, 6th July 1907; Times, 23rd January 
1908; Ayrshire Post, 24th January 1908; Ayr Advertiser; 
30th January 1908; Northern Chronicle, 14th July 1886.
3. BL Add MS, 44497, WEGP, Earl of Dalhousie (Secretary 
for Scotland) to WEG, 6th June 1886.
4. SRO, Crofting Files, AF 67/3, Davidson and Syme to 
A.J.B[alfour], 8th September 1886; Tods, Murray and 
Jamieson, to Scottish Office, 11th October 1886.
5. SRO, Crofting Files, AF 67/3, Crofters Commission to 
A.J.Balfour, 10th October 1886; A.J.Balfour to Sir 
Francis Sandford, 7th October 1886; BL, Add MS, 49871/1, 
ff 251, AJBP, AJB to Sandford, 29th October 1886; W.P.L. 
Thomson, The Little General and the Rousay Crofters: 
Crisis on an Orkney Crofting Estate, (Edinburgh, 1982), 
Chapter 13.
6. Scotsman, 9th October 1886.
7. SRO, Crofting Files, AF 67/4, Brand to AJB, 13 th 
October 1886; Scottish Highlander, 12th March 1891.
8. I.M.M. MacPhail, The Crofters' War, (Stornoway, 1989), 
175.
9. SRO, Crofting Files, AF 67/4, MacLachlan & Reid 
(Portree Solicitors) to AJB, 14th January 1887; AJB to 
Brand, 10th November 1886; SRO, Home & Health Department, 
Miscellaneous Files, HH 1/190, Ivory to AJB, 21st January 
1887; SRO, Ivory Papers, GD 1/36/1/48/26, Confidential 
Memo by AJB to Alexander MacDonald, 26th January 1887; 
Royal Commission on Land in Wales and Monmouthshire, 
P[arliamentary] P[apers], 1896 XXXV, Evidence of David 
Brand, Q 77104.
10. S. Moncrieff Penney, "The Highlands and Islands Under 
Commissioners", Juridical Review, 13, (1901), 427;
R.MacLeod, "The Crofters' Commission", Blackwoods 
Magazine, 146, (1889), 518.
11. J. Hunter, The Making of the Crofting Community, 
(Edinburgh, 1976), 168.
12. SRO, Crofting Files, AF 67/6, John Campbell Orde to 
Skene Edwards and Bilton, 20th June 1887; SRO, Home &
58
Health Miscellaneous Files, HH 1/200, Alexander MacDonald 
to AJB, 31st January 1887.
13. SRO, Lothian Muniments, GD 40/16/18/33, The 
Chamberlain, Stornoway to Lady Matheson, 20th August 
1888; GD 40/16/18/31, Letter on behalf of Lady Matheson 
to Lothian, 1st September 1888; SRO, Cromartie Muniments, 
GD 305/2/1895, William Gunn to William MacKenzie, 28th 
October 1889; SRO, Crofting Files, AF 67/9, William 
MacKenzie to Cochran Patrick, 1st May 1888; AF 67/10, 
MacLeod of MacLeod to William Mackenzie, 21st August 
1888; Dunvegan Castle MSS, 2/730, J.T.MacKenzie (on 
behalf of MacLeod of MacLeod) to William MacKenzie, 24th 
April 1890; 2/731, same to same, 10th March 1892.
14. SRO, Crofting Files, AF 67/10, D.C.MacDonald to 
Lothian, 3rd July 1887; AF 67/7, same to same, 3rd August 
1887; Skene, Edwards and Bilton, to the Scottish Office, 
8th August 1887; PD, 3S, Volume 319, 1700, G.B.Clark,
24th August 1887; Glasgow Herald, 19th July 1887.
15. SRO, Cromartie Muniments, GD 305/2/1004, Alexander 
Ross to William Gunn, 10th April 1887; SRO, Crofting 
Files, AF 67/14, Minute of Meeting of Coll Crofters, 1st 
December 1890; AF 67/5, Brand to Sandford, 30th May 1887.
16. SRO, Crofting Files, AF 67/6, Duke of Argyll to 
Lothian, 23rd June 1887; SRO, Home and Health Department, 
Scottish Office Correspondence, HH 28/5/2/144, Cochran 
Patrick to Skene, Edwards and Bilton, 13th April 1889; 
Inveraray Castle MSS, Bundle 1595, Duke of Argyll to 
Factor, 10th May 1887; same to same, 14th May 1887; same 
to same, 24th June 1887. I am grateful to Mr Alasdair 
Campbell of Airds for his help with the Inveraray Castle 
MSS.
17. SRO, Crofting Files, AF 67/8, Memorial of the Landed 
Proprietors of Skye, November 1887; AF 67/9, Letters from 
John Robertson, Greshornish, 19th April 1888; Lord 
MacDonald, 4th May 1888; William MacPherson (Co-Trustee 
of the Glendale Estate), 30th July 1887; AF 67/10, 
Alexander MacDonald to Lothian, 23rd October 1888; HRA, 
Kilmuir Estate Papers, AG INV 10/32, Fraser to MacDonald, 
29th November 1886.
18. SRO, Crofting Files, AF 67/8, William MacKenzie to 
Sandford, 27th September 1887.
59
19. SRO, Crofting Files, AF 67/9, William MacKenzie to 
Cochran Patrick, 21st May 1888; Crofters' Commission, 
Annual Report, 1886-7, xi.
20. HRA, Skaebost Estate Papers, AG INV 11/5, Lachlan 
MacDonald of Skaebost to Alexander MacDonald, 2 5th July 
1887.
21. Crofters' Commission, Annual Report, 1893-4, 6-7; 
SRO, Cromartie Muniments, GD 305/2/1891/310, William Gunn 
to R.M.Brereton (Sutherland Estate Commissioner), 27th 
April 1888; see Glasgow Herald, March and April 1887 for 
Reports of the proceedings of the Commission in Skye.
22. SRO, Home and Health, Miscellaneous Files, HH 1/241, 
Sheriff Liddell (Portree) to Ivory, 15th July 1887; 
Police Report, Staffin, Skye, 4th June 1887.
23. BL Add MS 49800, ff 161, AJBP, Ivory to Balfour 31st 
October 1886; ff 164, Balfour to Ivory, 2nd November 
1886; Court of Session Cases, 4th Series, 14, 181-90;
Scotsman, 8th December 1886.
24. SRO, Crofting Files, AF 67/5, Resolution of Caithness 
Farmers, Crofters, Farm Servants and Labourers, Thurso, 
16th March 1887; SRO, Lothian Muniments, GD 40/16/8/75, 
Cabinet Memo with Reference to the amendment of the 
Crofters' Holdings (Scotland) Act,
25. SRO, Lothian Muniments, GD 40/16/8/46, Brand to 
Sandford, 14th April 1887; GD 40/16/8/56, George 
Sutherland (Solicitor, Wick) to William MacKenzie, 19th 
April 1887.
26. SRO, Lothian Muniments, GD 40/16/8/62, Cabinet Paper 
by AJB, 11th February 1887.
27. Hunter, Crofting Community, 67.
28. SRO, Lothian Muniments, GD 40/16/8/66, memo by 
Secretary for Scotland on "Double Object" behind bill to 
amend Crofters' Act; GD 40/16/8/58, Brand to Sandford, 
3rd May 1887.
29. Hunter, Crofting Community, 70.
60
30. Crofters' Commission, Annual Reports, 1886-7, 105;
1887-8, 179.
31. SRO, Lothian Muniments, GD 40/16/58/4, Lothian to 
Argyll, 29th November 1888; GD 40/16/55/36, Crofter 
Commission: Alternative Scheme (undated handwritten
note); GD 40/16/24/13, Brand to W.C.Blackburn (Scottish 
Office Official), 28th November 1888.
32. SRO, Department of Agriculture and Fisheries, 
Miscellaneous Files, AF 43/6/1, Memo to Captain Sinclair 
MP, on Crofters' Act, by David Brand, 2 5th August 1903; 
SRO, Lothian Muniments, GD 40/16/58/4, Lothian to Argyll, 
29th November 1888; BL Add MS 49801, ff 48, AJBP, AJB to 
Brand 26th January 1887.
33. Scottish Highlander, 5th August 1886, 19th August 
1886, 26th May 1887; Oban Times, 8th January 1887, 9th 
April 1887, 28th may 1887; SRO, Crofting Files, AF 67/7, 
William MacKenzie to Sandford, 27th September 1887.
34. SRO, Home and Health, Miscellaneous Files, HH 1/24 5, 
Police Report, Lochboisdale, South Uist, 23rd July 1887; 
HH 1/253, Sheriff Hamilton, Portree, to Ivory, 15th 
September 1887.
35. BL Add MS, 49871/1, ff 254, AJBP, Balfour to Dunbar 
(Scottish Office Official), 29th October 1886; ff 262, 
Balfour to Sandford, 1st November 1886; SRO, Crofting 
Files AF 67/401, Confidential Reports to the Secretary 
for Scotland on the State of the West Highlands and 
Islands, by Malcolm MacNeill; SRO, Home & Health, 
Miscellaneous Files, HH 1/180, Police Report, Staffin, 
Skye, 11th January 1887.
36. F. Gillanders, "The West Highland Economy", TGSI, 43, 
(1960-63), 257.
37. SRO, Home & Health, Miscellaneous Files, HH 1/260, 
Sheriff Webster, Lochmaddy, North Uist, to Ivory, 3rd 
November 1887; HH 1/246, Ivory to Scottish Office, 17th 
August 1887.
38. Royal Commission on Land in Wales and Monmouthshire, 
Evidence of Donald Macrae, Q 75983; SRO, Cromartie 
Muniments, GD 305/2/566, Alexander Ross to William 
Matheson, 21st January 1889.
61
39. Especially with regard to Valtos on the Kilmuir 
Estate, Glasgow Herald, 29th March 1887; but also more 
generally, see, HRA, Kilmuir Estate Papers, AG INV 10/7, 
Remarks by Alexander MacDonald to the Crofters 
Commission; 10/32, Colonel Fraser to Alexander MacDonald, 
16th March 1887; 10/32, same to same, 29th March 1887
40. Glasgow Herald, 9th December 1887.
41. SRO, Home & Health, Miscellaneous Files, HH 1/237, 
Inspector MacDonald, Portree to Sheriff Skene, Portree, 
2nd June 1887.
42. Departmental Committee appointed by the Board of 
Agriculture and Fisheries to inquire into and report upon 
the subject of Small Holdings in Great Britain, PP 1906, 
LV, Q 4541, William MacKenzie; SRO, Crofting Files, Memo 
of Shetland Landowners, 28th November 1889; see letters 
to the Scottish Office from the following; AF 67/8, John 
Campbell Orde, 3rd February 1888; AF 67/9, John 
Robertson, Greshornish, 19th April 1888; Lord MacDonald, 
4 th May 1888; MacLeod of MacLeod, 17 th may 1888; AF 
67/15, Skene, Edwards and Bilton, on behalf of Lady 
Gordon Cathcart, 17th July 1891; L.Lyell, MP for Orkney 
and Shetland, 4th November 1891; Lewis Factor, on behalf 
of Lady Matheson, 3rd February 1891; Scotsman, 1st 
December 1888, Letter from William Burroughs of Rousay.
43. SRO, Agriculture and Fisheries, Miscellaneous Files, 
AF 43/6/13, Memo on Dual Ownership; K.Buckley, "The 
Records of the Irish Land Commission as a source of 
historical evidence", Irish Historical Studies, 8, (1 952-
3), 31-2.
44. Royal Commission on Land in Wales and Monmouthshire, 
Q 78041, George Malcolm; SRO, Cromartie Muniments, GD 
305/2/1898/549, William Gunn to Peter MacIntyre, December 
1890.
45. MacLeod, "Crofters Commission", Blackwoods Magazine, 
146, (1889), 523; SRO, MacKintosh Muniments, GD 176/2488,
The MacKintosh to Allan MacDonald, 26th April 1894; 
Dunvegan Castle MSS, 4/1390/1, MacLeod of MacLeod to 
William MacKenzie, 4th July 1889; 4/1390/2, MacLeod of
MacLeod to Lothian, 6th July 1889.
46. SRO, Lothian Muniments, GD 40/16/8/58, Brand to 
Sandford, 3rd May 1887.
62
47. Royal Commission on Land in Wales and Monmouthshire, 
Q 78709, Duke of Argyll; Glasgow Herald, 21st December 
1886; SRO, Cromartie Muniments, GD 305/2/1892/487, 
Alexander Ross to Wiliam Gunn, 31st March 1887; HRA, 
Kilmuir Estate Papers, AG INV 10/32, Fraser to MacDonald, 
14th February 1887.
48. Scotsman, 4th January 1887, 1st July 1887.
49. Crofters' Commission, Annual Report, 1894-5, 37.
50. Figures calculated from, Crofters’ Commission, Annual 
Reports, 1886 - 1893.
51. Glasgow Herald, 8th June 1887; Scotsman, 4th January 
1887.
52. E.Richards & M.Clough, Cromartie: Highland Life, 1650 
to 1914, (Aberdeen, 1989), 305; J.Hunter, "Sheep and
Deer: Highland Sheep Farming, 1850 -1900", NS, 1, (1973),
89; P. Gaskell, Morvern Transformed, (Cambridge, 1968) 
109; SRO, MacKintosh Muniments, GD 176/2674/46, The 
MacKintosh to Allan MacDonald, 10th January 1889.
53. Glasgow Herald, 8th June 1887.
54. Scottish Highlander, 10th May 1888.
55. SRO, Crofting Files, AF 67/15, Sir H.G. MacAndrew to 
brand, with an extract from the Lochalsh rental showing 
abatements; SRO, Cromartie Muniments, GD 305/2/1889/417, 
William Gunn to the Duchess of Sutherland, December 1886; 
Royal Commission (Highlands and Islands) 1892, PP 1895 
XXXVIII, Q 13654, Evidence of William MacKay.
56. Refer to enclosed map for the composition of the 
areas.
57. Glasgow Herald, 9th December 1887.
58. E.M. MacArthur, Iona: The Living Memory of a Crofting 
Community, 1750 -1914, (Edinburgh, 1990), 131.
59. Scottish Highlander, 14th June 1888.
60. Oban Times, 10th December 1887; SRO, Crofting Files, 
AF 67/5, Resolution of a Public Meeting of Crofters, 
Thurso, 16th March 1887; AF 67/8, Petition of the tenants 
of Airdens, Creich, Sutherland; AF 67/11, Resolution of
63
Edinburgh Southern Liberal Association, 3rd April 1889; 
Resolution of Kirkaldy Liberal Association, 18th April 
1889; AF 67/12, Resolution of a meeting of the crofters 
of Lochs, Lewis, 13th may 1889; Statement of the Clyth 
Branch of the HLLRA, April 1890; AF 67/13, Resolution 
adopted at a demonstration of Land Law Reformers and 
Liberals at Wick, 28th August 1890; AF 67/16, Resolution 
of meeting at Crossbost, Lewis, 9th November 1892; AF 
67/17, Resolution of Lewis District Committee, Ross and 
Cromarty County Council, 15th March 1893; Resolution of 
Ross and Cromarty Highland Land League, 14th January
1893; AF 67/18, Resolution of Edinburgh HLLRA, 8th
February 1894; AF 67/20, Petition of Lewis Crofters, 12th 
April 1895; Resolution of Caithness HLLRA, 13th May 1895; 
AF 67/24, Resolution of Meeting of Ferintosh Crofters, 
8th March 1905; Resolution of Meeting of Mullbuie
Crofters, 1st May 1905; AF 67/25, Petition of Kilmuir
Crofters, 17th June 1906.
61 . Report by the Crofters Commission in Regard to 
Applications for Enlargements of Holdings for the period 
from 25th June 1886 to 10th December 1887, PP 1888 LXXX; 
an MS copy survives in SRO, Crofting Files AF 67/8.
62. PD, 3S, 325, 1059, 1st May 1888, J. H. A. MacDonald, 
Lord Advocate.
63. W.Orr, Deer Forests, Crofters and Landlords, 
(Edinburgh, 1982) 123; Hunter "Sheep and Deer" NS, 1,
(1973) , 220.
64. See Crofters’ Commission, Annual Reports, 1886 to 
1912; as well as the high profile work of the Commission, 
they also dealt with a multitude of minor cases dealing 
with the finer points of crofting law. These concerned 
leases, joint tenancies, marches etc. The more important 
of these cases are detailed in the annual reports.
65. Hunter, Crofting Community, 164; I.F.Grigor, Crofters 
and the Land Question, 1870 to 1920, (PhD Thesis, 
University of Glasgow, 1989); MacPhail, Crofters’ War, 
173.
66. Crofters’ Commission, Annual Report, 1910-1912, xxvi.
67. D.J.MacCuish, "Ninety Years of Crofting Legislation 
and Administration", TGSI, 50, (1976-78), 300-1.
68. Crofters Commission, Annual Reports, 1886-7, 105;
64
1892-3, 144; 1893-4, 79.
69. Royal Commission on Land in Wales and Monmouthshire, 
Q 27038, Evidence of Sir Colin Scott Moncrieff, Under 
Secretary for Scotland; Q 78041, Evidence of David Brand; 
Qs 75921-7, Evidence of Donald MacRae; SRO, Crofting 
Files, AF 67/9, Speech at Taynuilt by Rev Malcolm 
MacCallum, February 1894; Inveraray Castle MSS, Bundle 
906, George Malcolm to the Duke of Argyll, 19th April 
1 895.
70. Report by the Crofters' Commission on the Social 
Condition of the People of Lewis Compared with 20 Years 
Ago, PP 1902 LXXXIII; SRO, Crofting Files, AF 67/19, 
Report by the Crofters' Commission on the Social 
Condition of the People of Uist, 1904; Crofters' 
Commission, Annual Report, 1903-4, Appendix K, Report on
Glendale for the C[ongested] D[istricts] B[oard]; 
Crofters' Commission, Annual Report, 1904-5, x-xvii, for 
work in Kilmuir for the CDB.
71 . SRO, Crofting Files, AF 67/30, Treasury to Scottish 
Office, 26th April 1910: Memo as to the duties of the 
Grazings Officer appointed under the Crofters' Common 
Grazings Regulation Acts, 1891 & 1908.
72. Crofters' Commission, Annual Report, 1886-7, ix; 
Glasgow Herald, 31st March 1887.
73. SRO, Cromartie Muniments, GD 305/2/1005, Alexander 
Ross to William Gunn, 13th May 1887; HRA, Kilmuir Estate 
Papers, AG INV 10/7, Alexander MacDonald, Remarks to the 
Commission.
74. Crofters Commission, Annual Report, 1910-12, xxv.
75. SRO, Crofting Files, AF 67/13, Crofters' Commission 
Memo on Grazing Rights.
76. F.Fraser Darling, West Highland Survey, (Oxford, 
1955) 310; J.R.Coull, "Melness: a crofting community on 
the North Coast of Scotland", Scottish Studies, 7, 
(1963) .
77. SRO, Crofting Files, AF 67/23, Lord Balfour of 
Burleigh to Brand, 26th March 1902; Brand to Lord Balfour 
of Burleigh, 1st April 1902.
78. SRO, Agriculture & Fisheries, Miscellaneous Files, AF 
43/6/2, Memo Regarding the Land Agitation in the
65
Highlands and the Legislation following thereon.
79. SRO, Crofting Files, AF 67/28, Treasury Statement 
Regarding the Crofters' Commission, 30th January 1908; 
Treasury to Scottish Office, 27th April 1908.
80. SRO, Agriculture & Fisheries, Miscellaneous Files, AF 
43/6/1, Memo, Brand to Sinclair.
81 . T.M.Devine & R.H.Campbell, "The Rural Experience" in 
W.H. Fraser & R.J.Morris (eds), People and Society in 
Scotland, Volume II, 1830-1914, (Edinburgh, 1990), 66.
82. J.P.Day, Public Administration in the Highlands and 
Islands, (London, 1919), 232.
83. Royal Commission on Land in Wales and Monmouthshire, 
Q 78717, Evidence of the Duke of Argyll; Royal Commission 
(Highlands and Islands) 1892, Q 5641, Evidence of MacLeod 
of MacLeod.
84. Richards & Clough, Cromartie, 385; Scotsman, 2nd 
May1888; Northern Chronicle, 5th January 1887.
85. Crofters' Commission, Annual Report, 1899-1900, 21;
SRO, Crofting Files, AF 67/13, Crofters' Commission Memo 
on Grazing Rights.
86. Thus it is not strictly true to argue as Devine and 
Campbell, "Rural Experience", People and Society, 149, 
have, that the 1886 Act did not confer any obligations on 
crofters.
87. SRO, Agriculture & Fisheries, Miscellaneous Files, AF 
43/6/2, Memo on Land Legislation and Administration.
88. Crofters' Commission, Annual Report, 1910-1912, xxvi.
89. Departmental Committee on Small Holdings, 1906, Q 
4541, Evidence of William MacKenzie.




Unionists and Liberals, Variations in Highland 
Policies, 1886 to 1895.
The years 1882 to 1886 have attracted a great deal of attention from historians.* 
They were years of drama and excitement in the Highlands, culminating in the 
apparent watershed of the Crofters Holdings (Scotland) Act of 1886. However, the 
years 1886 to 1895 have not been covered in the same depth. In fact, there is a 
considerable amount of continuity between the two periods. The agitation leading up 
to the 1886 Act did not immediately cease with its passage. The government's 
attempts to quell that agitation intensified from mid 1886 to mid 1888. The 
incidence of the agitation and the response of the government to it will be examined. 
Further, emigration, as a policy option for easing congestion, which had been a 
constant theme in government thinking, certainly since the 1850s, reached new 
heights with a government sponsored colonisation scheme. There were also new 
departures. Apart from the brief period of Salisbury’s unelected caretaker 
government in late 1885, the country had been governed by the Liberals since 1880. 
The split in that party in 1886 and the election of that year saw the Conservatives 
begin a period of administration which would take them down to 1892. This 
government outlined major policy initiatives for the Highlands which included 
projections of heavy expenditure on the communications infrastructure. How far the 
Unionist administration succeeded in carrying out its ambitious plans, and the 
motivations behind them are highly pertinent issues to be examined. The election of 
a Liberal government in 1892 saw another change of approach. The technocratic 
approach of the Unionists gave way to a more ideological concentration on the 
relationship of the crofters to the land. How much substance this policy contained 
will be questioned. Finally, some attempt will be made to identify the origins of the 
policies of land purchase and settlement which came to dominate the next generation 
of Highland history.
Historians have frequently pointed out that the land agitation in the Highlands did 
not automatically cease with the passage of the Crofter s'Act in 1886. In many ways 
it would have been odd if it had done so. Perhaps historians have felt the need to 
make the point because the 1886 Act has appeared to them as a much more 
significant piece of legislation than it appeared to those involved in the Crofters'
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movement. To the latter it was merely the first instalement in the settlement of the 
crofters’ grievances. The course of the agitation following the Act was different 
from that preceding it. Most noticeably, the geographic focus shifted. In the period 
1882 to 1886 Skye had been the centre of the agitation. From 1887 to 1890 Lewis 
emerged as its successor. The political focus shifted also, this was consequent both 
on the new geographic focus and the perceived defects of the 1886 Act. The 
problem in Lewis was not so much concerned with improving the status of the 
crofter, as with the lack of status of the cottars. This class were more numerous and 
more concentrated in Lewis than anywhere else in the Highlands. Indeed, the 
population of Lewis was still increasing in this period when the population of the 
Highlands as a whole was falling. The failure of the Act to deal with the central 
demand of the cottars, the provision of more land, could only serve to fuel the 
agitation in Lewis. ^
I
The next section will attempt to give a brief outline of the course of the agitation and 
will be followed by an analysis of the motives behind it and the government 
response. Following the Act the first outbreak of lawlessness occurred on the Island 
of Tiree. A vacant farm, at Greenhill, was raided as a protest at it being leased to a 
farmer, who had risen from the ranks of the crofters, rather than being divided 
among the bulk of the crofters. The police proved to be incapable of dealing with the 
situation and the military had to be called in. The original decision to use military 
force was taken by a Liberal Government, in July 1886, but by August, when the 
troops were despatched, the Conservatives had come into office and it was they who 
attracted the opprobrium of using military force to make a few arrests in Tiree. ^
If they had inherited the decision to use the military in the case of Tiree, the 
Conservative government were quick to prove that they would not hesitate to make 
the same decision themselves. This was demonstrated in September when faced with 
the paralysis of local administration in Skye, through non payment of rates, Arthur 
Balfour, the Secretary for Scotland, despatched a force of marines to the island to 
back up the civil authorities in their attempts to deal with the problem.^ Balfour was 
keen to make the point that the arrears of the proprietors should be pursued as wurcj Jbtc^dlj 
as those of the crofters, this issue was simplified by the rapid settlement of their 
debts by the proprietors. ^  Despite the belief of the Prime Minister that things were
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"proceeding charmingly" trouble arose on a number of instances during the 
operation. Deforcements took place at Bomeskitaig and Herbusta on the Kilmuir 
Estate on October 25th, and on the following day at Garalapin near Portree. Those 
involved at Bomeskitaig were sentenced to terms of imprisonment, but the others 
were treated more leniently.**
Further outbreaks of disorder took place in Assynt in western Sutherland. 
Deforcements of Sheriff Officers took place in April and May 1887, and land raids 
occurred both in Assynt and in Durness on the north coast. But once again it required 
the services of a gunboat and a force of marines to arrest those involved. The 
difficulties in this case were accentuated by the remote location of the disorder.^ In 
December of the same year more military activity was centred on Assynt in an 
attempt to arrest one of the original deforcers who had taken to the hills in May. The 
presence of marines in the district was said to have induced the people to adopt a 
more law abiding attitude.**
Despite these incidents the main focus of the agitation in this period was in Lewis. 
The event which began a period of intense agitation in the Island, lasting from 
November 1887 to mid 1888, was the raid on the Park Deer Forest. This was a 
major demonstration by the crofters'1movement rather than a spontaneous outburst of 
defiance against the deer forest system. It was efficiently stage managed by the 
schoolmaster at Balallan and leading light in the Crofter's Movement, Donald 
MacRae. Again, this occasioned a military response from the government, but by the 
time the soldiers arrived the raiders had quietly given themselves up. The raid 
attracted some lurid press coverage, with reports circulating of rifles imported from 
Ireland and vast numbers of deer slaughtered. If the official record does cast some 
doubt on these allegations there can be no doubt that the raid achieved its principal 
objective, to attract attention to the plight of the cottars who participated in the raid. ^  
Subsequently, the raid has become something of a favourite subject for modem 
writers, who have, to a greater or lesser degree, absorbed the more sensational 
aspects of the incident.^
The importance of the raid in terms of the pattern of the agitation was that, despite 
the ritual condemnations from all quarters, the raiders were acquitted on a 
technicality. The majority of the press felt that this would only serve as an 
encouragement to the agitation. ^  This conclusion would seem to be bome out. 
Crofters in the Point district of Lewis had made it clear as early as December 1887 
that they intended to occupy the farms of Galson and Aignish on January 9th 1888.
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Indeed, a deputation of crofters marched to the latter farm and informed the tenant of 
their intentions. The raids duly took place on the appointed day, and considerable 
trouble occurred at Aignish. The problems for the authorities stemmed not only 
from these high profile events, but also from a host of more minor incidents. A 
lengthy spate of nocturnal dyke breaking proved extremely difficult to counter. 
Sheriff Cheyne in his reports to the Scottish Office continually referred to the high 
state of activity and organisation of the Land League in Lewis. ^  This state of affairs 
necessitated the retention of the military force in Lewis. The effect of the agitation 
was to raise the temperature in other parts of the Highlands. This was particularly 
noticeable in Skye and the Uists. Though it should be noted that in the latter case 
there were autonomous factors, in particular a threat by the estate in South Uist, 
Benbecula, and Barra that they would begin to enforce the prohibition of crofters 
giving potato patches to cottars. This was spectacularly unpopular and such were its 
potential consequences that it was very quickly withdrawn. By the middle of the year 
the authorities in the disturbed districts felt that the worst of the agitation had passed. 
They put the improvement down to a number of considerations, the departure of 
most of the young men to the fishing and the improved returns from that industry. 
The principal reason was held to be the salutory effect of the heavier sentences 
passed on the Aignish rioters. These were widely held to have cancelled out the 
deleterious effects of the acquittal of the Park raiders earlier in the year. ^
The government tended to respond in the short term with military back up for the 
civil authorities attempting to deal with the disorder. This reflects their desire to stem 
the tide of lawlessness before they undertook any analysis of its roots. The 
Government felt that the despatch of military forces to a disturbed area was the 
best way to induce tranquillity. The police force was not regarded as objective. The 
perception that they were landlord instruments stemmed from the fact that the 
crofters did not contribute to the police rates. Indeed, the police constable in 
Stornoway felt that members of the force were "universally detested". It was 
noticeable that soldiers were held in higher regard by the crofters, whether this was 
due to the preponderant force which they represented or respect for the "Queens 
Uniform" is a matter for speculation. There were, however, limitations to the utility 
of military force. They were not able to add to the capability to detect criminals, 
which had to remain a police task. Further, they could only act as back up to the 
police in the presence of a magistrate, anything else would be tantamount to the 
declaration of martial law. By the period 1886 to 1888 the government had learned 
much about the deployment of soldiers in the Highlands. The first major operation 
involving marines, Skye in late 1884 and early 1885, had been plagued with the
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problem of fraternisation which destroyed the effectiveness of the force. To avoid 
any repetition the practice of billeting the soldiers with the population ceased. It was 
superceded by accommodating them aboard troopships, or billeting them together in 
local halls. The principal value of deploying troops was to counteract the impression 
that the police were inadequate to deal with sustained lawlessness, and to strengthen 
the law by having an apparently iresistable force behind it. Other more obscure 
advantages were suggested by Cameron of Lochiel, who pointed to the purchasing 
power of the soldiers as a boon to local traders, and hoped that the military presence 
would do its bit to reduce congestion by stimulating recruiting. ^  Military force was 
only one of a number of responses which was available to the government. It has 
already been noted in Chapter 2 how the military and the Crofters' Commission were 
used in tandem in the years immediately following the passage of the Act. They 
tended to complement each other, the Commission had more subtle capacities than 
the military option, but could operate efficiently only in areas where the agitation 
had passed its peak and did not infect the sittings of the Commission to the exclusion 
of constructive evidence.
The government's response to the agitation was multi faceted. Military force was 
only one of a variety of options employed, although, as the most visible it has tended 
to attract the greatest amount of attention from historians. Other facets of the 
response will now be examined. Their relationship to the agitation and the way in 
which the government hoped they would prevent lawlessness will also be 
scrutinized.
As noted above, those behind the Park deer forest raid in 1887 argued that one of 
their objectives was to provide food for the exceptionally destitute inhabitants of the 
parish of Lochs, indeed, they justified the killing of the deer in these terms. The 
government was keen to find out to what extent these allegations were true. In the 
short term they asked for information from the resident officials with this end in 
view. The picture which emerged was of a population suffering from acute poverty. 
Officials were reluctant to use the term "destitute" except to describe the most abject 
poverty, as it had unpleasant connotations of exceptional relief measures, and the 
attendant worry of demoralisation of the population concerned. Whilst the harvest of 
1887 had not been exceptionally bad, the financial returns from the east coast fishing 
were almost nil. A further financial penalty was the extremely low stock prices 
which prevailed in 1887. This was due to a change in the structure of the livestock 
market with the growing importance of chilled and frozen meat from New Zealand 
and North and South America.^ With the development of a higher degree of
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consumerism in the Highlands in the second half of the 19th century, this had 
obvious repercussions for the social condition of the people. The products of the 
crofts were more commonly used for wintering stock than for human consumption. 
The conditions were especially bad in the east of the island where the land was less 
fertile and the holdings smaller. The cottars were likely to be harder hit by these 
developments as they were highly dependent on the income they could make from 
fishing and other forms of labour. The problems were not confined to Lewis. The 
Inspector of Poor in the Parish of Kilmuir in north Skye reported similar 
circumstances, a reasonable harvest but low returns from the fishing and the sale of 
stock. The consequences of the agitation tended to exacerbate the problem and make 
the solution much more difficult. The widespread non payment of rents, whether 
through a conscious protest, or inability to pay, meant that contributions to the poor 
relief fund were low. This was an important factor in the situation in Lewis, and one 
which the estate officials were assiduous in informing the Scottish Office of. As time 
went on the operation of the Crofter's Commission would help. In 1887 however, the 
Commission was heavily tied up in Skye and the Uists and did not reach Lewis until 
the summer of the following year.^
II
1888 saw the government respond to the situation with two separate initiatives. Their 
nature demonstrated a preoccupation with the problems of Lewis. As a short term 
expedient, they awarded the Highlands a subsidy of £30, 000 in relief of rates. A 
proportion of this money was awarded to the School Boards and the bulk of it was 
distributed according to population, the highest rated areas being favoured. This, 
however, was not the only direct subsidy which the Highlands received. The subsidy 
of 1888 had been paid out of the Probate Duties while in the succeeding three 
financial years the Highlands received money amounting in total to £48,000 in relief 
of local taxation under the Local Government (Scotland) Act of 1889. This money 
was not of any long term benefit to the Highlands but it was vital in tiding over the 
crisis of the late 1880s and early 1890s. This money was not a contribution from 
central government to the Highlands. It was a reallocation of revenue raised in 
Scotland and intended to be spent there. ^
The second immediate government response to the problems encountered in Lewis 
in this period was to intensify the information gathering operation. For this purpose 
Malcolm MacNeill of the Board of Supervision, and Sheriff Fraser of Stornoway 
were commissioned to write a report on the condition of the cottar population in 
Lewis. These two men had been recommended for this task by Sheriff Cheyne the
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Sheriff Principal of the County of Ross and Cromarty. MacNeill had been employed 
by the government before in the Highlands. He had been Secretary to the Napier 
Commission, and in the wake of the 1886 Act, he had been despatched on a 
confidential mission to the Highlands by Arthur Balfour to gather information on 
prevailing attitudes. For his part, Fraser had been commended on his sensitive 
handling of the difficult situation in Lewis at the time of the Park raid and the 
disturbances at Aignish and Galson. Importantly, both men were native Gaelic 
speakers. The information gathered by the Commission would not only be helpful in 
substantiating policy options but the very fact of the existence of the Commission 
would help to convince the people of the island of the sincere nature of the 
Government's concern for them. As was customary when the government showed 
any signs of involvement in the Highlands, there were siren voices warning that this 
Commission would have a demoralising influence and would be regarded as a 
reward for the agitation and an encouragement to its continuation.^
MacNeill and Fraser personally visited 108 houses in the parishes of Lochs and 
Stornoway. The information on the economic and social condition of the people was 
then submitted to poor relief and estate officials. Their conclusions presented a 
picture of unremitting poverty, dire housing conditions and chronic congestion. In 
this, they laid themselves open to the accusation that they went to the areas were the 
conditions were worst in order to present as bleak a picture as possible. If, for 
example, they had visited the Atlantic coast of the island, they would have found 
different conditions. The soil was more fertile, and the holdings larger than in Lochs 
which was the most poverty stricken parish in the island. The reasons for this state 
of affairs were clearly presented. They substantiated the picture the government had 
acquired from its informal enquiries. The withdrawal of money from the economy of 
the island, in the shape of the collapse of income from the fishing industry and stock 
prices hitting a forty year low, were held to be the immediate causes of the recent 
poverty. More deep seated problems were also identified. The problems in the 
economy were not merely cyclical, but structural, particularly with regard to the 
fishing industry. The basis of the herring fishing industry altered fundamentally in 
1884. Faced with a worldwide downturn in the industry the curers were no longer 
willing to continue the arrangement whereby boats were contracted to them for the 
duration of the season, at a fixed price per cran. Instead, fish began to be sold at a 
daily peirhead auction, with the fishermen receiving a share of the price. The effect 
was to expose the fishermen to any fluctuations in the market. Importantly, the 
dominant trend in the late 1880s was downwards. ^
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Similarly, fundamental problems could be discerned in the structure of land holding 
in the island. MacNeill and Fraser referred to the consequences of congestion due to 
sub division of holdings. This was a theme to which several government agencies 
were to return in the succeeding years. It was the characteristic problem in Lewis, 
although it did exist elsewhere, and one to which modem authors have referred in 
attempts to explain the retarded nature of the economy of the Island. There are 
several factors which can be enumerated to account for this state of affairs; The 
relatively buoyant state of the economy in the years from the 1850s; The 
proliferation of sources of income leading to a decrease in the dependency on the 
holding encouraged the development of population levels which could not be 
sustained when the population was thrown back on the land, as it was in the late 
1880s. A second reason for the congestion was exacerbated, although not directly 
caused, by the agitation. Prior to 1886, most estates would have had specific 
provisions in their regulations prohibiting subdivision. From 1886 this prohibition 
was given legislative authority in the Crofter's Act. This did not solve the problem.
As we have seen attempts to outlaw subdivision in the Uists led to such an outcry 
amongst cottars that it was not followed through. In this period of agitation cottars in 
particular were alert to anything that could constitute a grievance. By the same token 
estates were reluctant to take actions which could lead to any further agitation. The 
agitation had seen lines of conflict drawn between the cottars and crofters and the /  
estate managements. The authority of the proprietors, and more pertinently the 
factors, was low as a result. Thus, the problem of enforcing the prohibition of 
subdivision was exemplified. Concluding their thoughts on a sombre note MacNeill 
and Fraser declared;
It is our conviction ... that actual starvation in Lews has only been 
averted during the present winter by the exceptional abundance of last 
season's crop, and will almost certainly occur before the crop of next 
season is available; your Lordship will judge whether the immense 
population here congregated can safely be permitted to rely on a 
chance so precarious in this climate as a continuance of favourable 
harvests.^*
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The official recognition of the peculiar problems of the island was regarded as a 
vindication of their position by the crofters’ movement. However, they did not regard 
the solution proposed so p o s i t i v e l y . ^  Given the depth of the problems recounted in 
this report it is not surprising that the authors proposed a solution which they 
regarded as permanent rather than palliative: state aided emigration. Emigration had 
been a permanent feature in government thinking about the Highlands for over 50 
years. MacNeill and Fraser were pushing an open door in terms of this policy 
recommendation. The government were already some way to developing a scheme 
for state aided emigration by the time MacNeill and Fraser reported. The climate of 
opinion and comment at the time was heavily in favour of emigration, or 
colonisation, for the Highland crofters. ^
From an early date, the government was making efforts to organise a scheme which 
was both politically and financially acceptable. By mid 1887 Lord Lothian the 
Secretary for Scotland had concluded that "the first step towards the solution of this 
great problem is an attractive and well devised scheme of state aided emigration". He 
undertook negotiations with various Canadian land companies to organise a scheme 
of colonisation involving their lands and government money. The discussions broke 
down over the issue of government unease at using the land as the security for the 
loans which were to be advanced. However, interest was revived on the part of the 
government, though not the land companies, with the agitation and destitution 
which characterised the later part of the year. They proceeded to organise a scheme 
involving the Canadian government. The Imperial government would provide loans 
of £120 for each emigrant family, and the Dominion government were to provide 
160 acres of free land under the Homestead Act. Malcolm MacNeill was despatched 
to Lewis and Harris in the spring of 1888 to undertake the task of selecting suitable 
families for emigration.^
There were a number of reasons for the adoption of the scheme, some explicit and 
publicly admitted, others not. Publicly, three basic reasons were enumerated; to 
benefit the population, to relieve the congestion, and to increase the size of holding 
available to those who remained. The latter two objectives were to be achieved by 
the reallocation of the holdings of the emigrants. The government made sure that it 
had assurances from the estates involved before the scheme was proceeded with. 
MacNeill saw a number of advantages for those remaining behind. Not only would 
they benefit from "increased elbow room" but predicted that the emigrant would find 
success in Canada and be able to "help his poor relations at hom e".^
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There were a number of other factors in the government's thinking on this issue 
which they did not so readily reveal. The emigration scheme fitted into the 
government's priority task at the time, which was to eradicate the agitation at source. 
Lothian admitted that because of its slow progress the Crofters’ Commission was not 
likely to settle the agitation. Further, it was felt that the Crofters' Act was a remedial 
measure and as such insufficient to deal with the real problem, congestion of 
population. Although the scheme contemplated at this juncture was limited in the 
number of families involved, it was hoped that it would prove valuable for the 
future. It would be viewed as a, hopefully successful, experiment in colonisation, and 
thus provide a model for the undoubtedly larger scheme which was required if 
congestion was really to be tackled. After all, in November 1886 MacNeill had 
written of the necessity of emigrating 30,000 families. Lothian saw the scheme of 
emigration as an alternative to reform of land tenure. It was to his mind a 
"permanent" remedy whereas land tenure reform was perpetual in its possibilities for 
raising expectations. He shared the view of MacNeill that a much bigger scheme 
would have beneficial effects.
Attitudes to this scheme varied considerably. It is very difficult to arrive at a 
verifiable conclusion as to the true state of crofter opinion on the matter. Certainly 
MacNeill found no difficulty in finding enough people to use up the £12,000 which 
was available for the colonisation scheme. He asserted before the Select Committee 
on Colonisation in 1889 that there was a general feeling in favour of emigration in 
the districts which he had visited. Other witnesses before that Committee who could 
safely be defined as representing the interests of the proprietors - such as William 
Peacock Edwards the Edinburgh solicitor and factor for Lady Gordon Cathcart or 
George Malcolm, factor for the Ellices of Invergarry - agreed with him. Equally 
strong in their assertions to the contrary were the representatives of the Crofter's 
movement, such as John Murdoch, Alexander MacKenzie, and the MP for 
Sutherland, Angus Sutherland. However, nothing in the way of reliable evidence was 
marshalled by either side to support these assertions. Interestingly, Lothian had 
claimed in 1887 that he had the support of three of the crofter MPs, as well as the 
Pamellites for an earlier version of the emigration scheme.
While MacNeill was in Lewis and Harris selecting families for emigration he 
encountered some concrete evidence of the Land League's opposition to emigration. 
They submitted fictitious applications and since it was MacNeill's policy to 
personally visit every applicant this resulted in a considerable waste of his time. He 
attempted to counter this by ensuring the applicants were chosen early and subjected
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to extra "encouragement" by the estate management to ensure that there was no 
"hesitation" when the time came. It was of course in the interests of the League to 
attempt to create the impression of crofter opposition to emigration. If emigration 
was seen to be gaining ground among the crofters it would counter their argument 
that their was sufficient land at home for them, and severely limit the League's 
ability to campaign effectively on that premise. ^
The details of the fate of the colonists on the other side of the Atlantic, and the 
difficulties which the scheme encountered have been covered elsewhere. It would 
seem that the 1888 emigrants went out too late in the year to be able to begin 
cultivating their land and had to live off their money until the spring of 1889. 
Subsequent investigations concluded that the loans made available to them, £120, 
were insufficient to allow them to set themselves up adequately. Other problems 
included allegations of extravagance among the colonists in their purchases of 
agricultural implements, and families attempting to make the loan of £120 cover two 
holdings, one for the father and another for a grown up son. Due to these problems 
the government had difficulty in recovering its money and the two settlements, 
Killamey in Southern Manitoba and Saltcoats in the North West Territories were 
less than conspicuous successes. ^
Other problems existed closer to home though, notably maladministration by the 
board set up to organise the scheme. It has been argued that it was the opposition of 
the crofters which ensured that the scheme did not continue beyond 1889. Certainly 
opposition from the Land League was encountered. How far this reflected broad 
based opposition by the crofting population could be questioned. Further, the 
government's attitude to the opposition makes it unlikely that they would capitulate 
to it. MacNeill actually reported that he regarded the opposition of the League as an 
encouraging sign;
...if the Land League ... did not look on emigration as a death blow to
the agitation and therefore to their power for mischief, these cruel
misrepresentations would not be used to induce the people to
• 31remain.
The fact the the Board spent all the money it had available to it by 1889, and the 
difficulties they encountered in extracting repayments were more important in the 
termination of the scheme than any positive response to the crofting community's 
demands.
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This was in many ways a novel scheme, the first time the state had become involved 
in the concept of emigration to this degree. It would have been surprising if some 
attempt had not been made to test the possibilities of emigration as a policy given the 
number of times it had been recommended to the government and the clamour for it 
which continued in the press , The Liberal government which took office in 1892 
had different priorities and was not well disposed towards emigration. From 1889 the 
Unionist government had themselves began to develop more diverse policies. 
Emigration, although it remained on the agenda it did so at a lower level than before. 
Perhaps the principal limitation with the colonisation policy was that it was 
geographically limited. The areas of congestion in the Highlands were limited to 
portions of the Hebrides, mainly Lewis and Harris, and the west coast. There were 
areas of the Highlands which the government had not really reached with any of its 
policy initiatives.
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The Government's policy, developed over the years from 1888 to 1892, for the 
development of the country and the stimulation of the fishing industry by large scale 
investment in the infrastructure in the Highlands has been hailed as a watershed in 
government t h i n k i n g . A  link should not be made between the demise of the policy 
of colonisation and the beginning of the policy of development first manifested in 
the appointment of the West Highlands and Islands Commission, chaired by 
Spencer Walpole, the Govemer of the Isle of Man, in 1889.^ Further, the policy of 
development should not be seen as a victory for the crofting community, or as 
significant of a sudden belief in the government of the viability of the crofting 
system. The harsh reality was that the initiative stemmed from concerted 
proprietorial demands and it should be seen as part of the same process which had 
led to the attempt at a colonisation scheme.
In mid 1888 Lothian received a lengthy Memorial from a group which included most 
of the major Highland proprietors. Their analysis of the state of the Highlands was 
closely in tune with that of the government. They perceived the problems to be 
chronic and believed that the only solution was concerted government intervention in 
three areas. Firstly, a programme of public works with the specific aim of developing 
the fishing industry; secondly, relief of congestion through colonisation; and thirdly,
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an injection of money to subsidise ratepayers in heavily burdened areas. They argued 
that the development was only likely to be successful if the population had been 
reduced at first. The proprietors explained away their distaste for government 
intervention by arguing that it was not they, but the government, which had begun 
the process with the 1886 Act.'*'*
In his submission to the cabinet, Lothian responded positively to the demands made 
by the proprietors, arguing that it was desirable that the possibilities for developing 
the fishing industry should be examined, the colonisation scheme continued and 
extended, and some money should be found for the relief of local taxation in the 
Highlands. The objectives were clear, in the short term to relieve the prevalent 
destitution, and in the longer term to diversify the economy in the Highlands to 
reduce the centrality of the crofting system. As the civil servant William Dunbar 
argued, with better facilities for the fishing industry and better connections to the 
southern markets, the West Highland Crofters "might become independent of their 
crofts a lto g e th e r" .^  This idea of weaning the people of the land, or at best 
separating the disciplines of fishing and crofting was an abiding concern for the 
government. It was felt that the people in trying to do both only succeeded in doing 
neither well enough to make a living. The government conducted exhaustive 
enquiries before the policy bore any fruit. Lothian, himself visited the Highlands in 
1889 to view the sites of the potential developments, and to meet the crofters in what 
was essentially a public relations exercise. ^  Consequent upon this experience he 
appointed the West Highlands and Islands Commission. This body made two reports, 
the more important in 1890 concerning the Islands and the Western Seaboard and a 
second the following year dealing with the northern coast and the Orkney and 
Shetland Islands. Its main recommendations were a railway to the West Coast 
preferably with its terminus at Aultbea, and the extension of the existing railways 
from Stromeferry to Kyle of Lochalsh and Banavie to Mallaig. The operation of a 
system of subsidies to steamers on the West Coast and the development of a major 
harbour at Ness in Lewis and numerous other smaller landing places. They also 
proposed expenditure on seemingly minor, but nevertheless important items, as 
lights for shipping and telegraph facilities. One of the improvements which were 
recommended was a road from Stornoway to Carloway on the West Coast of
I Q
Lewis00. This proved to be a long running saga. The work was beset with problems, 
both contractual and technical and the road was not completed until 1912. On its 
completion it became popularly known as the "Pentland Road", in recognition of the 
Liberal Scottish Secretary, John Sinclair, later Baron Pentland, who made significant 
efforts on its behalf. The main objective here was the development of the fishing
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industry which the Commission felt had been neglected due to the lack of facilities, 
and to a "want of energy" amongst the Highlanders which was perpetuated by the 
poor facilities. They also felt that emigration was a crucial component in the 
development of the Highland economy and added another voice to those arguing that 
crofting and fishing could not be simultaneously pursued. Lothian pressed the 
Treasury hard for the £150, 000 which he felt justified in asking for to carry out 
these recommendations. He used some interesting arguments in his submissions to 
G.J Goschen, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, arguments which confirm the view 
that the policy of development should be viewed concurrently with that of 
emigration. He argued that the Highlands were a special case requiring government 
intervention as local taxation was insufficient to cover the expenditure. The 
expenditure, it was argued, would see the Highlands transformed to a condition 
where agitation was a thing of the past and prosperity would be generated through 
the increased income from the fishing industry. Above all Lothian pointed out;
In conclusion, I must add that my recent visit to the North West 
Districts has confirmed my conviction that, concurrently with any 
other scheme of assistance, it is absolutely necessary, for the 
permanent relief of the destitution and overcrowding in many of these 
districts, that a regular scheme of emigration should be carried out. 
Without this the problem is I think, insoluble.
One of the arguments which Lothian used in his attempts to extract money from the 
Treasury was to point out that the government had sanctioned expenditure for 
similar purposes in the West of Ireland.^® As well as coercion and poor relief, 
Balfour had initiated large scale development schemes. These included railway 
building and the improvement of agriculture through the Congested Districts Board, 
set up in 1892. These schemes have recently been criticised by historians on account 
of their lack of contribution to the prosperity of the region and the anglo-centric 
political motivations behind them. Although there were similarities between the two 
cases, in that both involved an agitation among small tenants there were differences. 
Most importantly the government believed there was a great deal more at stake in 
Ireland. Home Rule had to be killed, with kindness or repression, whichever was the 
most effective. Salisbury and Balfour believed that if Ireland was allowed to leave 
the UK it would be the beginning of the disintegration of the Empire. No such big 
claims could be made for the Highlands.^
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In December 1890 the Treasury agreed to expenditure of nearly £70000 to cover the 
building of the roads and harbours, the steamboat subsidies and the telegraphic 
extensions. The final amount of grant would however be unknown until the 
controversial railway question was settled.^
The issue of which of the proposed railway schemes should qualify for government 
assistance was generating a considerable amount of debate. As well as the proposed 
extensions of the Highland Railway to Kyle of Lochalsh, and the West Highland line 
to Mallaig there where other schemes mooted. The issue of the whereabouts of the 
terminus on the West coast to serve the Minch fisheries was particularly vexed. 
Various interest groups were arguing for Aultbea, Ullapool, Lochinver and Laxford. 
In all probability it was likely in 1890 that only one of these lines could be built. 
Aultbea had a number of physical and geographic advantages over the others, but 
Ullapool had the political advantage that its proposers had an Act of Parliament 
passed to sanction the line .^  Railway Company politics were also a pertinent issue 
in the decision. The Highland Railway Company owned the line to Strome Ferry 
and it was felt that they would be unlikely to see much sense in operating another 
line to the west coast. Indeed they had turned down the opportunity of doing so. On 
the other hand they were unlikely to feel positive about their rivals, the Great North 
of Scotland Company, running the line, especially as some of the new route to the 
west coast would have to utilise the Highland line for a portion of the journey, 
regardless of the terminus. For example if the terminus was to be Ullapool the most 
direct route would be by way of a branch from Garve on the Highland Line, or 
Achnasheen on the same line in the case of Aultbea. This controversy gave rise to 
what the Scottish Office called a "most interminable correspondence."^ Despite 
the West Highland Commission recommending that the location of the terminus be 
Aultbea and a second committee appointed in May 1891 favouring Lochinver, the 
government tended to support Ullapool. Perhaps this was so because of the 
vociferous nature of the representations from that quarter, or, more likely, the 
existence of Parliamentary and Treasury approval for the line .^  The issue was not 
settled in the lifetime of the government. In the event none of the large projects 
contemplated were carried out. The two existing lines were extended to Mallaig and 
Kyle of Lochalsh respectively, with the help of government loans. The government, 
certainly the Unionist government, were not entirely comfortable about subsidising a
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line which was never likely to be a viable commercial proposition. Despite defence 
implications and statements about the national good the only real justification for 
such a line would be the development of the fishing industry, and with the agitation 
dying out by the early 1890s the Highlands were given less priority by the 
government.
It can be seen then that despite large claims in its early years the Unionist 
government actually failed to produce the fruits of its policy. The Scotsman aptly 
commented in 1891 that the Highlands "are never without their Commission". The 
government spent a great deal of time in the gathering of information for the policy 
making process possibly to the exclusion of positive action. Most of its policy 
initiatives were never followed through, the colonisation scheme never proceeded 
past the stage of experimentation, the ideas for the development of the Highlands did 
not fully come to fruition. Railway development was limited and protracted and 
specific projects like the Carloway Road and the Ness Harbour in Lewis proved 
problematic. This is not to argue that a certain amount of progress was not made in 
the building of harbours, subsidising of steamers and development of the telegraph 
system, with the latter being especially helpful to the fishing industry. However, 
these were minor achievements compared to the intentions of the Government in its 
early years. Certainly, the Unionist government did not preside over a lasting 
transformation in the state of the Highlands. In particular, the fishing industry never 
achieved the central economic role for the indigenous population which Lord 
Lothian and others had hoped. ^
A second concluding point which can be made on the record of this government is 
not only to note the structure of its intended policy, with the combination of 
emigration and development but also the direction. In announcing his visit to the 
Highlands in 1889 Lord Lothian made clear the objectives he had in mind for the 
visit;
the object of ascertaining how far any of the
proposed works are practicable, desirable and likely to prove 
effective. The inquiry will not be directed to questions of rent, or as to 
how far the demand for more land can be met, these being matters 
falling within the province of the Crofters' Commission.^
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This attitude was redolent of the overall approach of the Government. They 
attempted to deal with the problems of the Highlands without further alteration of the 
arrangements of land tenure. Whether they were worried about being perceived 
weak in the face of continuing demands from the Land League, or concerned about 
creating undue expectations among the crofters, is unclear. This attitude makes the 
thesis that this government was highly responsive to the demands of crofters difficult 
to substantiate.^
Away from the debates in the government about Highland policy the situation on the 
ground had changed by the early 1890s. The agitation had declined considerably. It 
took on the appearance of a guerilla campaign rather than a full frontal assault on the 
existing structure of land holding. Instead of the large scale land raids which had 
been characteristic of the agitation in 1887 and 1888, action was limited to small 
scale intrusions, the destruction of fences and dykes and the occasional deforcement 
of a Sheriff Officer.^
The period 1888 to 1891 had seen three relatively mild winters and no particular cry 
of destitution from the Highlands. Stock prices had been better and there was a slight 
upturn in the income from the fishing industry. However a climatic deterioration in 
early 1891 exposed the vulnerability of social conditions. Destitution was reported in 
the parish of Lochbroom in Wester Ross and in Skye, and was of a scale and 
intensity for the poor relief authorities to require imports of meal and for the 
commencement of relief works to be contemplated. ^  The following winter saw 
further problems and although the focus of the problem this time was Lewis, 
problems were also encountered in north Sutherland. The mild winters had seen a 
build up of stock beyond what could be wintered on the land when the weather 
deteriorated. Valuable seed and meal was then used to keep animals which should 
have been sold years before, and a shortage of food was the ultimate result. Poor 
agricultural practice, particularly in Lewis where rotation of crops was practically 
unknown, certainly did not lead to optimism in the government. 51 Many of the 
attitudes which the authorities displayed towards the relief of this distress were 
reminiscent of the famine of the 1840s. The idea of the destitution test remained 
relevant, ie. pitching the wage levels for relief works lower than anything else 
available, to ensure that only the truly destitute would consider accepting them. 52
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The Unionist government of 1886 to 1892 had clearly demonstrated its priorities. 
First of all to adopt a structured approach, encapsulating colonisation to reduce 
congestion, to be followed by development to ensure that the remaining inhabitants 
would not impose on the government again. This policy would, in theory, lead to the 
obselescence of the second strand demonstrated by Lothian, the taking of emergency 
action to deal with recurring crises, either in the shape of agitation or destitution. The 
reform of land tenure, the crofters' principal demand, was simply not on the 
government's agenda. This demonstrates that the government were responding to 
their traditional constituency, the proprietors. The policies pursued in the period 
1886 to 1892 reflected their demands, as enumerated in their Memorial to the 
government in 1888.
The unpopularity of the general thrust of the policy, as much as dissatisfaction with 
the government's failure to fulfill the promises it had made, accounted for the 
success of the Crofter candidates at the General Election of 1892. Caithness, 
Sutherland, and Ross-shire, were all retained. In Argyll D.H. MacFarlane recaptured 
the seat he had lost in 1886 to Colonel Malcolm of Poltalloch, a Tory proprietor. In 
Inverness-shire the crofters' most highly respected and longest serving 
representative, Charles Fraser MacKintosh was defeated by Dr Charles MacGregor, 
a Land League candidate. This result reflected the unpopularity of Fraser 
MacKintosh's opposition to Home Rule.*^ This result was inexplicable to the Tory 
press and led them to reflect on the ungrateful nature of Highland electorates and the 
cheap promises of the Land League. The victory of the Crofter candidates in 1892 
was different to the successes of 1885 or 1886. By 1892, the Crofter MPs had 
become synonymous with the Gladstonian Liberal Party. The Land League itself had 
changed. Its interests had become broader, espousing Disestablishment and Home 
Rule. This only served to cause divisions among its members who, although they 
agreed on Highland issues, did not necessarily share the same views on these wider 
questions. Splits began to appear in the ranks of the League, initially in the 
Inverness-shire branch in 1891, but more widely in 1893. That year saw the HLLRA 
reformed by prominent members of the League dissatisfied with the problems caused 
by Angus Sutherland's Chairmanship, particularly his perceived neglect of the grass 
roots of the movement. This had been reflected in poor performances in the County 
Council and School Board elections. Many felt the League was being run by a 
London based clique. Efforts were made to bring its decision making structure closer 
to home and to revamp its campaigning facilities. Despite this, the various 
embodiments of the crofters' movement could not regain the eminence of the 
HLLRA in the mid 1880s.55
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IV
Gladstone's fourth administration, which took office in August 1892, engendered 
high expectations in radical circles with its shopping list of reforms embodied in the 
Newcastle Programme. These high expectations were evident in the Highlands. Sir 
George Otto Trevelyan, Secretary for Scotland, as he had been for a period in 1886, 
had toured the Highlands in 1890. He poured scorn on the Unionist policy, and 
denounced the West Highland Commission as a fraud. He went on to promise that 
the government would legislate on behalf of the cottars and leaseholders who were 
excluded from the 1886 Act, and bring more land under crofting tenure. He was, 
however, vague on the precise mechanics of this proposed transformation.^
Trevelyan proved to be a weak Scottish Secretary in an administration with a slim 
majority and little standing in the country, especially after Gladstone's retirement in 
March 1894. One contemporary described his performance as "lamentable".^ The 
first evidence of the new Government’s Highland policy was the appointment in 
December 1892, of the Royal Commission (Highlands and Islands) 1892, which 
became popularly, and somewhat misleadingly, known as the "Deer Forest 
Commission". The fact that Highland policy was low on the agenda of another 
Liberal government dominated by Irish Home Rule is suggested by the fact that 
Trevelyan and Harcourt had to remind Gladstone that such a Commission had been 
discussed at the cabinet. Its purpose was to;
... inquire whether any, and if any, what land ... now occupied for the 
purposes of a deer forest, grouse moor, or other sporting purposes, or 
for grazing not in the occupation of crofters or other small tenants, is 
capable of being cultivated to profit or otherwise advantageously 
occupied by crofters or other small tenants. ^
The government had declared that the Commission was not appointed to advise on 
policy, it had already been decided to give more land to the crofters, but to identify 
the land which would be given.
The Commission received a universally bad press on its appointment, throughout its 
work, and on the publication of its report. The initial criticisms focused firstly, on 
the vague nature of the remit, particularly the words "otherwise advantageously 
occupied", which commentators struggled to interpret. Secondly, the personnel of the 
Commission was attacked on account of its lack of practical expertise in land
85
valuation and agriculture, and further on its political persuasion, which was largely 
inclined to the Land League. One Highland factor called them a "sorry crew" and 
predicted a wholesale attack on the property rights of landowners. The Commission 
was Chaired by David Brand, the widely respected Chairman of the Crofter's 
Commission. Several well known Land League personalities also sat; Angus 
Sutherland, MP for Sutherland and Rev Malcolm MacCallum, Church of Scotland 
Minister in Muckaim, Argyll-shire. Both were prominent in the crofters' movement, 
and the latter was a brother of the equally prominent Rev Donald MacCallum of 
Watemish and subsequently Lochs in Lewis. George Gordon, a land valuer from 
Elgin, was the only member with any relevant expertise. Voices associated with the 
crofters' movement commented, prophetically, that the only effect of the 
Commission would be to delay legislation. The response of proprietors was to 
convene in Inverness, under the Chairmanship of Cameron of Lochiel, to lament the 
effect the Commission would have on the value of their land.^
Prior to the publication of its report, in April 1895, the Commission held 64 sittings, 
interviewed hundreds of witnesses, accumulated 1500 pages of evidence, and 
inspected the relevant lands. From the outset the evidence took the form of a sterile 
debate between representatives of the crofters and the proprietors. The former 
arguing that old arable land suitable for reoccupation existed in abundance. Aged 
crofters were produced to list the names of old townships which had been cleared at 
various points throughout the century. The latter responded by denying the validity 
of hearsay evidence based on the all too fallible memories of old men. Further, they 
pointed out that even if old arable land could be identified it did not necessarily 
mean it could be reoccupied profitably. Standards of living had changed and 
conditions tolerable in the 1830s would not be contemplated by the crofters of the 
1890s. They pointed out that the grazing farms and deer forests which the crofters 
coveted would be destroyed as letting properties, to the detriment of prosperity in the 
Highlands, if they were given over to crofters. Proprietors and factors, who often 
gave evidence on their behalf, were particularly assiduous in their defence of deer 
forests arguing that they contained very little arable land at a suitable altitude for 
cultivation. The early sittings of the Commission set the pattern. John Mackay, a 
Portree merchant and Land League activist, asserted that land existed for the crofters 
and painted a picture of halycon days in the Highlands prior to the clearances. Lord 
MacDonald's factor argued that while many of the farms on the estate had land of the 
requisite quality, it would destroy the farms if it was given over to crofters.
86
In fact the Commission was a forum where the lines between the Crofter s'movement 
and the proprietors were clearly drawn. The Land League delegated its full time 
official, Donald Macrea, "Balallan", to help the crofters prepare their evidence and to 
see that they were questioned fairly by the Commissioners. The landlords 
organisation, the Highland Property Association, was represented by George 
Malcolm, who, in his lengthy evidence, delivered a classic exposition of the 
proprietorial case. He utterly denied the validity of Land League assertions that land 
existed for the crofters and that they should have it forthwith. The Highland Property 
Association had circulated a questionnaire to proprietors prior to the sittings of the 
Commission. They enquired as to the effect, on the estate and the local economy, of 
taking land from sporting and grazing purposes. Malcolm made it clear that he 
wished to argue that the amount of arable land in the deer forests was small, 
currently utilised, and hence not available for crofters. Others with an interest in 
deer forests were keen to make the same point, arguing that if the low lying, good 
land, was given to crofters there would be no place to winter the deer.^
The defence of the deer forest system was often conducted through the argument that 
they provided much needed employment and investment in areas which would 
otherwise not receive such benefits. The validity of these arguments has been eroded 
by recent studies of the issue which tend to suggest that the employment created was 
seasonal and minimal. It perhaps only compensated for the jobs lost when the land 
went from sheep farm to deer forest. Certainly, from the point of view of those 
involved in the crofter's movement such expenditure did not strike at the root of the 
problem of shortage of land. The enumeration of the fringe benefits of deer forests 
was always likely to sound unimpressive to those who viewed their very existence 
with contempt.^
The Commissioners made some attempt to investigate the potential of club farms as 
an alternative method of putting small tenants back on the land. They were held to 
have various advantages, in terms of improved husbandry and more attention paid to 
stock breeding. Nevertheless, there were disadvantages. It was felt by some that 
crofters had a propensity to quarrel which would hinder proper management. Also, 
club stocks tended to favour the crofter with means, at the expense of his less 
fortunate neighbour, and this could lead to problems. In the event club farms were 
not attempted widely enough for any judgement to be made as to whether they 
provided any answers to the problems of the Highlands.
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The Commission was plagued by internal problems. These had begun in 1893 when 
George Gordon demanded payment for the surveying work he did in connection with 
the Commission. The government's accession to this request created resentment 
among the other Commissioners who were only receiving their expenses. The 
government eventually got round the problem by employing independent surveyors 
and not using Gordon in his professional capacity. Nevertheless, the Commission 
was never united, with various members absenting themselves at various points 
during its sittings. There was also a definite political split. Those members 
sympathetic to the Land League were derided by one of their fellow commissioners 
for bias in their perception of the evidence. They argued that wherever signs of 
former occupancy existed new holdings could be created. There had been problems 
finding suitable people to sit on the Commission at the outset due to the lack of 
financial recompense offered. Trevelyan attempted, without success, to get the 
Chancellor, Harcourt, to grant more money for the Commissioners.**^
The Commissioners scheduled 1, 782, 785 acres throughout the Highlands as 
suitable for occupation by crofters, either as grazing extensions to existing holdings 
or as new holdings. This was regarded as spoilation by much of the press. A more 
pertinent criticism of the Commission's recommendations is that they did not define 
the solution to the problem of shortage of land. Despite a large amount of debate on 
the subject in the evidence, the Commission made no recommendation as to the 
optimum size of holding. Other substantial issues which received no mention in the 
report included the crucial issue of money. If new holdings were to be created, who 
was to pay for the buildings, equipment, and stock which would be required. The 
only hint of thought on the implementation of policy was an addendflttto the main 
report by three of the Commissioners. They advocated carrying out the 
recommendations through a land purchase scheme undertaken by a "representative 
body" with regulations for the selection of tenants and the management of 
grazings.'****
The report has often been interpreted by historians as a victory for the crofter's 
movement argument that land existed in abundance for the crofters* a justification of 
the agitation, and an authoritative statement on the iniquity of the deer forest 
system.**"^  A closer examination of the conclusions of the commission leads to a re- 
evaluation of these assertions. The total number of acres scheduled were divided into 
three sections. Land suitable for new holdings with corresponding pasture; land 
which could be used for extending existing grazings; portions of deer forests and 
sheep farms which were considered suitable for occupation as moderately sized
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holdings at a rent of more than £30. In the first category the commissioners 
identified 794,750 acres, in the second category, 439,188 acres and in the third, 
548,847 acres. In the latter category it was clear that crofters would be unable to take 
advantage of these holdings as they lacked capital. However, the government was 
not enthusiastic about providing money for the equipping and stocking of holdings. 
In turn, the land in each section was divided into old arable and pasture; in the first 
category there were 50,101 acres of old arable, in the second 4528 acres and in the 
third, 6393 acres. Clearly then the the vast majority of land was not old arable but 
pasture. In addition, the commissioners made it clear that they considered deer 
forests to be most unsuitable for cultivation on account of their sterility, excessive 
altitude and remoteness. The commissioners accorded the Island of Lewis special 
attention but reached the conclusion that if all the forest and farm lands were given 
over to crofters they would still be insufficient to effect a permanent remedy. Thus, it 
can be seen that the recommendations were less revolutionary than has been claimed. 
The most recent historian has commented that the crofters found the conclusions 
"disappointing". This is a more realistic assessment than many that have been made, 
both at the time and by other historians.**®
The government, armed with the report of the Commission, was expected to legislate 
to settle the grievances of the crofters by bringing more land into crofting tenure. In 
the 1894 session they had attempted to pass a bill extending the benefits of the 1886 
Act to leaseholders but it had to be dropped. At that time major legislation was 
postponed pending the report of the commission.*^ 1895, however, saw the 
government make a serious attempt to pass a large bill on behalf of the crofters. 
When its contents became known it occasioned major disappointment. Not least to 
Dr MacGregor, the MP for Inverness-shire who resigned his seat in protest at the 
governments lack of resolution on this issue. The Bill made no attempt to implement 
the recommendations of the Commission, merely extending the Act to other rural 
counties in Scotland, where the demand for such a measure was minimal, and to 
make enlargement of crofts through the Crofters' Commission easier. Arthur 
Balfour taunted the government in the Commons with the argument that while his 
party were prepared to make substantial decisions to deal with congestion in the 
Highlands, the Liberals seemed content to tinker with the fringes of the problem. The 
crofters' movement was disappointed by the contents of the Bill, but regarded it as 
better than anything likely to come from the Conservatives. ^  The Liberal 
government had initiated some minor developments during its tenure of office. Small 
grants were made to some of the County Councils for road improvements with 
particular reference to their educational needs. Further, it was Trevelyan who had
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taken the decision to spend £45,000 on the extension of the Highland Railway to 
Kyle of Lochalsh. This, however, had been a long running issue, predating his term 
of office. The extension to Kyle was favoured by the government as the cheapest and 
simplest option. This was inevitably unpopular with the proponents of the other 
schemes.
The argument proved academic as the Government resigned on the 21st of June 
1895. The failure of the Liberals to do anything for the Highlands was clearly 
reflected in the election results in 1895. Not only had the by election, caused by 
MacGregor's resignation, gone against the Liberals, but the victor on that occasion, 
Baillie of Dochfour, held the seat at the General Election. In addition, Argyll and the 
two burghs, Inverness and the Northern Burghs, also went to the Unionists. Several 
issues were involved here, clearly there was a national swing against the Liberals 
following the spectacular under achievement of the preceding three years. Further, 
and peculiar to the Highlands, were the issues of land reform, discussed above, and 
the government's espousal of disestablishment, which was unpopular among 
adherents of the Free Church. Liberal newspapers tried hard to forestall this defeat 
by arguing that a vote for the Conservatives was a rejection of land reform. Unionist 
ideas on land purchase were derided as "subterfuge" and antipathetic to the 
continuing need for more land for the crofting community.
V
The period 1886 to 1895 saw two distinct approaches to Highland issues. The 
Conservatives sought to temper radicalism with a tight grip on law and order, before 
going on to attempt to destroy its base with policies of emigration and development. 
Their espousal of emigration reflected the polarisation of the debate on the 
Highlands. With the crofters' movement arguing that there was land for the crofters 
to be settled on, the government chose to deny this with attempts to remove some of 
the population from the country. They specifically avoided any measures 
involving reform of the relationship between proprietor and tenant. This reflected a 
belief that the Liberals had gone far enough in 1886, and a veneration for private 
property. Further, had they indulged in further land legislation, the perception could 
be fostered that agitation had its rewards. The Duke of Argyll solemnly warned his 
fellow peer, Lothian, that the inevitable end to such legislation would be crofters 
"quartered ... on the fields of Monteviot and Newbattle". Thus, the Conservatives 
restricted themselves to reforms of the Crofters' Commission in 1887 and 1888, 
displaying a tendency to administrative reform which ran through their domestic 
policy.
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Under pressure from proprietors, and in possession of vast amounts of information 
from the Commissions, Committees and the multitude of reports from various 
officials who had been despatched to the Highlands, the Conservatives tried to 
stimulate the Highland economy through the development of the fishing industry. 
This policy promised more than it delivered. The central idea of a new railway 
terminus on the West Coast to ease the marketing of fish caught in the Minch did not 
come to fruition. The incomplete implementation of this policy and the changing 
political environment in the Highlands meant that when they returned to Government 
in 1895 the Conservatives adopted a new approach to the Highlands.
The approach of the Liberals in the period 1892 to 1895 was more ideological, but 
was hampered by the dominance of the Irish issue in 1892 and 1893, and by a 
chronic lack of leadership in 1894 and 1895. Trevelyan did not have the political 
weight to overcome these obstacles and force the Highland issue on to the cabinet 
agenda. His Royal Commission was derided from all quarters and its conclusions 
ignored. Despite the apparent commitment of the government on its election and its 
considerable reservoir of support in the Highlands, the Liberals failed to produce 
anything distinctive. However, atrophy in the crofters' movement and economic 
improvement meant that there was no resurgence of the agitation which had greeted 
similarly dashed expectations a decade earlier. They did manage to lay aside the 
shibboleth of emigration and concentrated on extending the crofting system, themes 
to which they returned in 1906.
The 1890s have been called the "decade of peace", clearly this was so in comparison 
to the to the strife of the 1880s.^ This was the biggest achievement of the Unionist 
government and particularly reflected the efforts of Lord Lothian at the Scottish 
Office. As befitted a former diplomat, and in contrast to Balfour, his predecessor, 
Lothian's response to controversy was low key and constructive.77
The major distinctive element to emerge from the period was the creation of a 
climate of opinion where land purchase could become an acceptable policy. In the 
Bill which followed his tour of the Highlands in 1887, Joseph Chamberlain 
advocated such a policy. The response of the Crofters' movement at this time was 
cool.7* By the early to mid 1890s the major proprietors seemed more positive. The 
Duke of Sutherland experimented with a small scheme on his estate: MacLeod of 
MacLeod and Cameron of Lochiel advocated it before the Royal Commission of 
1892.7^ MacLeod was praised for this advocacy by William Burroughs^the strident
91
Orkney proprietor N and by William Edwards, of Skene Edwards and Garson, an 
Edinburgh law firm which acted for many landowners. Further, the Conservatives 
had experience of the policy in Ireland. There, as in Scotland the objective was to 
free the proprietor from the limitations of "dual ownership" rather than to expropriate 
him on the crofters' behalf. Proprietors were particularly opposed to the idea of 
having new holdings created on their estates against there will. This opposition was 
to be particularly vocal in the years after 1906 when a Liberal government tried to 
implement just such a policy.®*
The themes of the period 1886 to 1895 extended back to the priorities of the earlier 
1880s, with large scale law and order problems and difficulties over the rent issue. 
Also they extended forward to the period leading up to the Great War which was 
dominated by attempts to extend the crofting system geographically and politically^ 
he latter through the attempted conversion of the crofter from a protected tenant to 
a peasant proprietor.
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CHAPTER FOUR.
The Conservative Government and the Congested Districts Board, 1897 to 1906.
The 1895 election had seen significant Unionist advances in the Highlands. In 1895 
J.E.B. Baillie held Inverness-shire which he had won earlier in the year at a by- 
election. The two burgh constituencies and Moray and Naim were added. Despite 
losing Inverness-shire in 1900, the Unionist breakthrough was consolidated by 
victories in Orkney and Shetland, and Sutherland. * Unionist land policy in these 
elections was twofold. Much of their rhetoric was critical of the Liberal government 
which was accused of having ignored the Highlands. More substantively, they 
promised a measure of land reform based on the concept of land purchase. This, as 
has been noted above, was called for by a minority of the 1892 Royal 
Commissioners. Historians have made the link between that Royal Commission and 
the establishment of the Congested Districts Board (CDB) in 1897. ^  This misses 
the point. There was a definite Conservative analysis of the land question which led 
to the application of the concept of land purchase in Scotland, as in Ireland. Not only 
was there the aim of relieving existing proprietors of the burden of their crofting 
tenants, but also the aim of creating new proprietors. The Duke of Argyll, 
summarised this neatly in 1895;
A measure which could provide facilities for the purchase of estates
at low prices to be broken up might create a very desirable
Conservative middle class of proprietors. ^
This chapter will examine the conduct of the CDB under the Conservative 
Governments from 1897 to 1906. This examination will proceed primarily in the 
context of the Conservative objectives behind its creation. However, of considerable 
importance is the crofter input to the development of the policy of land purchase. 
This was largely a negative contribution, with crofters reluctant to cooperate in the 
key policy of migration, and unwilling or unable to purchase holdings. These trends 
created the conditions for a distinctive Liberal contribution to the debate on 
Highland policy from 1906
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1897 saw the passing of the Congested Districts (Scotland) Act. It provided for the 
creation of a Board to administer a fund of Government money to be used for the 
benefit of certain parishes deemed "congested". These were to be defined by the 
members of the Board with reference to the population and valuation of those 
parishes. The formula used was that the valuation of holdings under £30 should not 
exceed £1 per head of population. ^  This led to 56 parishes in the crofting counties 
being defined as congested. Andrew Graham Murray, the Lord Advocate (as the 
Scottish Secretary, Lord Balfour of Burleigh, was a peer, Murray conducted Scottish 
business in the Commons) told MPs what the objects of the new Board were to be;
The objects included the aiding and developing of agriculture... the 
provision of land for sub division among crofters and cottars for 
cultivation and grazing; the aiding of migration of crofters and cottars 
to other districts and their settlement there.
In addition the Board was to have responsibilities for developing the fishing and 
other industries and extending the road and communications network in the 
congested area.**
Before the Board even set to work, a number of criticisms were directed at it. They 
concentrated on three aspects of the new legislation. Firstly, the Board's lack of 
compulsory purchase powers was lamented. Most of the Highland MPs made this 
point in the Commons. John Galloway Weir (Ross-shire) and G.B. Clark 
(Caithness) both pointed to Lewis as an area where this shortcoming would be 
cruelly exposed. Not only was it the epitome of congestion, but the whole island was 
in the hands of one proprietor who, in the absence of compulsory powers, could veto 
any action by the Board. This, however, was to miss the point, the Government was 
interested in relieving congestion but in cooperation with the proprietors not at their 
expense. Further, they saw the Congested Districts Board (CDB) as an experiment 
and as such were reluctant to provide it with draconian powers.** Secondly, the 
constitution of the board was attacked. It was to be composed of the Secretary and 
Under Secretary for Scotland, the Chairmen of the Crofter's Commission, the Fishery 
Board for Scotland, and the Local Government Board, plus not more than three other 
nominated members. Although these arrangements were commendable to some from 
the point of view of economy, it was felt by others that the Board would largely be 
staffed by men in different parts of the country busy with other responsibilities and
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unable to give the CDB the time which was demanded by the problems which faced 
it7  This fear proved to be well founded, and was often voiced during the Board's 
existence. It was pointed out that for no single member was the work of the CDB the 
first claim on time and money, leading to the inevitable conclusion that the Secretary 
for Scotland was "in reality the CDB". Such facts have led commentators to 
conclude that the CDB lacked executive direction. The fact that the complete 
membership of the Board rarely convened together for a meeting certainly hampered 
its ability to react quickly to situations.^
The third point raised concerned the fund which the CDB was to administer. 
Although the government announced that this would amount to £35,000 in total it 
was pointed out that this was not all new money for the Highlands. Following the 
report of the West Highlands Commission, in 1891, there was an annual vote of 
money to carry out the purposes outlined by that Commission. This was now to be 
discontinued. Lord Balfour of Burleigh explained that the £35,000 was composed of 
£15,000 which had been set apart for the Highlands by the Agricultural Rating Act 
of 1896 and that the balance was in lieu of the former Highlands and Islands vote. 
So, the financial aspects of the Act did not grant new money to the Highlands, rather, 
they consolidated the administration of existing sums already set aside. Importantly, 
the CDB was allowed to accumulate a surplus without prejudicing the amount of its 
next annual vote. This attracted criticism to the Board in its early years when it 
accumulated a sizeable surplus. However, this was convenient as it allowed the CDB 
to purchase both Glendale and Kilmuir when they came on the market almost 
simultaneously. ^
There were also more general worries that the idea of aiding the ccongested areas 
through migration of the cottar population was doomed to failure through the 
reluctance of the people to move. This reluctance was seen by some to stem from the 
association in the minds of the people of migration, however beneficial, with 
clearance. This was an association which was never likely to prove helpful, and such 
worries proved to be prophetic in light of the CDB's efforts to relocate crofters over 
the next 15 years.
Like the Crofter's Commission, the CDB was operating without any real precedent. 
Although the Act of 1897 defined the scope of their operations there were a number 
of grey areas. How they were to acquire land was one. Given its lack of compulsory 
purchase powers, the Board had to consider expedients such as advertising for land. 
This question led to a debate on the CDB's general policy for land acquisition. Some
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members felt that the CDB was or should be limited to the crofting counties for land 
purchases. However there was nothing in the Act which specifically stated this, and 
Malcolm MacNeill, Chairman of the Local Government Board, and a man with very 
definite views on the Highlands, disagreed. He argued that if the CDB limited itself 
to the Crofting Counties it would be limiting its own chances of success. He felt that 
beyond the Crofting Counties there would be more scope for settlers achieving 
prosperity as there was a more active labour market. To create more holdings in the 
Highlands, where there was little demand for labour, would perpetuate the 
conditions which had led to congestion in the first place. A possible problem for the 
application of this admirable thesis was the feeling of the crofters on the idea of 
moving outside the crofting counties, or indeed moving anywhere. There would also 
be practical obstacles in the way of buying land in the lowlands, where most 
agricultural subjects were held under lease. What was clear was that the land to be 
bought did not have to be in the congested area, but the man to be aided had to come 
from one of the congested parishes. ^
Given its lack of compulsory purchase powers, the Board could not take the 
initiative in the land market but had to wait until a proprietor was willing to sell a 
piece of land. So for the first few years of its existence the CDB concentrated on its 
other objects, principally, the aiding of agriculture and stock breeding in the 
Highlands. In terms of the CDB's overall contribution it is important to examine its 
efforts in this regard.
As far as arable agriculture was concerned the CDB helped through the provision of 
a better quality of seed, new methods of combating crop diseases and an attempt to 
encourage vegetable growing in the congested districts. In the area of stock they 
provided bulls, rams and stallions to crofting townships in an effort to improve the 
quality of stock. This policy was successful to a degree but its ultimate success was 
hampered by the fundamental problem facing the CDB, the crofter's lack of quality 
land and capital. The former was needed to winter the CDB's animals when they 
were in the hands of crofters and the latter to supply them with adequate feeding. 
The consequence was a high rate of mortality among the sires loaned by the CDB. 
The problems faced were of course different in the various parts of the congested 
area. In Lewis the problems were chronic. Stock was of a very poor standard, due to 
long years of inbreeding and even the new blood introduced by the CDB failed to 
raise the standard greatly. Of course, this was the area where congestion was most 
acute, thus demonstrating the integrated nature of the problems faced by the CDB. ^
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The CDB also noted, as did the Crofter s' Commission, that the arrangement of 
common grazings, with the prevalence of overstocking and the absence of fencing, 
reduced the value of crofter's stock. The more stringent provisions of the 1908 
Common Grazings Act went some way to dealing with this problem. However, the 
crofters themselves showed a reluctance to deal with this problem through their 
grazings committees. The CDB tried at every opportunity to impress upon crofters 
the benefits to be obtained by the club stock system. In Kilmuir, which the CDB 
purchased in 1904, the Board was to see such problems exemplified. By 1910, six 
years after purchase and two years after the passing of the new Grazing Act the 
problems remained chronic. The grazings committee in Staffin, for example, was 
effectively based on the contribution of one man. He could make no progress and 
found that his efforts only served to engender ill feeling. Attempts were made to 
interest the crofters in the advantages of the club stock system, with some success. 
This had the advantage of generating some capital for the participants. It also had 
practical advantages in that the stock would be more expertly managed and disturbed 
far less. As a native of Kilmuir pointed out;
The Club Stock is also step towards cooperation, a principle which is 
so greatly needed in these parts, and should be encouraged in every 
possible way. 1**
It is important to note that it was not only ignorance and want of instruction that 
produced the low standard of agriculture in the congested districts. The shortage of 
good arable land made good agricultural practice, like crop rotation, difficult. It also 
meant that stock was rarely wintered adequately. Congestion, with its symptomatic 
problems of sub - division and squatting, created the conditions where overstocking 
became rife, leading to deterioration of the common grazings. Above all, the lack of 
capital among crofters in the congested areas perpetuated these problems. The 
crofter was always under the temptation to sell his best ewe - lambs to raise some 
ready cash rather than keep them for breeding. The CDB felt it was not within their 
power to provide crofters with loans to buy stock. They were concerned that with the 
fluctuating prices of stock such loans could not be adequately secured. The crofters 
and cottars in the congested areas rarely achieved the financial security to enable 
them to equip a holding properly or to take a long term view of their principal asset, 
i.e. their stock. ^
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Among the surveys of the work of the CDB there has been a tendency to 
compartmentalise its functions into neat categories, land settlement, improvement of 
agriculture, improvement of communications, etc. This short survey of the work of 
the CDB in the area of agricultural improvement demonstrates that such an exercise 
fails to convey the connections between the apparently diverse problems which faced 
the CDB.15
II
Although no major opportunities for large scale land purchases presented themselves 
to the CDB, they endeavoured not to neglect their duty of creating new holdings. 
1898 and 1899 saw the completion of a small holdings scheme on privately owned 
land in North Uist. In cooperation with Sir Arthur Cambell Orde, the proprietor, 34 
new holdings were created at Sollas and Grenitote, and the vacated land was 
redistributed. Care was taken to relieve the most crowded townships and the 
protection of the Crofter s'Act was extended to the new tenants on the condition that 
they paid their rents and kept up to date with the repayment of the CDB's loan for the 
equipment of the holdings. A similar scheme was developed on the Atlantic shore of 
Harris. ^  Macleod of Macleod prepared a scheme on one of his farms in Skye at 
Bay. He proposed to create 5 large crofts of £20 each, but complained to the CDB 
that there was little interest in his offer. The CDB felt that he had provided 
insufficient information and that the offer of such large holdings was too ambitious. 
The CDB offered to reshape the scheme and to help with details like access roads. ^  
This scheme is of interest due to the large size of the holdings on offer. The CDB 
had stated in its first report that it was their intention to create holdings which would 
provide the complete livelihood of the holder without any ancillary occupation. 
The failure of the initial Bay scheme to attract any interest was one of the first 
instances where the CDB's preferred policy foundered on the lack of interest and 
economic problems of the crofting community. Over the course of its existence the 
outlook of the CDB seemed to be often at odds with that of the crofters.
For the first few years of its existence, down to 1904 and the major purchases of 
Kilmuir and Glendale, the CDB was heavily criticised for its perceived failure to 
act. It was attacked for its inefficiency and its lack of contact with the people, 
especially on the mainland, as most of its activities had been concentrated in the 
islands. By 1903 such criticism was being echoed within the Scottish Office. The 
new Under Secretary for Scotland, Reginald MacLeod, argued;
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Can we in the sixth year of our work command continued public 
support unless we can show on of two things; either that the income 
with which we are entrusted is spent and well spent; or that every 
means of encouraging local activity has been tried and failed. ^
However, the next year did see some progress. The Board was engaged in serious 
negotiations to purchase the estates of Kilmuir and Glendale in Skye. In addition, the 
Duke of Argyll offered them his Ross of Mull Estate for £60,000. An offer which 
they refused due to the impending purchases in Skye. These purchases were an 
important breakthrough for the CDB. They could at last claim to be fulfilling the 
objects for which it was created, and for a brief period enjoyed an enhanced
reputation.^
Before going on to examine developments on the land which formed the major 
purchases of the CDB, it is interesting to note another instance where the CDB's 
efforts to provide aid to a crofting community did not provoke a favourable response 
from that community. The township of Sconser lay on the shores of Loch Sligachan 
in Skye, and was backed by the mountainous region of the Island known as Lord 
Macdonald's Forest. There had been an ongoing dispute between the crofters and 
Lord MacDonald concerning the right of the township to keep sheep. The estate was 
concerned about the animals encroaching on the deer forest and the crofters in turn 
complained of the deer damaging their crops. When the Crofter's Commission had 
tried to enforce the 1891 Grazings Act in respect of the overstock of sheep, a 
deforcement occurred and the township came to the prominent attention of the 
country and the government. The preferred solution of the estate was to move the 
crofters to other lands at Suishnish and Borreraig. Some authors have interpreted this 
as a cynical attempt by the estate to extend the deer forest at the crofter's expense. 
Others have presented the ultimate solution, the provision by the estate of a march 
fence between the deer forest and the township, as ideal.^ It is clear that Sconser 
was the scene of some of the worst social conditions in the Highlands. The Under 
Secretary for Scotland enumerated the advantages of a move;
The place is unhealthy. The holdings are too small, and for every 
reason it is better that they should be transferred bodily to other 
lands. The estate is willing to make over to them the lands at 
Suishnish and Borreraig which there is every reason to believe are 
amply sufficient for their wants. ^
108
The Crofter’s Commission held a special sitting at Sconser to attempt to persuade the 
crofters to accept the move. Sheriff Brand reminded the Sconser crofters of the 
frequent outbreaks of fever in the township. He pointed out that they would have the 
right to keep sheep, have more arable land, more and better hill pasture, access to 
fishing grounds, and retention of all their crofting rights at Suishnish and Borreraig. 
Despite these advantages Brand had to report back that;
it is beyond doubt that the prevailing tone of the meeting was against 
the proposed migration. No one present intimated any assent to the 
scheme, or suggested further consideration of the same, or inquiry as 
to the lands of Suishnish and Borraig.^
Many reasons have been suggested for the failure of these crofters to take advantage 
of such an apparently generous offer. It was certainly the case that Suishnish and 
Borreraig were less accessible than Sconser and the coastline was rocky in the 
extreme, as the crofters claimed. Some of the Sconser people may have been 
unwilling to give up their ancillary employment as mountain guides for the nearby 
Sligachan Hotel. Further, the attitude of the estate and the CDB in making the offer 
public before the crofters knew the details did not help to secure their co - operation. 
In addition, Suishnish and Borreraig had been the site of a notorious forced 
emigration and clearance in the early 1850s and as a result the crofters regarded the 
lands as impossible of profitable occupancy. However, Dugald MacLachlan, the 
Portree solicitor acting for the Sconser crofters, made an important point when he 
informed Lord Balfour of the "unspeakable tenacity with which people like them 
cling to their native locality".^
This episode is important for the pointers it provides as to the likely success of the 
CDB's key policy of migration. The Board would be unable to do anything to 
relieve congestion on a meaningful scale if it could not persuade the people of the 
congested areas to migrate. Sconser, as J.P. Day has noted, was the "first and only 
serious effort made by the Board to migrate the people" and it was a complete 
failure. If the CDB could not succeed in enticing crofters away from a fever ridden 
congested township to land which had been a substantial grazing property on very 
liberal conditions, there could be little hope for the policy of migration. Sconser 
provides another example of crofters reacting negatively to a central policy of the 
CDB, apparently to their own detriment. It is perverse to argue, as a more recent 
author has, that these events at Sconser represented a "mighty" victory for "the 
common p e o p l e " . I t  represented a defeat for the CDB which was engaged in
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reasonable efforts to relieve congestion, poverty, and in the case of Sconser, squalor, 
in the Highlands. One commentator argued that the CDB had been "baulked by the 
backwardness and immobility of those whom they wished to help". Moreover, a 
defeat which left the Board chastened and pessimistic about its potential for 
successfully carrying out its stated objects.
Existing evidence adds to the complexity of this question. There were in this period, 
and before, examples of crofters expressing a desire to migrate from their present 
holdings. In 1890 the Crofter's Commission had received a petition from the 
inhabitants of the district of Kyles Stockinish on the east coast of Harris, expressing 
a desire to move to the west coast of the Island. The Commission had no powers to 
give effect to such a move, regardless of its sympathy with the undoubted poverty of 
those involved. In 1906 crofters and cottars from Bruenish in Lewis applied to the 
CDB to be relocated. The Board has come under criticism for the tardiness of its 
response. However there was the question of where to move them to. The proprietor 
of Lewis, Major Matheson, offered the farm of Dalbeg, but on enquiry the CDB 
found that it would not be sufficient for the required number of self sustaining 
holdings. The CDB was of the opinion the "it would be most unwise to increase the 
number of miserable 25/- holdings that are so plentiful in Lewis". They concluded 
that the benefit to be gained did not justify the intervention.^
In 1900 the CDB acquired the option to buy one of the Duke of Sutherland's best 
grazing farms, Syre in Strathnaver. The CDB felt that only 12,000 of the 30,000 acre 
farm was suitable for small holdings. The Duke asked for the sum of £10,000 for this 
land, including the shooting rights. The principal obstacle in the way of this highly 
desirable transaction was familiar, the crofters did not have sufficient capital to take 
over the sheep stock on the farm. After some delay the land was purchased and some 
29 holdings were set up with the tenants purchasing from the CDB.^8 However, 
even the history of this transaction does not proceed according to the plans of the 
CDB. By 1907 the settlers were petitioning the government (by then Liberal) to be 
allowed to return to the position of tenants. They complained of the smallness of 
their holdings, the heavy purchase annuity and the heavy rating burdens consequent 
on ownership. There was also a political element to the demand. The government 
was in the process of trying to pass the Small Landholders (Scotland) Bill which was 
predicated on the basis of tenancy and not ownership. The petition was repeated in
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1909. On both occasions the government declined to entertain the requests of the 
settlers. But in 1911 the CDB recorded in their annual report that a third petition had 
been received. The request was granted and the Syre settlers returned to the position 
of tenants. By then the Small Landholders (Scotland) Act had been passed and the 
government were in a better position to grant such a request.
The political context of these events will be discussed below in greater detail with 
reference to the Board's activities in Skye and the Southern Hebrides. It is important 
to note at this point that the Syre crofters did not become unsettled until the change 
of government in 1906 and the consequent change of policy. In different 
circumstances Syre may have become a model CDB property, especially as it was 
reported in 1908 that the agricultural situation was prom ising. Outside the realms 
of speculation the experience at Syre must be recorded as a failure of the CDBs 
policy of land purchase.
On this evidence the record of the CDB in applying its policies does not appear 
attractive. The experience at Bay had suggested that large, potentially self - 
sustaining holdings were beyond the means and desires of crofters. The events at 
Sconser had exposed major problems with the key policy of migration, and the 
history of the Syre settlement from 1902 to 1912 hints that crofter support for the 
concept of land purchase was soft and could be easily eroded in changing political 
circumstances. It was essentially problems with the policy of migration which led to 
a reassessment of the latitude of the CDB in 1910. Because the policy of migration 
was inoperative by that time any purchase outside the congested area, like Seafield 
farm in Easter Ross which was purchased in that year, was useless to the Board 
because it was located in the parish of Feam which was not congested. 
Consequently, the CDB could not use its money to aid the inhabitants of that parish. 
The result of these and other considerations was that all the crofting parishes were 
also declared congested. It was hoped that this would give the CDB "much more of a 
free hand".^
Ill
One of the main arenas of the CDB's activities was the Southern hebridean estate of 
Lady Gordon Cathcart. They had seen most of the themes of Highland history in the 
second half of the 19th century. The area had achieved notoriety in the period of her 
infamous father - in - law, Colonel John Gordon of Cluny following his acquisition 
of the estate from the MacNeills of Barra in the 1840s. Lady Gordon Cathcart was a
I l l
proprietor of note herself. Although she rarely visited her lpng Island properties she 
held very definite views as to their administration. The controversies surrounding the 
visit of the Crofter’s Commission to South Uist in 1888, and the trouble which 
ensued when she attempted to enforce the provisions of the 1886 Act prohibiting 
subdivision have already been noted.
Lady Gordon Cathcart’s estate management had long been criticised by the crofter's 
movement. But such criticisms received a polite echo from the Crofter's Commission 
in 1902. They noted that in comparison to Arthur Campbell Ordes North Uist estate, 
no new holdings had been formed in South Uist since 1886. They commented on the 
"deplorable state of congestion" and the fact that the estate always "strenuously 
opposed" enlargement applications. South Uist was plagued by cottars to a large 
extent. By 1902 there were 227 with over £2000 worth of stock, and all the attending 
s q u a lo r .  ^  it was such facts, equally applicable to other parts of the estate which led 
to it becoming the focus of a further phase of crofter agitation from 1901 to 1909. 
There seems to have been a certain amount of loyalty and respect for Lady Gordon 
Cathcart herself. Whether this was merely good politics on the part of the crofters, 
who knew their demands for more land could only be met by her, is unclear. The 
Commission were well aware that the proprietor was the key actor when they stated;
The congestion on her ladyship's estates is ... very serious , and we
may be permitted to express the hope that wiser counsels may lead to
its removal by well considered assignments of land to crofters and
33others, without the application of any drastic remedy.
Lady Gordon Cathcart also held substantial lands on the east coast of Scotland, and 
was keen to apply some of the lessons from that area to her Hebridean estates. In 
particular, she believed that the exclusive pursuit of crofting by the people was a 
recipe for disaster, and that the ideal method of containing congestion was to provide 
small holdings for fishermen who would obtain their principle livelihood from the 
sea and not the land, as her east coast tenants did. In pursuit of this condition she had 
granted land in 1883 in the vicinity of Castlebay on Barra, at Bentangaval and 
Garrygall, for small fishermen's holdings. These settlements were less than 
conspicuous successes. Their prosperity was heavily exposed to the many and varied 
fluctuations in the fishing industry. 3^ The exercise was not repeated and by the turn 
of the century the problem of congestion on Barra was chronic. The estate had found 
it almost impossible to combat the problems of squatting and subdivision. The
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tenants on Barra were becoming discontented, as they had been in the 1880s. Their 
dissatisfaction achieved expression in September 1900 when cottars raided the farm 
of Northbay. They claimed that they had petitioned the proprietor for more land 
without success and that the raid was the only course left open to them.
The farm of Northbay and its tenants were themselves interesting and could not 
easily be fitted into the customary rhetoric against an alien farming class. It was 
tenanted by two brothers named MacGillivray who had been bom and brought up on 
the island. Indeed Lady Gordon Cathcart's agents, the Edinburgh law firm of Skene 
Edwards and Garson, described them as "two men of the crofter class who have been 
energetic and prudent beyond their fellows"^. The unusual factor in this situation 
was the close personal relationship between Lord Balfour, the Scottish Secretary and 
Lady Gordon Cathcart. This allowed Lord Balfour to make an enquiry in January 
1901 as to whether the proprietor would consider a proposal by the CDB to purchase 
land in Barra to enable some attempt to be made to relieve the crofters of the cottar 
burden. He made it clear that the CDB would purchase the land at fair value and no 
risk would fall on the estate. Her initial reaction was that such a course of action 
would only provide temporary relief and in the long run would be "suicidal". 
However, by February in view of the "strongly and repeatedly expressed wish of the 
CDB" she agreed to sell "with misgivings" the whole of the farms of Eoligarry, 
Grean and Cliat, Ardveenish and Northbay to the CDB, at an asking price of 
£15,000.36
This arrangement was ideal in principle as the lands formed a self contained unit in 
the north of the island which could be easily divided and administered as a whole. A 
problem arose when the MacGillivrays proved unwilling to vacate their farm to 
facilitate the deal. Their reasons were curiously reminiscent of crofter rhetoric. They 
argued that as they had spent all their lives there, they were attached to the place and 
unwilling to leave it. They went on to demand other land in compensation if they 
were to be moved, or alternatively they enquired whether Lady Gordon Cathcart 
would be willing to sell the lands in question to them. In the event the farm of 
Eoligarry was divided between the CDB and the MacGillivrays, and in addition the 
CDB purchased the farm of Northbay making a total price of £7,500.^
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The whole transaction was a highly unsettling influence on cottars throughout Barra. 
The news that the CDB was to purchase land in Barra created high expectations. 
Rumours circulated that the CDB had not been successful in its attempt to purchase. 
The cottars around Castlebay were disappointed that the CDB was not attempting to 
buy lands on the adjacent island of Vatersay which they had coveted ever since the 
Deer Forest Commissioners had scheduled them. A further problem was that once 
the CDB had actually secured purchase the earliest date of entry which they could 
negotiate was Martinmas 1901. This necessitated the arrangement of potato land to 
keep the cottars in the interim period. This mixture of expectation, rumour, 
disappointment and delay led to further land raids at Eoligarry and Vatersay in 
February and April 1901.^
Once the details had been concluded the CDB divided the land into 25 crofter 
holdings and 33 smaller fishermens holdings. The number of applicants exceeded 
the number of holdings and selection had to proceed on the basis of favouring cottars 
for the larger holdings and making judgments about those with experience or interest 
in the fishing industry for the others. This arrangement in itself caused 
disappointment among the cottars. They had expected that 120 holdings would be 
created, and were disappointed that the CDB appeared to be favouring applicants 
with capital. The CDB felt that capital was necessary for securing the loans they 
were to advance for the construction of improved houses, and for paying for stock. ^  
This provides another example of the familiar problem which the CDB faced. They 
were unable to reach out to the very poorest class in the congested districts because 
they lacked capital. Essentially, any settlement provided by the CDB was a 
partnership, with the CDB procuring and passing on the land and providing money 
for housing and other equipment. On the other hand the settler, who was most often a 
former landless cottar, had to provide all the items for which the CDB felt they could 
not make secure advances, principally stock, without which the holding would be 
worthless. Despite this, the CDB have been accused of creating too many small and 
potentially unviable holdings in this settlement.^
The CDB was keen to see the settlement managed along efficient lines. They made 
clear to the new settlers the absolute importance of adhering to the soumings, no 
overstocking was to be tolerated. Sheriff Brand, a member of the CDB by virtue of 
his position on the Crofter's Commission, made a personal appearance at Castlebay 
to press home these and other points, including the prescription that all houses 
should be completed by April 1904 on pain of removal. The CDB appreciated the 
importance of ensuring that the cottar houses vacated by the settlers should be
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demolished. If this was not done other cottars would take possession of them and the 
cycle of squatting and congestion would begin again, nullifying the work which the 
CDB had expended so much time and money on. The government took this task so 
seriously that they claimed they were prepared to spend £100 to fight each case of 
seizure to establish the principle.^
In the light of the preceding discussion of the CDB's experience with their settlement 
in Sutherland it is useful to compare and contrast the history of the Barra settlement 
which was purchased in the same period but which was located in the heart of the 
congested area.
By 1904 it was reported that the progress being made in the townships of Grean and 
Cliat, in the west of the CDB's land, was satisfactory. On the east side at Ardveenish 
and Northbay the progress, particularly in the area of housing, was slow. The settlers 
here had little capital and the fishing industry had not proved remunerative. Further, 
there were signs that the structure of local grazing committees and constables which 
had been set up to manage the common land was incapable of enforcing the rules 
concerning soumings, subdivision and squatting. By the latter part of 1905 it had 
become necessary to issue formal letters to those who were behind with house 
building. In a similar fashion to Syre, 1907 1908 and 1909 saw petitions from the 
settlers in Barra to return to the position of tenants. Changing political 
circumstances, awareness of the proceedings on other CDB estates and an initial 
miscalculation, or lack of awareness of what was involved in the purchase scheme 
combined to produce this eventuality.^
A factor which was present in the Barra situation which had been absent at Syre was 
the ongoing problem of congestion in the immediate vicinity of the CDB settlement. 
The CDB land manager reported an alarming increase in squatting in Barra, with the 
customary appalling housing conditions in attendance. This was proving to be a 
problem with which the estate could not cope. The CDB could see little way to ease 
the situation as the cottars possessed no means. Land raids recurred in the northern 
part of Barra in March 1909 . ^
This pattern of events would seem to confirm the worst fears of Lady Gordon 
Cathcart when she warned the CDB that the settlement would not prove a successful 
experiment in dealing with the cottar question. She had warned then, and repeated 
the warning on many other occasions in her frequent dealings with the CDB;
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I am profoundly impressed with the view that it would be a social 
and economic mistake to add to the number of crofter holdings in 
Barra.
She felt that the tendency for the children of crofters to stay at home indefinitely 
with no secure occupation was the source of the congestion on her estates. They 
settled on a portion of their parent's croft or squatted on the common grazing. They 
learnt no trade or skill, became imbued with the habits of indolence and were 
generally a detrimental influence on all those around them. In her view temporary 
migration, to the east coast fishing or for agricultural or industrial work in the 
lowlands was insufficient. Such migration represented an attempt by Highlanders to 
strengthen their position on the land by increasing their income. It did not represent a 
rejection of crofting life. In this regard she cooperated with the CDB in a scheme of 
industrial and domestic training for boys and girls from crofter families in the hope 
that they would be drawn away from the congested areas. This was certainly a 
worthy scheme but it was not conducted on a large enough scale to have sufficient 
impact on the inhabitants of the congested areas to reduce the problem of 
congestion.^
The policy of the CDB towards the end of its existence of allowing its settlers to 
return to tenancy was certainly not consistent with its earlier actions and could be 
interpreted as an admission of failure. It should be recognised of course that by this 
time it was operating under a Liberal government committed to the idea of tenancy 
and hostile to the concept of land purchase. Further, a government which had made 
repeated legislative efforts to have the CDB abolished, efforts which were eventually 
successful with the passage of the Small Landholders (Scotland) Act in 1911. Like 
the Crofters' Commission, the CDB was living on borrowed time from 1906 and it 
felt that to pursue its former policy which had now been superceded would be 
anachronistic.^
There were also other more practical reasons why the settlers at Barra and Syre 
should be allowed to return to a tenancy arrangement. The two settlements were 
showing heavy arrears on the purchase annuities and other monies which had been 
advanced to them. By 1907 the Syre settlement was showing arrears of £439 12s Id, 
out of a total amount due up to that date of £2093 7s Id. The figures for Barra were 
arrears of £313 19s 5d from a total amount due of only £864 15s 4 d .^  Under the 
purchase scheme there was little that could be done to rectify this situation.
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Forfeiture of the holding was the only course open to the CDB. Under the Crofters' 
Act, the Commission could be brought in to revise the rents and arrears. It was also 
felt that the CDB's insistence that the settlers build a stone and lime house 
immediately, was too onerous. If the settlers were allowed to temporarily live in a 
house of the old type until they became established, more progress could be 
expected. In addition, the CDB was of the opinion that tenancy would lead to better 
management of the common grazings. Above all, by 1911 it was abundantly clear 
that the settlers, whether through inability or unwillingness, could not keep up with 
all the payments expected of them. This again substantiates the premise that the 
CDBs policy of purchase was difficult to apply in an area so short of capital as the 
congested districts.^
The CDB was later to become embroiled in controversy surrounding its activities in 
Kilmuir and Vatersay, but the purchase which could be described as a textbook 
operation was that of the Glendale estate in the north east of Skye. This estate was 
purchased in 1904. Like Kilmuir and Barra it had seen the heights of the crofter s ' 
agitation in the 1880s. Glendale had first attracted the attention of the CDB in 1898 
and again in 1901. On these occasions it was felt that it contained no land which 
could be used for new crofter holdings. It did contain a substantial sheep farm which 
could be used for extra grazing or for other purposes. Sheriff Brand felt that if the 
purchase was of the whole estate it would not be useful to the Board. The crofters 
would be unlikely to be interested in becoming purchasers of their existing holdings 
and as he pointed out the CDB had at that time no powers to act as landlords of 
existing holdings. Prophetically, he argued that to contemplate such a role for the 
CDB would be to "enter upon a sea of embarrassment". However, political pressure 
was such that the CDB could not afford to pass up such an opportunity. The estate 
was purchased in December 1903, for £15,000.^ The lands purchased amounted to 
20,000 acres, of which about half was in the possession of crofters and the remainder 
used as grazing for a stock of 2,200 black face sheep. The farm was valued at £350, 
which the Crofter's Commission considered to be excessive, and suggested that £250 
would be a fairer figure. Nevertheless, this was clearly a desirable property with 
good ground and a fine flock of sheep, and it was important that it should be utilised 
as part of the scheme.^
After meeting the tenants at Glendale it was decided that the CDB should offer to 
each of them the opportunity of purchasing the holding he already rented, plus a 
share in the grazing farm which would be operated as a club farm. It was reported 
that the people "appeared thoroughly to understand the advantages of the purchase
117
system". The scheme was completed in 1907 when 131 crofters became owner 
occupiers holding a share in the club farm, which in 1906 had yielded the sum of £3 
7s 4d to each participant.**^
The subsequent history of the Glendale settlement is different from the others which 
have been considered. The purchase scheme was clearly conceived from the outset 
and the transaction of acquiring the estate and selling the holdings to the crofters was 
expedited quickly and efficiently. There were none of the complications with stock 
as at Syre or with competing purchasers as in Barra. A further distinction between 
Glendale and Barra was that in the former case the CDB was dealing with 
established crofters and not landless cottars. This is not to claim that the people of 
Glendale were unduly prosperous, the customary insanitary dwellings existed there 
as well. Nevertheless, the number of cottars on the estate was small The consensus of 
the crofters and the Board was established from an early date. Perhaps the lessons of 
Sconser had been learnt in regard to keeping the crofters scrupulously and 
exclusively informed. ^  It has been argued that the distinctive factor which made the 
purchase scheme attractive in Glendale was that it "was the undisputed stronghold 
of antilandlordism". Aside from the issue as to whether this is a justifiable epithet,
it would seem to be peripheral to the real issues at stake. What was more important 
are the facts that there was not an entrenched tradition of squatting and subdivision 
on the estate and secondly, the existence of a profit making scheme adjacent to the 
holdings, i.e the club stock. We have seen how the paucity of crofter’s capital and the 
burden of the cottars had hampered the development of other CDB schemes. The 
profits from the sheep stock, although they were never luxurious and although they 
fluctuated with the markets, did at least provide a small income which could help 
pay off the purchase annuity. These factors helped to ensure that the Glendale 
settlers remained as owners when others returned to the position of tenancy. Those 
concerned with a more ecological approach to the history of the congested area have 
argued that the CDB acted "without much commonsense" in regard to Glendale;
The fault lay in imagining that a group of 147 crofters would be able 
to manage a large pastoral estate, a task for which a landowner 
usually employs a fully qualified factor.
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Although the Crofter s'Commission returned to Glendale in 1908 to draw up grazing 
regulations for the common grazings on the estate and for the operation of the club 
farm, this accusation does have some force. The CDB were certainly short staffed as 
far as factoring duties were concerned. They only had one full time official, Angus 
MacKintosh their land manager, who had to oversee the management of all the 
CDB's properties from his base at Uig on the Kilmuir estate in north Skye.^ It is 
interesting to note at this point that the Board thought carefully before MacKintosh 
was appointed. They were reluctant to have an employee who would be known as a 
"factor". As Angus Sutherland reminded his fellow Board members the factor was 
"not a popular personage in the Highlands". There were also worries that having 
such a person on hand would dilute the self help element of the CDB's endeavours. 
MacKintosh felt by 1907 that he could not do his work properly as long as he was 
based at Kilmuir and labelled as a "factor", and in that year his residence was moved 
to Edinburgh.
IV
The island of Lewis was the epitome of all the evils the CDB was supposed to 
combat; congestion, subdivision, poor agricultural practice and bad housing 
conditions. When it was formed it was confidently predicted that, through its lack of 
compulsory purchase powers, the CDB would have no impact on Lewis. The 
proprietor of the island, Major Matheson was held up as a prime example of an 
obstructive landlord who would not cooperate with the Board. This was a 
particularly important concern as Lewis was one of the most congested areas in the 
Highlands. The problems on Lewis were quantitatively and qualitatively different. 
The island had contributed almost the whole of the increase in the crofting counties 
rural population over the 19th Century. The rate of increase from the 1890s did show 
some signs of slowing down. If 227 cottars had been considered problematic in 
South Uist the scale of the congestion on Lewis can be gauged by the estimated 
figure of over 1000 cottars. There was also a structural aspect to this problem as the 
Crofter's Commission noted in 1902;
Elsewhere in the Highlands, enlargement of holdings affords at least 
partial, possibly in some cases full relief. In Lewis on the other hand, 
the congestion of the crofter townships is such that enlargement under 
the Crofter's Act, even if it were competent to any material extent will 
not meet the requirements of the situation.
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There simply was insufficient land to settle cottars and create new holdings. 
According to the Crofter s' Commission, migration or emigration were the only 
possible solutions. Nevertheless, there were over 70,000 acres of deer forest and well 
over 50,000 acres of farmland on the island. Much of the deer forest land was 
unsuitable for occupation and the Deer Forest Commission could only find 35,000 
acres, almost all of it pasture, to schedule for the extension of crofting. They 
commented;
... that were the whole forest and farm lands in the Island of Lewis 
made available for crofters in some form or another, this step, while it 
might allay or mitigate the more serious evils arising from the 
existing condition of matters, would not effect a permanent 
remedy.
The endemic congestion on Lewis both strained the capacity of the local authority to 
provide services and made it extremely difficult for them to raise the revenue for 
them to do so. The smallness and low rateable value of most of the holdings 
contributed to this problem. However, it was exacerbated by the number of squatters 
and cottars whose property did not appear on the valuation roll. They paid no rates 
but received all the services paid for by ratepayers. ^ ^In 1902 the CDB set up a Local 
Committee to examine the conditions of the various industries, social conditions, and 
structure of land occupation. Matheson responded by pointing out that he was not 
unsympathetic to the idea of such a committee making some recommendations but 
that they should remember that it was his property they were dealing with. His 
outlook was similar to that of Lady Gordon Cathcart, and there is evidence that he 
was directly influenced by her thoughts. He argued in December 1902;
My own opinion is very decided, that an extension of the crofting 
system by making new crofts is a mistake. If one or two farms 
could be divided not into crofts (which means fishing and crofting) 
but into self sustaining holdings, that is little farms on which a man 
could live without fishing, of say 20 or 30 or even 40 acres, there 
would be some good done.**®
By 1903 Matheson had come to the conclusion that self sustaining holdings "are not 
a success in the hebrides". He encountered similar obstacles to the CDB in this 
regard^ namely, the fact that landless cottars did not have the capital, expertise or 
motivation to make the transition to such holdings. However, Matheson did offer the
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farms of Aignish and Mangersta, where, in cooperation with the CDB, 45 crofts were 
formed. At Battery Park near Stornaway 29 fishermens holdings were established. ^  
However, these efforts were insufficient to prevent land raids taking place at Croir 
on Bemera in 1901, and at Dalbeg in 1909. In addition the settlement at Battery Park 
was a failure, as by 1911 the settlers asked for new holdings elsewhere. They pointed 
out the smallness of their holdings and the fact that the prosperity of the fishing 
industry had been destroyed by the advent of steam trawling. *>2
It is evident that the CDB's failure to make a substantial impact on the problems in 
Lewis are accountable to more complex forces than simple proprietorial opposition. 
The very scale and depth of the congestion ensured that the usual problem faced by 
the Board, lack of capital in the cottar community, was magnified in Lewis. There 
was also a linked physical and social problem for the CDB to contend with. There 
was a distinct lack of available land in Lewis for the extension of crofter holdings. 
Certainly there were farms which theoretically could have been divided, however, to 
do so on a large scale would not have been wise. Such farms were a repositary of 
agricultural knowledge invaluable in a predominantly crofting community. However, 
the social aspect of this problem should not be neglected. The CDB could have 
purchased land elsewhere in the Highlands for the Lewis cottars to migrate to. 
Indeed, they considered using the farm of Seafield in Easter Ross, purchased in 
1910, for this purpose. In reality, the much publicised, and undoubtedly real, 
reluctance of the crofters to migrate militated against such an undertaking. Before 
1910 the problem was exacerbated by the difficulty of finding somewhere to relocate 
them to. The consequences of trying to settle them on the Board’s land in Skye were 
too great for the CDB to contemplate, given the disturbed state of the natives of 
these areas from 1906 to 1910.^ Simplistic accusations of the CDB's inadequacy 
to breach proprietorial indifference or opposition to their plans seriously 
underestimates the integrated nature of the problems of the congested areas. The 
complexity was such to bring the problems to the verge of intractability given the 




A pertinent consideration for any government body in this period was that of 
economy. It is necessary to briefly examine the CDB from this point of view. The 
fact that it was largely composed of ex - officio members who drew their salaries 
from elsewhere obviously reduced its expenditure. In addition its Secretary was 
shared with the Exchequer department, again in the interests of economy. Despite 
these considerations the Board has been criticised for being profligate in its 
administrative expenses. However, this was not a consideration which was a 
concern of those involved in the running of the board. It was noted in 1903 that the 
Scottish Board spent much less in this regard than its Irish counterpart and that "with 
good cause shown we might spend more without excess". Considering these points, 
it does not seem justifiable to criticise the Board for being an unduly heavy burden 
on the public p u rsed
It is useful to compare the Scottish CDB with its Irish counterpart, which dated from 
1891. There were similarities in that the Irish Board was also largely composed of 
supernumerary officials. It had, however, a much larger income than the Scottish 
Board, receiving £41,000 per anum initially, eventually rising to £231,000 after 
1909. The Scottish figure remained static at £35,000. As with its income, the powers 
of the Irish Board steadily increased. Under the 1891 Act, its powers were for aiding 
and developing agriculture only. Throughout its existence, down to 1923, this 
remained an important facet of its work. Inspectors and instructors were sent out to 
help improve agricultural practice in the congested areas. The success rate was 
considered to be high, especially in the poorest areas, like Connemara. The same 
could not be said for the Scottish Board's influence in Lewis, perhaps the poorest 
area for which it had responsibility. The Birrell Act of 1909 made the CDB a 
corporate body with compulsory powers of purchase. The frequent changes in the 
legislation covering the Irish Board was problematic in that time consuming 
procedural changes reduced its effective working life. There was a qualitative 
difference with the Scottish situation, in that in Ireland the policy debate was largely 
settled on the side of land purchase at an early date. In Scotland after 1906, the terms 
of the debate changed and the CDB operated with the knowledge that its abolition 
was imminent and the objective for which it was constituted superceded. Perhaps the 
principle difference was that in Ireland the policy of migration was successful, 
whereas in Scotland the crofters could not be persuaded to migrate or purchase. The
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Irish Board had greater powers to cajole, and eventually compel, landlords to sell 
land than the Scottish Board.**** The Irish Boards efforts were aided by the fact that 
it persuaded the small holders to espouse the doctrine of cooperation. Despite Irish 
opinion that the crofter would benefit greatly from cooperation and was well suited 
to its practice, this line of policy was never consolidated.**^
VI
From the evidence of the CDB's first phase of operation under Conservative 
governments its record is not wholly convincing. Its key policy of migration was 
unsuccessful. This reduced the Board's impact in the most congested districts of the 
Highlands where relief could not be found close at hand, principally Lewis. The 
Board also found that the of the crofting economy, particularly the chronic
lack of capital among crofters, proved an obstacle to its purchase proposals. Lands 
were purchased, but through a combination of economic and political calculation, the 
crofters declined to fully grasp the opportunity before them. Glendale was the 
exception to this trend. It was the distinctive feature of the structure of this estate and 
the opportunities it presented for capital returns, which allowed it to develop 
differently from other settlements in Barra and Sutherland.
The Board, nevertheless, does deserve some credit for its important attempts to raise 
the quality of stock and the standard of agriculture in the Highlands. However, here 
as well, the Board came up against the undercapitalised nature of the economy. This 
prevented the crofter from undertaking long term development programmes for 
stock, which would involve an initial loss of revenue. This demonstrates that there 
was a general problem faced by the CDB across the range of its efforts.
The CDB has been accused of acting "opportunistically or responsively rather than 
on the basis of a grand design or development strategy".**** This point has some 
validity, but it sits uneasily beside the view of another geographer who argues "the 
1897 Act was the first integrated development plan in the Highlands and Islands".**  ^
Another writer disagrees, and attempts to place the CDB in the context of economic 
development proposals since the 18th century and the schemes to administer the 
estates annexed in the wake of the Jacobite risings of 1715 and 1745.70 Two points 
can be made here. Firstly a grand design may have been inappropriate as the Board 
encountered a multitude of differing local conditions. Secondly, to discuss the CDB 
in such conceptual terms is to miss the point. The CDB's objectives were as much 
political as social or economic, in this area the comparison with the Annexed Estates
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Board is most valid. The implicit aim of creating a class of small proprietors was 
probably over-ambitious given the funding available to the Board. Nevertheless, an 
awareness of the political context of the CDB’s operations is fundamental. Its 
political aim remained unfulfilled. Not only was this a failure of scale, but also of 
ideology, with crofter interest in purchase failing to develop. The full implications of 
the ideological element of this failure became apparent at the General Election of 
1906 when the Liberals swept the crofting counties. The consequences of this 
Liberal victory for the Highlands, both on the ground and in Parliament will be 
examined in the subsequent chapters.
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CHAPTER FIVE.
The Liberal Government and The Congested Districts Board, 1906 to 1912.
As the Secretary for Scotland was Chairman of the Congested Districts Board (CDB) 
his political complexion and the policy of his party could have a definitive effect on 
the CDB, despite the statutory provisions which governed its operations. The advent 
of a radical Liberal Government in 1906 was a turning point in the history of the 
CDB. The new Prime Minister, Henry Campbell Bannerman, appointed his close 
political associate of many years standing, John Sinclair, to the office of Secretary 
for Scotland. This government expressed a vague, but apparently radical, 
commitment to a measure of land reform early in its life. The Bill which eventually 
emerged from this commitment in 1906, rejected the idea of land purchase and 
espoused a strengthened and extended version of the dual ownership principle which 
had been behind the Crofter’s Holdings (Scotland) Act of 1886.1 This created a 
potential inconsistency. While the government was trying to legislate on one 
principle, it had inherited an institution and responsibilities with entirely different 
objects. The inconsistency was accentuated when serious difficulties were 
encountered in passing the Small Landholders (Scotland) Bill. With the problems of 
obstruction from the House of Lords and the government’s inability to adapt to 
changing circumstances and demands from the crofting counties, the Act did not 
receive Royal Assent until 1911.
I
The CDB had acquired the celebrated estate of Kilmuir in North Skye in 1904. 
Known as the ’’granary of Skye" it was recognised as agriculturally one of the best 
on the island. It had seen the heights of the "Crofter ^  War" in the 1880s. Under the 
proprietorship of Colonel William Fraser from 1855 to 1892, it had become 
notorious for rack renting. The CDB paid £80,000 for the estate which extended to 
45,337 acres. Entry was to be at Whitsunday 1904 and the CDB were to take over 
the existing sheep stock at valuation. 4,000 acres on the estate were in the possession 
of some 450 crofters with the remainder including 8 farms of varying sizes, six of 
which were under leases which expired over the period 1906 to 1911.^
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The CDB's land manager, Angus Mackintosh, was in favour of conceiving a 
comprehensive plan for the whole estate at the outset, rather than conducting 
divisions in a piecemeal fashion as the various farm leases fell in. Most of the farms 
were principally of use for grazing with very little land suitable for cultivation. 
Further, it was noted that the crofter s' holdings were chronically short of grazing 
land. He presented a scheme for the extension of the crofter sN grazings using the 
suitable portions of the farms as they became available. In addition, the farms of 
Monkstadt and Flodigarry were to be broken up, creating 25 new crofter holdings. ^
However, before details like these could be settled, major problems had to be faced. 
The first of these was what to do about the outstanding arrears. These amounted to 
£4463 19s 7d. Only 101 crofters out of a total of 450 were not in arrears. The 
outlook for the recovery of these arrears was not promising. Of those hopelessly in 
arrear, mostly aged or otherwise disadvantaged people, it would serve no 
constructive purpose to pauperise them by turning them out of their holdings. Of 
those in arrear who could be expected to pay some money it was felt that the dissent 
would multiply the Board's problems. The only method of recovering such debts 
was to have the assets of the indebted crofter sold by order of the Sheriff court, an 
action which would cripple the crofter's economic prospects. The only viable course 
of action was for the Crofter’s Commission to undertake a complete revaluation of 
the whole estate. The Commission had visited Kilmuir in 1887 and if the reduced 
rents and arrears ordered to be paid then had been firmly pressed for by the estate 
management the bulk of the outstanding money would probably have been 
recovered. The prevailing opinion on the estate, that no crofter would be called upon 
to pay his arrears, was difficult to combat without causing alienation against the 
CDB, clearly not a situation which would help the Board so early in its 
proprietorship.^ These difficulties were yet another manifestation of the problem 
which had faced the CDB so often already; the crofter’s vulnerability created by his 
lack of capital.
This was largely the position which had been reached when the government changed 
in December 1905. More months were lost with the general election and the proper 
establishment of the Liberal Government in January and February 1906. However, 
the principal cause of the increasingly noticeable delay in arranging matters in 
Kilmuir was the attitude of the crofters to the idea of purchasing their holdings. The 
delay led to MPs from Highland constituencies putting pressure on the Government
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to show some progress at Kilmuir. This added to the CDB’s exasperation with the 
crofter's lukewarm attitude to the purchase scheme. The Secretary of the Board 
reported to Sheriff Brand in May 1906, that this pressure was growing and that the 
least the Board could do would be to publish some information and offer the new 
holdings and extensions of grazing;
This would at any rate make it clear that that it is not the fault of the
CDB that a settlement is not made, while if Kilmuir men will not
negotiate others from elsewhere might be willing to do so.^
The next stage in the CDB's efforts concerning Kilmuir was to begin a concerted 
effort to persuade the crofters of the advantages of the purchase scheme. There 
would certainly come a time when this effort was abandoned but initially at least an 
attempt was made, despite the Small Landholders (Scotland) Bill, which was 
published in the autumn of 1906 and which itself repudiated purchase.
The first argument used by the crofters to circumvent the purchase scheme was to 
claim that their rents were too high. This was important because the purchase terms 
offered were calculated on a specified number of years purchase of the rental. This 
claim was generally considered to have some validity and the CDB pointed out that 
it would not stand in the way if the crofters applied to the Commission to have the 
rents revalued. Indeed, the existence of substantial arrears ensured that such an 
application would ease one of the Boards difficulties. By March 1906 only 17 of the 
450 crofters on the estate had indicated a willingness to purchase their holdings. In 
the Summer of 1906 the Commission adjudicated on 350 fair rent applications from 
Kilmuir and gave effect to the reorganisation of the estate conceived by MacKintosh 
and P.B. MacIntyre (of the Crofter's Commission) in 1905. These rearrangements 
had the effect of converting nearly 3000 acres into croft lands and large reductions of 
rent across the estate.**
However, even these efforts on behalf of the Kilmuir crofters did not occasion 
universal approval. Some crofters complained to the CDB that the Commission had 
increased their rents. In this complaint they overlooked the fact that the Commission 
had also increased the acreage of common grazing available to them.^ The support 
of the CDB for rent reduction in Kilmuir is not absolute evidence of their belief that 
the estate was over rented. It should be seen in the context of the campaign to 
persuade the crofters to purchase their holdings. Given the widespread perception in 
Kilmuir that the rents were too high, and the fact that only 17 out of 450 crofters
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responded positively to the initial offer of purchase, there was little else that the 
CDB could do but consent to a revaluation. They clearly hoped it would have the 
effect of making the purchase scheme look more attractive as well as making a small 
contribution to improving the economic position of the crofters.
From mid 1906 to May 1908, the campaign to have the Kilmuir crofters purchase 
their holdings reached its peak, with the personnel of the CDB and the Crofter's 
Commission being deployed in an attempt to counter the reluctance of the crofters. 
By late 1907 it had been agreed that the lotting out of the remaining portions of the 
farms, i.e. those not required for the extension of the common grazings of townships, 
(an operation which would create 78 new holdings) would have to be delayed until 
the ultimate fate of the estate was decided. Responsibility for that decision lay firmly 
with the Kilmuir crofting community. The CDB were determined that the purchase 
scheme should be taken up by the crofters as a whole, and not individually here and 
there by crofters. The reason for this delay was not made clear to the crofters and this 
led to a number of threats being made to take forcible possession of common grazing 
lands, at Cuidrach, Monkstadt and Duntulm on the east side of the estate. This was 
partly down to the new Scottish Secretary, John Sinclair, who was not the most 
efficient of administrators and had to be warned of the dangers of unaccountable 
delays in crofting matters.**
It was in this period that the reasons for the crofters rejecting or postponing the 
purchase of their holdings were most clearly articulated. It is useful to examine these 
in the context of the opinions of historians who have studied the matter. Day has 
argued that the crofters were "afraid" of increased rates consequent on the loss of the 
tenants dispensation which only meant having to pay a portion of the occupiers 
rates. They would only buy if the purchase annuity plus the owners rates was less 
than the fair rent. This could only be achieved if the Board was willing to bear a loss 
on the transaction. Hunter, although avoiding the specific case of Kilmuir, makes the 
general comment that the opposition to purchase was based on the fact that owners 
would have no protection under the 1886 Act and no right of appeal to the Crofter's 
Commission. ^  This was undoubtedly the case, but the impression should not be 
given that purchasers were unprotected. They would have the protection of their 
purchase agreement and as long as they kept up with the payments they would be 
secure. Significantly, it should be noted that the protection of the 1886 Act was 
conditional on the prompt and correct payment of rent. At the end of the defined 
period the holding would belong to the occupier and he would be free of some of the 
limitations of the 1886 Act. For example, under the 1886 Act the crofter could not
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assign his holding and it could only pass to his heir at law in the event of his death. 
As an occupier he would be able to let it out or will it to anybody of his choosing. 
In a statement delivered at a meeting with the Kilmuir crofters in June 1905, Sheriff 
Brand laid out, with his usual clarity, the advantages of purchase. He made the 
following crucial point;
... you would not be under the terms and provisions of any Act 
of Parliament, however liberal, but would be proprietors of the 
soil on which you live, as much proprietors as any other 
proprietor in the Isle of Skye.
So, it is evident from the most cursory of examinations that the option of purchase 
held opportunities as well as burdens.
It is important also to examine the arguments and ploys which the crofters used to 
avoid purchasing in the period before the context of the argument changed in May
1908.
Initially, the sticking point appeared to be the perception of over renting. However, 
when the Crofter’s Commission cleared up this problem in 1906 the crofters were 
resourceful in developing further arguments to counter the CDB’s position. The 
argument concerning rates has been well rehearsed and does not require further 
examination beyond the recognition that the crofters were worried by the rating of 
their houses as much as the other burdens consequent upon ownership. ^  The CDB 
were initially of the opinion that if this difficulty could be cleared up most of the 
crofters would purchase. Other problems did exist though. Many felt that the number 
of years purchase of the holdings was too high. Not only could many crofters never 
hope to live to see the day when they would be proprietors but they felt the amount 
of money which 20 years purchase represented was too high for the land on offer. (It 
should be noted that although one describes the calculation of the prices of holdings 
as 20 years purchase, the payment of the annuities to the CDB would extend over a 
period of 50 years) This was an argument which had its supporters in the CDB. The 
Secretary, R.R. MacGregor, pointed out that on this basis the purchase of the estate 
by the crofters would realise more than the Board had paid for it in 1904. His 
colleagues felt that 16 or 17 years would be the highest price which would not 
compromise the success of the scheme.^
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In the early months of 1908 the government made an attempt to discover 
authoritatively the feeling on the estate as to purchase. In December 1907 the CDB 
had sent out a statement to every crofter detailing the conditions of the purchase 
offer and inviting replies before the end of February 1908. Only 18 positive replies 
were received, but there had been 363 non replies, with Earlish, a township south of 
Uig, the only place where negative replies were evident. The problem for the Board 
was how to interpret the non replies. It is impossible to know whether these 18 
represented the same group as the 17 who had indicated a desire to purchase in 1905. 
What is clear is, that in the period between the two surveys support for the concept 
of purchase was not widespread in Kilmuir. Angus Sutherland was not exaggerating 
when he argued "this does not look encouraging". He felt that the outcome was not a 
categoric refusal to purchase, however, his CDB colleague Reginald Macleod (Under 
Secretary for Scotland and the future 26th Chief of the Clan Macleod) disagreed in 
the strongest terms. He was well aware that the prevailing opinion in Skye was 
suspicious of purchase, despite what he called the "golden terms" being offered to 
crofters. He believed they were "foolish ... ill advised and ignorant". ^
The prevailing political climate, its effect on the Highlands, and events elsewhere in 
the crofting counties afford some clues as to which of these interpretations was the 
more valid. As has been noted above, and as shall be discussed in depth in chap 6, 
the Liberal Government was attempting to pass the Small Landholders (Scotland) 
Bill. Its efforts in the years 1906 to 1908 were particularly vigorous. The bill had 
been introduced 3 times. It had been withdrawn voluntarily in 1906, but in 1907 and 
1908 it passed the Commons only to be rejected by the House of Lords. It was 
eventually taken up by a private member in 1911 and passed with government 
support. This was a different political atmosphere to the early attempts as it followed 
the Parliament Act of that year which restricted the powers of the upper house. This 
Bill provided for a new improved version of the protected tenancy arrangements of 
the 1886 Act. It also provided for the abolition of the Crofter’s Commission and the 
Congested Districts Board and their replacement with a Board of Agriculture for 
Scotland and a Scottish Land Court.
The crofters in Kilmuir were now confronted with the situation whereby, a 
government institution was attempting to persuade them to follow a particular line of 
policy, that is land purchase. Simultaneously, the government was attempting to 
legislate along different policy lines, dual ownership. Clearly, there was an 
ambiguity for crofters to exploit. It is important to note, not the date of the eventual 
passing of the Small Landholders Act, 1911, but the introduction of the original bill,
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1906. The crofters knew from that date that if they could remain as tenants the idea 
of purchase and the CDB could well be things of the past. This fact was fully 
appreciated by the CDB. Their land manager pointed out at the beginning of 1908;
They hoped to see the Bill passed into law last year and they are 
sanguine that it will be passed this year. In these circumstances there 
will, I fear, be a tendency to delay coming to a decision and to mark 
time to await the fate of the bill. ^
The second factor which had an impact on the situation at Kilmuir, were the ongoing 
events on the Southern Hebridean Estates of Lady Gordon Cathcart. Prior to a 
discussion of these events below it should be noted at this point that after buying a 
small portion of land on Vatersay (a small island adjacent to Castlebay, Barra) the 
CDB had responded to repeated land raids by Barra cottars by entering into a highly 
public debate with the proprietor. In this debate the governments position was that 
the proprietor was responsible for the condition of her estate and that the best way of 
remedying it was to cooperate with the government in settling crofter tenants on the 
island.
Thus, from two sources the crofters of Kilmuir could see the policy of purchase 
disintegrating. The governments strategy was a repudiation of that policy. On an 
estate renowned for political awareness and activism the crofters of Kilmuir 
needed no instruction to convince them that the chances of the purchase scheme 
being followed through diminished as time passed.
Some members of the CDB were infavour of responding to the crofters with a varied 
series of final threats to cajole them into purchase. Reginald MacLeod was of the 
opinion that if the present crofters would not purchase the new holdings should be 
sold to suitable holders form elsewhere on the island and even outwith Skye. This he 
felt would be a "valuable object lesson". Angus Sutherland was in favour of sending 
a circular to the Kilmuir crofters including "all the arguments we think necessary to 
induce them". Angus MacKintosh, with his superior local knowledge argued that the 
CDB could threaten to sell the estate altogether if the crofters refused to purchase. 
He warned of potential trouble "if outsiders are brought in". Generally, the 
government warned that any developments for the benefit of the Kilmuir crofters 
would be retarded if they broke the law. This, however, did not look very convincing 
in light of the government's positive response to the Vatersay raids. ^
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A major difficulty for the Board was that legal opinion up to then had led them to 
believe that they could not permanently act as proprietors under the provisions of the 
1897 Act. However, law officers such as the Lord Advocate, were essentially 
political appointees and as amenable as other members of the government to 
prevailing political trends. It is not surprising then, to find in the CDB’s report for 
1908-1909;
We were advised by the Lord Advocate and the Solicitor General that 
the provision of land by the Board for subdivision among, or 
enlargement of, the holdings of crofters and cottars in the congested 
districts need not proceed exclusively by sale to such crofters and 
cottars.
This legal advice had cleared the way for the proceedings of mid 1908. The fruits of 
the decision of May to allow the crofters of Kilmuir to continue as tenants can be 
seen in the earlier months of that year. Sinclair had written confidentially in March;
... it must be borne in mind that if the tenants will not purchase, 
the method of crofter tenancy will probably have to be adopted. ^
Sinclair wrote to the Kilmuir crofters in May 1908 pointing out that the legal 
position of the CDB as proprietors was ambiguous. If the Small Landholders Bill 
had been passed the statutory position of the government to hold land would have 
been clarified. In the absence of new legislation it was proposed to offer tenancies 
under the 1886 Act, as opposed to terms for purchase, to all the existing crofters on 
the estate. Although he added that this did not necessarily mean that the purchase 
scheme would be abandoned or that the government would retain the estate, in 
tandem with the events in Vatersay and the continuing efforts to pass the land bill, 
the political signal had been sent. The crofters now considered that they had seen off 
the purchase scheme.^
This decision could be seen as a victory for the crofters in that tenancy was their 
preferred position and the one which prevailed. There is no doubt that their destiny 
would have been in their own hands to a much greater degree if they had become 
owners. Subsequent debates concerning the future of the Kilmuir estate would never 
have arisen. However, in the light of the failure of the other CDB settlements to 
sustain the burdens of ownership, difficulties which the well informed Kilmuir
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crofters would have almost certainly have been aware of. They may have reached 
this position on the basis of this evidence rather than on ideological grounds. What is 
certain is the fact that the Liberal government from 1906 onwards was well disposed 
to the idea of tenancy. They were essentially moving in the same direction as the 
Kilmuir crofters and it is this fact as much as any other which secured their victory. 
Further, by the early years of 1908 it was clear that some sort of decision on the 
future of the estate would have to be taken. The government had owned the estate 
since 1904 and had available to them a detailed plan for its rearrangement, in a 
fashion which would reduce congestion, almost since that date. It would have been 
an abdication of the objectives of the Board, even in its less active second phase, if 
they had continued to mark time. The delay in acting had brought the crofters to the 
brink of renewed lawlessness. Individual members of the CDB were pressing for 
action to be taken on the subdivision of the farms and the lotting out of the proposed 
78 new holdings. It was significant that this was begun as soon as the de facto 
decision to abandon purchase in Kilmuir was taken. ^  So, it is evident that there 
were considerations other than the power of the crofters' arguments weighing on the 
government as they took this decision.
II
Before returning to Kilmuir to examine the events of the years from 1908 to the 
abolition of the CDB in 1912 it is necessary to examine the events which occurred in 
the southern Hebrides, and particularly Vatersay, which have been referred to above. 
The events at Kilmuir and Vatersay, and indeed at Westminster, had important 
implications for each other. The CDB had already tangled with the redoubtable Lady 
Gordon Cathcart at the turn of the century in the course of persuading her to sell land 
on Barra to them. The events surrounding Vatersay which were to run until 1910 
begem in 1901.
The Island of Vatersay was arranged as a sheep farm extending to 3400 acres, rented 
at £400 and was separated from Castlebay, the main settlement on Barra, by a 
narrow channel. It had only a small amount of land suitable for cultivation, and had 
been scheduled as a grazing subject by the Deer Forest Commissioners in 1895.^0 
This was considered by the crofters as a mark of legitimacy for their claims to have 
new holdings set up on the Island.
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Further, in September 1897 the County Council of Inverness had decreed that 
amongst other lands in Barra and North Uist, Vatersay should be leased for 
allotments under the Allotments Act of 1892. The Committee had visited and 
inspected the land and recommended that 4 acre plots be leased for a trial period of 
ten years. However, the Committee had no powers under the Act to force the 
proprietor to follow a course of action which she manifestly disapproved of. 
Consequently, although no action was taken on this recommendation the crofters 
regarded it as a confirmation of the righteousness of their claim, and the delay as a 
further grievance. Further force was added to their arguments by the tenant farmer 
on the island giving the cottars from the Castlebay area potato ground. In the early 
Spring of 1902, however, the cottars were surprised to find that the farmer wished to 
terminate this arrangement. After contacting their MP, Sir John Dewar, who secured 
the intervention of Lord Balfour of Burleigh (the Conservative Secretary for 
Scotland) with the proprietor on the matter, the crofters again approached the farmer 
who refused access a second time. At this point the cottars took matters into their 
own hands and raided land on Vatersay and proceeded to prepare it for c u l t i v a t i o n . ^
This put the CDB in an extremely difficult position. They had no real power to take 
the initiative in a matter of this kind. As the land was under lease the proprietor had 
no real power either. However, the estate management recognised the validity of the 
cottars'position, commenting;
It must also be kept in view that this is not a case of a mob 
taking possession of land with which they had no previous 
connection. There undoubtedly has been a usage of long standing by 
which the cottars were allowed potato ground on Vatersay.
There was the worry, shared by the Conservative government of the day and the 
estate management, that the precedent of making arrangements for cottars who had 
broken the law would encourage others to do likewise. This, however, had to be 
balanced against the likelihood of destitution if the cottars did not receive land to 
grow their staple crop. Initially, the terms offered by the tenant were prohibitive and 
the scheme had to be laid to rest for the 1902 season. Negotiations were resumed in 
the autumn of 1902 against a background of cottar determination to seize more 
ground on Vatersay "no matter the consequence" if they did not get potato ground. 
Lady Gordon Cathcart was advised to offer the land for £600. A higher price had 
been considered but it was felt that this could have the effect of provoking the 
government into legislating for compulsory purchase. The offer of letting the land
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was briefly contemplated, only to be discarded with the realisation that sale would be 
a more profitable transaction.^ In November 1902 Hugh MacDiarmid, the Duke of 
Argyll's factor on Tiree, was sent to Vatersay to report on the quality of the ground 
and to recommend a price. He did so, reporting that ground on the eastermost point 
of the Island at Creagmhor and Uinessan was suitable for growing potatoes, and that 
£575 was a fair price. The estate management accepted this price but went to great 
lengths to point out how moderate it was in comparison to similar transactions on the 
East Coast of Scotland. This was a familiar refrain of the Gordon Cathcart estate 
management and was of doubtful validity, especially with regard to the different 
conditions, and quality of land in the two areas. In addition, Hebridean cottars were 
likely to be much more dependant on potato land for their survival than east coast 
fisherman who would have more capital at their disposal and were closer to centres 
of population where supplies could be purchased. In the event, 60 acres were secured 
on condition that they be used only for potatoes, not pasture or settlement. In the 
spring of the following year it was noted that there were 50 families at work on the 
land. Most of these people were fishermen who had house sites, but no land, in the 
vicinity of Castlebay.^
Although in the longer term this transaction was to prove unsatisfactory it is of note 
for the ease with which it was carried out. There had been the experience of the sale 
of lands in Barra which had built up trust between the CDB and Lady Gordon 
Cathcart. The amity, political and personal, between Lord Balfour and the proprietor 
undoubtedly helped. However, the principal fact which facilitated the transaction 
was that it fitted in with Lady Gordon Cathcart’s analysis of the way forward for the 
Highlands. The agreement was not for new crofter holdings but for cultivation plots 
to be used by fishermen. This was in line with her ideas for steadily reducing the 
dependence of the people on the land for their livelihood, and similar in nature to her 
own private schemes of the 1880s. Although, as has been noted above, the crofters 
felt they had strong precedence for their claims to land on Vatersay, their raid had 
concentrated the minds of the estate management and the government on the 
problem. Although crofter action did play a part in stimulating developments it was 
the similarity in views between the government and the proprietor which was the 
deciding factor in defining the nature of the purchase. Before this intervention was 
established it is significant that the farm tenant of Vatersay refused to cooperate with 
the crofters.
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Despite the acquisition of this land "the peace thus achieved proved t r a n s i e n t " . ^  
Over the next two years complaints were made about the quality of the land and the 
conditions upon which it had been let. Land raids recurred in the spring of 1905, at 
which point the CDB made clear to the cottars that such actions would proscribe the 
Board from aiding them. Significantly, the CDB were slowly coming to the 
conclusion that the land which they had purchased was "useless" for growing 
potatoes. A second agricultural expert had examined the land in 1906 and had 
directly contradicted MacDiarmid's opinion. Lady Gordon Cathcart was approached 
with an enquiry as to whether she could make more land available to the CDB. Her 
solicitors responded negatively and went on to say that in their opinion the failure to 
grow potatoes on the land was "due not to any inherent incapacity of the soil but to 
the inability of the people to work it properly". 28
The land raid was repeated in February of 1906, prompting the comment by the 
Chief Constable of the County Police Force, "this is a sort of annual proceeding at 
this season". In contrast the Scotsman commented that the Vatersay raid could be 
"the portent and prelude to another Hebridean crofter's storm". The intervention of 
the proprietor secured a further 20 acres of the farm which were let to the CDB at a 
rate of 10s an acre for a period of two years. The implication made, when this was 
communicated to the CDB, was that the government were now duty bound to afford 
the protection of the criminal law to the proprietor in an effort to prevent any further 
land raids. This surprised the government who had always regarded trespass as a 
civil matter and as such it was up to the proprietor to initiate proceedings.^
The CDB in this case, and others have been criticised for giving the impression by 
their actions that they were encouraging land raids and other illegal acts. Day argues;
Unfortunately, this was not the only case of the Board's stating 
that threats would not move them delaying action till the threats 
came, and then at once giving way to the cottar's demands.
Hunter agrees, arguing that "subsequent events did little to refute" the idea that the 
CDB was "condoning and even encouraging lawlessness". The cycle of raid and 
CDB intervention established at Vatersay did seem to coincide with illegal acts 
elsewhere in the Highlands. It is, however, difficult to see how else the CDB could 
have acted. Day, in attempting to address this issue merely states that "such action 
should have been avoidable". This is unhelpful, if the CDB as the only body capable 
of intervention had not acted they would have been criticised for ignoring distress
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and congestion and not facing up to their responsibilities. The estate management 
had shown no real tendency to act independently, preferring to work in conjunction 
with the CDB, who would helpfully bear some of the expense of dealing with such 
situations. Normatively, it may have been judicious for the CDB to stand firm in the 
face of threatened and actual raids, but reality, and the fact that such raids indicated a 
degree of distress, compelled the CDB to ac t.^
The remainder of 1906, and the early months of 1907, saw the situation at Vatersay 
escalate seriously. By May 1907 the cottars had taken their cattle to Vatersay, were 
cultivating the land, and had erected huts on the island. This bears out the conclusion 
drawn by the Barra Police Constable in early 1906;
they are determined to get possession of the whole farm of Vatersay
and to remove their dwelling houses there as early as possible. ^
The period from the middle of 1907 to February 1909 when the CDB purchased 
Vatersay was characterised by a number of vigorous debates. A debate between the 
Liberal government and the representatives of Lady Gordon Cathcart on the issue of 
who should take responsibility for the Vatersay raiders, and the issue of the 
upholding of the law. It developed into a debate on the future of the island with the 
estate arguing, in line with its long held views, that the government should purchase 
Vatersay if it wished to extend crofting. On the other hand the government argued, in 
line with the policy on which it was trying to legislate, that the proprietor should 
retain the crofters as tenants and establish new holdings in cooperation with 
government agencies. Further,' there was a debate within the Scottish Office, 
between John Sinclair the Secretary for Scotland and the Under Secretary, Reginald 
Macleod, which developed along similar lines. Examination of the course of these 
debates will help to develop the main themes of this thesis, namely the question of 
the power of the crofting community to substantially influence government policy, 
and the course of the ongoing contest in this period between the rival concepts of 
land purchase and dual ownership.
I l l
The first issue which emerged in both debates concerned the law and order issue. 
The government was firmly of the opinion that if the estate wanted to deal with the 
problems of the raiders it should pursue them in the civil courts. The estate believed 
this to be an abdication of the responsibilities of the government to provide
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protection to a land owner whose property rights had been injured. Reginald 
MacLeod in the Scottish Office noted that the cottars had disregarded the conditions 
of the lease of the potato ground, and had been grazing their stock on it. He felt the 
CDB's habit of responding positively to lawlessness had contributed to this and that 
the moment was opportune for the CDB to demonstrate that they would no longer 
tolerate such behaviour. The Secretary for Scotland was on a different wavelength. 
He argued that the way out of the difficulties in Vatersay was for the estate to 
cooperate with the CDB in setting up a new crofter settlement on the Island. Added 
to the well known general opposition of Lady Gordon Cathcart to such a course of 
action, there were specific difficulties with Vatersay. As well as unwillingness to 
accept the raiders as tenants there were doubts about the adequacy of the water and 
fuel supply on the island. There were none of the necessary facilities for a 
settlement, such as a school, church or shop. Further, it was pointed out to the Board 
that the farm of Vatersay was held under lease until 1926. Her solicitors presented 
the Government with a stark choice;
... either they must take effective action for putting down the present 
lawless movement and protecting the tenant of Vatersay in the 
peacable enjoyment of his farm, or they must purchase the farm, 
make terms with the tenant for renouncing his tenancy, and deal 
with the farm and the squatters now on it in such way as they may co 
nsider proper.
Clearly, if a settlement was to evolve on Lady Gordon Cathcart’s terms the CDB was 
going to incur a great deal of expenditure in compensating the tenant. The rating 
burden for the settlers would be crippling if the parish had to provide all the 
necessary facilities. Sinclair confided to the Lord Advocate, Thomas Shaw, in 
September 1907 that he was against purchase, "on the merits and because of the 
example".
As has been noted the Conservatives when they were in government were able to 
work in cooperation with Lady Gordon Cathcart and her estate management with the 
minimum of public controversy; n ot so the Liberals. There was a certain amount of 
political antipathy on the part of the estate management towards the new 
government. Sinclair had been condemned by them as "a man with no administrative 
experience" and the Lord Advocate as "an extreme radical" and "hostile to
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landowners".^ Shaw, in particular, seemed to go out of his way to exacerbate the 
situation. Relations between the government and the estate worsened in August 1907 
when the Vatersay situation was discussed in Parliament; Shaw described the raid 
the following downbeat manner;
These poor tenants of Barra stepped across to the island of 
Vatersay and on the shore they planted a few potatoes, hoping to 
return in the spring to reap what little crop there was.... they were 
interfering with no human soul.
This enraged Lady Gordon Cathcart who demanded an apology from the Lord 
Advocate. This was provided but proved to be insufficient and the dispute festered to 
the detriment of the prompt settlement of the problems on Vatersay. Indeed, the 
proprietor was so bitter about the episode that she went to the trouble of having the 
correspondence privately published with her own introduction.^
The estate management had begun to think that the government were favourably 
disposed to the position of the raiders, who were increasing in number all the time. 
In mid 1907 the Sheriff of Inverness, John Wilson, visited Vatersay and reported his 
impressions. He took care to attempt to persuade the raiders to desist from illegal 
actions, and managed to convince the estate management to drop a civil action 
against them. His report was not well received by the estate as it appeared that 
Wilson had sought his information only among the raiders and had not approached 
the estate officials. In reporting the views of the raiders he inadvertently gave the 
impression that he had some sympathy with them .^
The remainder of the period up to the eventual sale of the estate to the CDB in late 
1908 was characterised by a rearguard action by the government to prevent this 
eventuality and consistent attempts by the estate to complicate any scheme of setting 
up new holdings under the proprietorship of Lady Gordon Cathcart.
The initial demand made by the estate was that the CDB should compensate the 
tenant of Vatersay for the breach of his lease. The government was extremely 
reluctant to agree to this request, both on the grounds of the cost and the fact that 
they were not at all sure that they wished to be saddled with responsibility for the 
whole farm. The estate's position on this point, trenchantly put by Lady Gordon 
Cathcart, was that they had no wish to disturb the tenant and were only doing so to to 
help the CDB.
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The Secretary for Scotland has taken the extraordinary position 
that the government are not responsible for the conditions 
existing in these islands, that the only mode of dealing with these 
conditions is to yield to the violence of a handful of raiders and that it 
devolves upon me to pay compensation to the tenant in order to 
induce him to give up his lease and allow the farm, which he is 
managing successfully as a grazing, to be divided up into crofts 
which cannot be managed successfully, and to be handed over to 
those who have taken and retained violent possession, not only in 
defiance of the rights of the proprietor an tenant, but in defiance of 
the interdict of the supreme court. ^
The next condition the estate issued was that the government guarantee that the 
remainder of the farm of Vatersay was not raided if they only used part of it for their 
settlement. The estate escalated the situation in June 1908, when they took civil 
action against 10 of the 150 raiders now on the island. They were duly sentenced to 8 
weeks imprisonment. This put the government in an extremely difficult position, as 
they had consistently argued that the estate should follow this course. They were left 
with no option but to concede the point that they were responsible for compensating 
the tenant, indeed they had been given an incentive to follow this course by Lady 
Gordon Cathcart who offered to apply to the court to have the raiders released if they 
did so.^9 This concession did not satiate the estate's desire to force their own 
analysis of the situation on the government. Following the release of the raiders, who 
were welcomed home as heroes, the government were faced with a new demand; 
namely, that they guarantee and cover any loss to the estate through non payment of 
rent by the proposed new settlers. The government felt this to be unreasonable, but 
the estate stuck to this position until October when the government were forced to 
ignominiously capitulate to the initial demand of the estate and purchase the island 
outright. The Scotsman commented, "in deciding to purchase Vatersay Lord 
Pentland has taken the course which he obstinately refused to consider for more than 
a year".^® The transaction was eventually completed in February of 1909 with £6250 
changing hands, although many have considered this to be an inflated price it 
represented a considerable reduction on the figure of £10,000 which had been 
initially demanded by the estate. ^
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Before going on to briefly examine the details of the CDB's administration of their 
latest purchase it is important to relate these events to the wider political background 
and to the history of the CDB.
The first point to note is that the Small Landholders (Scotland) Bill cast a significant 
shadow over the proceedings. There was no doubt in the minds of Lady Gordon 
Cathcart's agents that it was this factor, above all others, which influenced Sinclair so 
strongly against purchase. Indeed, Sinclair himself admitted that the objective in 
Vatersay was to try a dry run of the arrangements in that Bill. So, as in Kilmuir, the 
government were reluctant to be seen financing further purchases when their 
preferred policy was to set up crofter settlements under the existing proprietors. In 
the case of Vatersay they made no attempt to sell the holdings to the settlers 
preferring to allow them to hold under the Crofter's A ct.^  The passage of the Small 
Landholders Bill would have given the government much needed authority in its 
negotiations with Lady Gordon Cathcart. Further, the framework provided would 
have prevented the estate from introducing new and escalating demands at crucial 
points in the negotiations.
The course of events in Vatersay provides a good example of the continuing power 
of proprietors over government policy. The events in Vatersay have most often been 
interpreted as a victory for the direct action tactics of those who raided the island. 
There is certainly some substance in this, in that it focused attention on the the 
situation and secured an extension of the crofting system on the Gordon Cathcart 
estates against the wishes of the proprietors. However, there are other points to be 
added. It should be recognised that the Liberal government was in general sympathy 
with the raiders, in their objectives if not their tactics. The course of the negotiations 
in 1907 and 1908 was heavily in favour of the proprietor and her interests. The 
government was moved from its advocacy of a dual ownership arrangement for 
Vatersay and forced to take the whole island off the hands of the proprietors at a cost 
of over £6000 to the CDB. Indeed, the government did not prevail at any of the 
crucial points of the negotiation until the settlement of the purchase price. The 
Scottish Secretary was well aware that he was fighting a losing battle almost from 
the beginning of the negotiations. He confided to the Lord Advocate in September 
1907, "ultimately purchase may be forced upon u s" .^  This helps to substantiate the 
argument that the 1886 Act did not preside over the death of "landlordism" to the 
extent that has often been claimed.
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Although Sinclair claimed that the dispute over Vatersay was "a miserably small 
business and a sordid bit of work", its importance goes beyond the narrow 
geographical confines within which it took place. Reginald MacLeod, the Under 
Secretary for Scotland, future Highland landowner and Conservative candidate was 
well aware of this wider importance when he remarked, "responsibility is the key to 
the whole difficulty". Macleod was convinced privately that a settlement on Vatersay 
although sanctioned by the Deer Forest Commission would be a "retrograde step".^  
The debate can in fact be interpreted as a microcosm of the wider debate over 
Highland policy which had been going on since the early 1880s. This debate had left 
such rival landmarks as the statutes of 1886 and 1897, with the former based on 
tenancy and the latter on purchase. The proprietor was reluctant to establish new 
tenants under the 1886 act. Although in the case of Vatersay this would have been 
done at the public expense it still exposed the proprietor to a number of financial 
penalties. Firstly, there would be a loss of rent, even assuming that the crofters paid 
regularly and in full. Vatersay had yielded a rent of £330 as a farm, whereas its 
crofters once settled yielded only £157 . ^  Although the estate's demand, in July 
1908, that the CDB cover any loss in rental was issued with the objective of making 
the idea of dual ownership unpalatable to the government, it did have a basis in 
substance. There was also the question of rates. Setting up a crofter settlement 
imposed increases in public burdens, through the provision of sanitary and 
educational facilities, which would fall mostly on the proprietor. There were also 
considerations of social cost from the proprietors'perspective. Lady Gordon Cathcart, 
like many proprietors, believed that crofting only served to breed a congested and 
discontented population. So for all these reasons the option of purchase was 
attractive to the proprietor. She would no longer have any responsibility for the 
problems of the island all of which would be transferred to the government. Sinclair, 
whose lack of experience in Highland matters was exposed in the debates over 
Vatersay, had the greatest difficulty understanding this and had to have it explained 
in specially simplified language by Reginald Macleod. MacLeod resigned his 
post in the Scottish Office to fight Inverness-shire for the Conservatives in the 
general election of January 1910. His private doubts about the "dishonesty" of the 
Liberal policy of encouraging crofter tenancies became public during the campaign, 
when he argued, "I am in favour of people becoming owners of the land they 
cultivate"^It was these arguments, which had been voiced by landowners in the 
early 1890s, which had moved the Conservatives in the direction of land purchase as 
their preferred policy for the Highlands.
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One final issue which the Vatersay situation profiled was the relationship between 
the actions of the CDB and the incidence of land raids and other outbreaks of 
agitation. It had been an oft repeated accusation that the CDB were responsive to 
such acts in a manner which would only serve to encourage their repitition. Lady 
Gordon Cathcart was reluctant to accept any of the raiders as tenants and was 
concerned that the liberation of the Vatersay Raiders in July 1908 would be regarded 
as a victory for illegality, a point echoed by the Conservative press. Indeed, the 
release saw a number of incidents throughout the Highlands. In August cottars at 
Bruemish in Barra threatened a land raid. In February 1909 cottars from 
Lochboisdale in South Uist raided the farm of Glendale, and the following month 
saw a raid at Ardmhor on Barra. Reginald MacLeod reflected proprietorial concern 
on this issue to the Scottish Secretary. ^ I n  allocating the holdings at Vatersay the 
CDB were at pains to point out that an applicants chances were neither improved or 
made worse by his status as a raider. The most important criteria for the Board was 
agricultural ability. It is interesting to note that the ringleaders in the land raids of 
1905 and 1906 actually refused holdings. They manufactured a grievance from the 
CDB's method of allocating the 60 holdings on offer on Vatersay. They argued that 
the CDB had discriminated against the raiders in their allocation of holdings. A 
grievance not shared by the other applicants.^
The Island of Vatersay continued to pose difficulties for the government and the 
CDB even after the decision to purchase had been taken. Once that point was 
reached the Crofter's Commission were duly despatched to survey the farm and 
assess its suitability for holdings. As a grazing farm it had carried a sheep stock 
capable of producing 800 to 1000 lambs. It was proposed to establish 60 fisherman's 
holdings in 4 townships across the island, at Uidh, Earosdale, and Netherton and 
Upperton of Vatersay. The Commission had to face the difficult problem of rent. The 
current rent of the farm was £350, the Commission recommended £330 for the total 
rent of the crofting townships, but retained an awareness of the problems, 
commenting, "it is not unlikely that the class of tenants proposed to be settled in 
Vatersay cannot afford to pay that rent". Further problems surrounded the stock
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which the raiders had taken over to the island with them. The island was 
unquestionably overstocked and the Board realised that it would be impossible to 
remove the crofter's stock. So, in a somewhat self defeating exercise, they decided to 
sell the existing high quality sheep s to c k .  ^
In the event, there were 85 applicants for the 60 holdings on offer. They were 
informed that the estate had been purchased with the objective of relieving 
congestion in Barra and that nobody would be accepted or rejected because they had 
been involved in the raids. As noted above, the ringleaders of the raids rejected the 
holdings they were offered. This posed no difficulty for the CDB, indeed it played 
into their hands. Grateful to be rid of such troublesome incendiaries, they declared 
them trespassers on Board land and gave them a short time to leave. They responded 
by attempting, without success, to stir up a dispute with the Scottish Office about the 
terms of the agreements they had been offered. ^  By September 1910 the CDB 
were still not in a position to demand any rent from the settlers who had neither 
reaped crops, sold stock, or earned any money from fishing. It was these sorts of 
considerations which had initially prompted Lady Gordon Cathcart to urge purchase 
on the CDB . The fact that the CDB had paid £6000 for the inheritance of these 
difficulties was no doubt a source of satisfaction on her part.^
IV
From the settlement of the Vatersay difficulties the focus of the Board's activities 
returned to Kilmuir. As has been discussed above the Liberals had abandoned efforts 
to persuade the crofters to purchase their holdings. This was not the end of 
difficulties in this troublesome part of the Highlands.
The early months of 1910 after most of the restructuring of the estate had been 
carried out, the Board received a flurry of threats from the crofters. Those at 
Heribusta threatened to raid the farm of Duntulm in the extreme north of the estate. 
In more menacing terms, the crofters of Idrigill indicated their designs on the 
neighbouring farm of S c u d d a b u r g h .* ^  They had long coveted this farm and were 
aggrieved in early 1910 when the Crofter's Commission awarded them only 397 
acres of the farm. They argued that the crofters had neither the capital nor the skill to 
justify the award of the remaining 63 acres of arable land. Despite the CDB, in their 
position of proprietors, obtaining interdicts to prevent a raid, such an event took 
place in late April 1910.*^
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The CDB felt that they had to stand by the decision of the Commission and not yield 
to the crofter s' demands for an independent valuation of the farm. Further raids took 
place in June 1910 and the government began to make much more resolute noises 
about the necessity of stamping out lawlessness when it was their own property 
which was being raided. However, they found out just how difficult the civil law was 
to apply in such remote areas when they attempted to serve writs on the raiders. The 
police refused to arrest or to point out the guilty parties. Local CDB officials refused, 
in fear of their safety, to become involved. The result was that Angus MacKintosh, 
the CDB’s Land Manager, had to perform the task. He did so, but felt the action 
destroyed his reputation in Kilmuir. The attempt to serve the writs was singularly 
unsuccessful. MacKintosh and the Sheriff Officers were attacked by the men, 
women and children of the township and despatched in general direction of 
Portree.
After a meeting between Lord Pentland and the Idrigill crofters in the Free Church in 
Uig, the issue was settled by giving the disputed 63 acres to the Idrigill crofters to 
farm communally. A proposal had been made to form 4 large holdings on the land 
but, in Pentland's words "jealousy was too much for it". Pentland expected, and 
received, criticism for his carefully arranged solution, with the Scotsman 
condemning it as "socialistic".^
This was a period noted for the number of land raids which occurred, so it is 
important to note the similarities and contrasts between the various raids. The raids 
on Vatersay were the most prominent, principally because of the attitude of 
permanence taken by the raiders. They were also large scale events, with 130 people 
on the island by October 1908. Not only did they bring their stock with them, but 
they also erected wooden houses to live in. Such facts made the raiders very 
difficult to dislodge. They had gone further than any other previous raiders in 
physically staking a claim to the land they coveted. One author has correctly noted 
that the raiders "showed every determination of staying on the island for good".^ 
The challenge made by the raiders was to the estate not to the government, which 
they perceived as being supportive of their cause, with Lord Pentland being held in 
particular reverence. Previous land raids in the 1880s were certainly anti landlord but 
they were also characterised by anti government sentiment as well. The land raids 
which occurred in South Uist can be characterised more accurately as 
demonstrations, rather than challenges. Those involved did not take up permanent 
residence on the land in question but withdrew when they felt their protest had been 
registered.*^
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The various threats, and the actual raid on Scuddaburgh farm in 1910, are different 
from either of the above. Firstly, they took place on an estate owned by the 
government. The CDB acted like other proprietors in attempting to protect its 
property through recourse to civil law. The drawbacks of such procedures were made 
evident through these experiences. The raid is notable because of the vehemence of 
those involved. This would seem to sit uneasily alongside the limited nature of the 
grievance, 63 acres of arable land. There would seem to be little doubt that 
Scuddaburgh held an importance to the Idrigill crofters beyond the mere acreage. 
Their reaction to the Sheriff Officers demonstrates that clearly. Perhaps the fact that 
the CDB were the proprietors had raised expectations for the receipt of land unduly 
high. This would go some way to explaining the depth of the reaction to the 
Commission's decision to hold back the arable land from the crofters.
A noticeable factor common to both Vatersay and Scuddaburgh was that although 
participation in the raids was high in the respective communities involved, there was 
a hard core of ringleaders in both cases. The extent to which these men fuelled the 
sense of grievance in the other crofters is debatable. It is clear that they had an 
exaggerated sense of it themselves. It has already been noted how the Vatersay 
ringleaders' sense of grievance outlasted that of their fellow raiders to their own 
detriment. It was said of one of the Scuddaburgh ringleaders, "the others seem to 
think that they have only to follow him to get everything they want on their own 
terms'1. ^
The overriding impression gained from the evidence of these raids concerns the 
limited nature of the aims. In this period at least, land raids were not a direct 
challenge to the institution of landlordism as many have claimed. Rather, they were a 
tactic employed to extract limited gains, like the establishment of a few fisherman’s 
holdings on Vatersay, or access to 63 acres of arable land in Scuddaburgh.
V
In conclusion, the fact that the CDB was essentially a political creation should not be 
lost sight of. It was constituted by a Conservative government with a political aim in 
mind. Thus, when a Liberal government ensued in 1906 the outlook of the Board 
changed accordingly. Its impending abolition played an important part in this 
process. It was placed in a difficult position by the political difficulties of the Liberal
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government in the period 1906 to 1911, which meant that its constitution was at odds 
with the preferred policy of that government. Its reputation was not enhanced in 
these years. The Liberals displayed a distinct lack of understanding in its dealings 
with Highland proprietors, like Lady Gordon Cathcart.
The events at Kilmuir demonstrated the basic unpopularity of the concept of land 
purchase among crofters. On the other hand, the events at Vatersay demonstrated 
proprietorial disapproval for the Liberal policy which they felt to be an 
unsatisfactory compromise of responsibilities.
The limited modem historiography on the Congested Districts Board has tended to 
consider its period of existence as a whole. The analysis of the Board in this, and 
the foregoing, chapter indicate the importance of the change of government. The 
two major parties attempted to implement different policies in the Highlands and 
used the Board accordingly. A quantitative analysis of the performance of the Board 
is rendered meaningless by this change in policy and by the substantial overlap 
between the two periods. For example, the estate of Kilmuir was purchased under the 
Conservative government, however, the reorganisation of the estate straddled the 
election of 1906. Nevertheless, the important point to note is the differing political 
performance of the Board in the two periods and how it was employed to implement 
in turn the Conservative policy of land purchase and then the Liberal policy of 
protected tenancy.
It has been said of the Irish CDB that its land purchase operations "completely 
changed the face of the congested districts".1^  No such claim can be advanced for 
the Scottish Board. Its funding was insufficient and its effective working life too 
short. Up to 1904 no large estates were bought, and after 1906 its efforts were 
restricted for political reasons. The Board themselves commented in 1907;
... that to proceed further with schemes for settlement under the 
provisions of the Act of 1897, which the government desired to 
supplant by a new process would lead to no useful public result.
The earlier passage of the Small Landholders Bill would have given the CDB an 
easier task in dealing with its responsibilities in Kilmuir and more authority in its 
negotiations in Vatersay. The latter dispute became symbolic of the general 
stalemate on Highland policy which existed from 1906 to 1912. Above all, it is an 
indication of how the CDB was absorbed by the politics of the government which it
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served. Objectively, the Board would have been reluctant to spend so much time 
and effort in creating 60 very small holdings in less than ideal circumstances. 
Historically, these disputes demonstrate clearly the tension between the contending 
policies of purchase and the extension of crofting tenancies. They also demonstrate 
the continuing power of proprietors to influence government policy over 20 years 
after the Crofter s'Holdings Act.
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CHAPTER SIX.
The Small Landholders (Scotland) Bill, 1906 to 1911.
Following the general election of January 1906, Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman was 
able to form the first Liberal Government to have the security of a comfortable 
majority for 20 years. The figures were, 134 Conservatives with 23 Liberal 
Unionists compared to 376 Liberals and 54 Labour MPs. The Liberal dominance was 
equally clear in Scotland with 58 Liberals from the 72 Scottish Constituencies. * The 
House of Commons was said to have a new and serious outlook with its many new 
Liberal members. Campbell Bannerman was able to rebuke Arthur Balfour, the 
Unionist leader, for attempting to carry his old fashioned debating style into the new 
era.
In December 1905, during the general election campaign, the Prime Minister had 
declared at a large Liberal rally in the Royal Albert Hall, London, that he wished to 
make land "less of a pleasure ground for the rich and more of treasure house for the 
nation". This was a somewhat vague commitment, but a commitment nevertheless, 
to land reform. On the strength of this, as well as other factors, the Liberals reversed 
the Unionist advance in the Crofting Counties which had been evident at the general 
election of 1900. Liberal Unionist defeats in Argyll and Sutherland, and a 
Conservative defeat in Inverness-shire ensured a clean sweep of the Highland 
constituencies for the Liberals. This was emphatically a "Liberal" victory with none 
of the successful candidates describing themselves as "crofter" or even 
"Liberal/Crofter" candidates. This was the logical culmination of the process which 
had begun in the mid 1890s with the Highland Land League moving into the wider 
political arena and moving closer to the Liberal Party, losing its identity and its unity 
in the process. ^
Over the period which passed before the Small Landholders (Scotland) Bill became 
law John Sinclair, the Secretary for Scotland, would often be accused of acting 
without any authoritative information to substantiate his claims. Nevertheless, it is 
worth examining the influences which led to the drafting of the Bill. In 1903 he had 
received a lengthy memorandum from the widely respected Chairman of the 
Crofters’ Commission, David Brand. He enumerated the benefits which nearly two 
decades of administration of the Crofters' Act had brought to the Highlands. He
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advocated extending the Act in a number of particulars. Parishes in other counties 
where crofting conditions existed should be admitted to the Act. Sir George Otto 
Trevelyan's abortive crofter's Bill of 1895 had attempted to do this. In addition, 
leaseholders should be given protection under the act. The Congested Districts Board 
should be invested with compulsory powers of acquisition of land to ease its task of 
relieving congestion. Brand strongly argued that the Crofters' Commission and the 
CDB should retain separate existences as they had different functions to perform. 
Most importantly, Brand felt that the enlargement provisions of the Crofters' Act 
were too limited, and conditions, such as the need for a group of five crofters to 
apply together for an enlargement, should be relaxed. The second identifiable 
influence on the development of Sinclair's ideas on the land question was the report 
of a commission of farmers and other agricultural experts who had visited Denmark 
in 1904. The proportionally large rural population of that country favourably 
impressed Sinclair, as did the efficiency of its agriculture and the social condition of 
small holders. A well structured system of agricultural education and the importance 
of the principle of cooperation lay behind these successes.^
These influences have been accepted uncritically in a recent discussion of the 
origins of the Small Landholders (Scotland) Bill.^ It is important, however, to note 
the points where Sinclair's scheme diverged from these recommendations. Brand's 
opinions were as much concerned with ensuring a continuing role for his Crofter's 
Commission, which by 1903 was running out of judicial work to do. Nevertheless, 
on no occasion did he argue that crofter tenure should be extended to the rest of 
Scotland in a general sense. He confined himself to echoing the contents of the 1895 
Bill. The connection between the Danish report and the Small Landholder's 
(Scotland) Bill is even more tenuous. It was made clear that, apart from education 
and cooperation, the factor which stimulated rural prosperity in that country was 
peasant proprietorship. Statutes of 1899 and 1904 empowered the state to grant 90 
per cent loans for small holders to purchase land.^ It would seem that Sinclair's 
espousal of dual ownership rested, not upon expert opinion but upon the dictates of 
Liberal ideology. Land purchase in Scotland had traditionally been rooted in 
Conservative thought. His rejection of it was based on that fact as much as his 
protestations about the expense to the state of such a policy. The argument was also 
used that the demand for purchase did not exist and the experience of the CDB was 
used as evidenced This was a difficult argument to sustain. The failure of the CDB
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and the lack of popularity for the policy of purchase were self fulfilling prophecies 
once the Liberals came to power pledged to abolish both the policy and the 
institution. These points lead to the conclusion that the Small Landholders (Scotland) 
Bill was an intensely ideological measure only tenuously based on informed analyses 
of the land problem in the Highlands and beyond.^
The Small Landholders (Scotland) Bill was introduced on the 28th of July 1906. The 
bill had been heralded in the King's Speech in February and, despite the complexity 
of the issues, by the middle of the year there was some impatience that it had not 
been forthcoming. Indeed, it would seem that the question did not receive serious 
consideration by the cabinet until May when the question was discussed and a 
committee established.^ The Scottish Secretary, John Sinclair explained its principal 
elements to the House of Commons. It was based on the Crofters (Holdings) Act of 
1886, but with some important amendments. It was to apply to the whole of 
Scotland, not merely the crofting counties. Principally, these changes concerned the 
procedure for extending existing crofter holdings and creating new ones. The 1886 
condition for the necessity of 5 applicants was abolished, as were some of the 
restrictions, limiting available land under section 13 of the 1886 Act. Under the 
crofters Act the qualifying rental had been £30, under the new Bill any holding with 
a rental of less than £50 was to be subject to its provisions. However, the most 
contentious parts of the Bill were the compulsory provisions for creating new crofter 
holdings. New institutions were to be set up to oversee the creation of the new 
holdings, if they failed to secure agreement with the proprietors an element of 
compulsion could be introduced. The government were to provide the finance for the 
equipment of the new holdings.^
The government was keen to point out the successes of the Crofter s'Act to give it 
substance as a basis as a model of land tenure for the rest of Scotland. An 
independent report written by, amongst others, Ronald Munro Ferguson and several 
members of the Commission which had visited Denmark in 1904, cast doubt on this 
premise. Their principal conclusion with regard to the operation of the Crofters' Act 
since 1886 was that although it had undoubtedly improved housing conditions and 
removed the sense of grievance which crofters had felt prior to 1886, conditions in 
the crofting counties were still primitive. In particular, agricultural practice, despite 
the best efforts of the Crofters' Commission and the CDB, was still backward. They 
concluded that the improvement which was evident was based on the capital 
provided by the offspring of crofters working in the South. Elsewhere, Munro 
Ferguson argued that the establishment of dual ownership in the crofting counties
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had been no more than a recognition of the de facto situation. It was the case that the 
crofter provided his own improvements and equipped his own holding. This was not 
for any deeply rooted historical or cultural reason but due to the simple economic 
fact that they were worth so little there would be no investment value for a proprietor 
in providing them.*®
Not only the special circumstances of the crofter but also the particular demands of 
the time were used to invalidate the governments use of the 1886 Act as a basis for 
new legislation. The agitation of the 1880s created a political imperative for crofter 
legislation. There was no such clarity of demand from tenants in the Lowlands in 
1906. Further, the historical bases of the Crofters' Act were held to be critical 
defining characteristics. Despite the vague definition of these in the Act they were 
not perceived as an encroachment on landowners' rights in the same way as the 
provisions of the new Bill. These criticisms carry substantial weight. The 
government found it difficult to provide evidence that the landlord-tenant 
relationship outside the crofting counties was in need of such drastic reform as they 
proposed. Indeed, modem historiography has confirmed the validity of this 
contemporary impression in certain regards. It has been argued that the peasantry of 
the Northeast, who shared at least some characteristics with Highland crofters, 
missed their opportunity to secure protection in 1886 by failing to independently 
articulate their case to the government. Unfortunately, Trevelyan's 1895 bill (see 
chap 3), which would have given them crofter tenure did not reach the statute book. 
According to a recent historian the Small Landholder's Scotland Bill "gave too little 
protection and was much too late". In addition the government did not really 
succeed in moving the debate into a new context with their arguments concerning the 
national benefit to be gained from the creation of new small holdings. ^  ^
It is important to put this bill in the context of the debate on Highland policy over the 
previous two decades. Some have argued that it was based on the "precedents" of the 
statutes of 1886 and 1897.^ This is to misunderstand the important differences 
between these two acts and the contents of the new bill. The 1886 Act was based on 
the basis of "dual ownership" or "compulsory hiring", to use the contemporary terms 
in which it was described. That is to say, the crofter was still a rent paying tenant of 
a proprietor. However, he had security of tenure, the right of compensation for 
improvements and the right to appeal to the Crofter's Commission to set a fair rent 
for the holding. The 1897 Act, on the other hand was based on the concept of land
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purchase. The aim of the act, although it remained largely unfulfilled, was that the 
crofter would cease to be a tenant and become an owner occupier. The new bill was 
a direct repudiation of this concept and an attempt to strengthen and extend the 
provisions of the 1886 Act. As Sinclair's biographer as written;
As regards the formation of new holdings, like most Liberals at that 
time, he was not anxious to obtain the necessary land by purchase, 
because he did not want to turn the smallholders into peasant 
proprietors or tenants of a government department.^
Its introduction was greeted by heavy criticism of the drafting and the substance of 
the bill. In particular, there was some surprise that the government had resorted to 
the concept of "dual ownership", and ill concealed horror that such a concept was to 
be extended beyond the Crofting Counties. It was argued that the system had worked 
only patchily in the Highlands and not at all in Ireland. Despite these criticisms, 
Scottish ministers attempted to convince the Prime Minister that it was proving 
popular in Scotland. Thomas Shaw the Lord Advocate wrote that it was being 
received with "positive enthusiasm". Finally, it was attacked on the grounds that it 
did not stem from any thorough investigation of the Scottish land problem. Indeed, it 
does seem peculiar that Sinclair did not wait for the report of the Departmental 
Committee which was investigating the subject of small holdings. ^
This Committee, which included amongst its members, the Liberal MP and Easter 
Ross landowner R.C. Munro Ferguson, reported in December 1906 some months 
after the introduction of the Small Landholder's (Scotland) Bill. It was certainly in 
favour of government action to meet the perceived demand for the creation of more 
small holdings. However, the Committee was certainly not in favour of action in the 
direction advocated by Sinclair in his bill. They were of opinion that a system of 
dual ownership would detrimentally affect the "sense of responsibility which should 
accompany ownership". In their view, it would be impossible to administer in the 
face of proprietorial opposition and would lead to insecurity among farming tenants 
outside the crofting counties. With these factors in mind they concluded;
Experience has proved that a system of dual ownership of land is 
one which, under ordinary economic conditions, cannot be 
permanent, and while it lasts, is fatal to the proper maintenance of 
holdings, to harmony between landlord and tenant, and to the 
prosperity of agriculture.
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This provided ammunition for critics of Sinclair who felt that he was flying in the 
face of informed opinion.^ The Bill was withdrawn from the 1906 session through 
pressure on the parliamentary timetable. It was reintroduced the following year. 
This marked the beginning of the real debate on the fate of the Bill. It is important 
not only to examine the course of events throughout the lengthy period up to the 
Bill's passage in 1911, but also to examine the arguments which the government 
used to defend the bill. The debate has often been crudely characterised as conflict 
between the Liberals on one hand and the Conservatives and the House of Lords on 
the other.I** It will be shown here that the politics were considerably more complex 
than this portrayal suggests. Opinion on the Bill cut through the Liberal party and the 
cabinet. Further, the country was divided geographically along the Highland line. 
This division cut across both party and social lines with an alliance of sorts arising 
between the Highland MPs, the representatives of the proprietorial interest in the 
House of Lords and the newly formed Scottish Land and Property Federation.
II
In the 1907 session the Bill was introduced, in an unchanged form, to the Commons 
in March. After a second reading in April it was sent to the Lords in August only to 
be rejected by a majority of 162 to 39. This session saw most of the arguments which 
had been used in the debates of 1906 develop further. The main argument which the 
government used to defend the Bill demonstrated their attempt to emphasise the 
fundamental nature of the land problem in society. The main objective of the Bill 
was to halt rural depopulation and hence temper overcrowding in urban areas. The 
secure tenure and capital incentives offered in the bill were designed to retain the 
existing rural population on the land, with the increased facilities for creating new 
holdings to provide opportunities for new generations of small holders. The theory 
was to create small holdings of a sufficient size to deal with congestion and deal with 
the cottar problem.^ There was a tendency to idealise the small holder and the 
small holding as progressive forces in society. This idea that the land problem could 
be manipulated to achieve desired social ends was not particular to Scotland at the 
time. As far away as Russia, Tsar Nicholas H's Chief Minister, Peter Stolypin, held 
similar views. His conception of the land problem was similar in some respects to 
that of the Scottish Unionists. In the aftermath of the 1905 revolution in Russia,
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Stolypin sought to create an independent peasant class which he hoped would be 
"defenders of order, a support for the social structure". He argued that such people 
would have a sufficient stake in society to become opponents of revolutionary 
ideologies. He stated;
I propose that, first of all, it is necessary to create a citizen, a peasant 
owner, a small landowner, and the problem will be solved. 
Citizenship will reign throughout Russia.^
1907 also saw Small Holdings legislation passed for England. Lord Carrington the 
President of the Board of Agriculture, under the influence of Lord Ripon, the aged 
leader of the House of Lords, produced a moderate Bill. It left the administration of 
the new procedures for creating small holdings in the hands of county councils and 
did not interfere with the relations between the proprietor and his new tenants. 
Carrington had acted astutely in waiting for the Departmental Committee on Small 
Holdings to report, as one writer has said "out of politeness", not because of the 
weight of its likely recommendations. ^  However, in doing so he could not be 
accused, as Sinclair was, of producing a baseless bill. Nevertheless the importance of 
this report as a foundation of the legislation should not be exaggerated as it 
recommended purchase for small holders. This Act has generally been well received 
but it is interesting to note that members of the CDB who visited England to report 
on the workings of the Act in 1911 were not favourably impressed. They reported 
that the price paid for the holdings was excessive and the improvements were 
proving to be similarly expensive.^®
This bill is important due to the contrast it provides in the ease with which it went 
through Parliament. Further, the Unionists argued that since the agricultural 
conditions in Lowland Scotland were similar to England the procedures could be 
applied there. This was felt to be preferable to the bill which would in effect extend 
crofting tenure to the Lowlands. Arthur Balfour put this point in reply to Sinclair in 
parliament;
Anyone with even the most superficial acquaintance with the facts of 
the case knows that the difference between Berwickshire and 
Northumberland is incomparably less than than the difference in 
farming between Berwickshire and the crofting counties of 
Scotland,
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Added to this Unionists often expressed a worry that because of the similarity
between the conditions in Lowland Scotland and England, the provisions of the
Scottish Bill could not logically be confined to Scotland. This idea of the
"crofterisation" of the entire UK can best be understood as a scare tactic to stir up
opposition to the Scottish Bill. The statement was often made but the mechanics of
11how the much feared process was to take place was never fully explained.
These were not arguments confined to the Conservative ranks in the Lords. Lord 
Rosebery, the former Liberal Prime Minister, and still nominally of that party, 
pursued them vigorously and to the embarrassment of his former colleagues. He 
described crofting as the most "backward " agricultural system in the country and 
pointed to the absurdity of extending it to an area where he felt the agricultural 
system was unrivalled.^
Opposition to the terms of the Small Landholders Bill was not confined to ageing 
and fractious politicians. Much expert agricultural opinion was opposed in particular 
to the idea of extending crofter tenure to the lowlands. The Scottish Chamber of 
Agriculture consistently opposed the terms of the Bill. This organisation should be 
seen as much as a repositry of Unionism as of agricultural expertise, composed as it 
was of factors, landowners and tenant farmers. They complained that the terms of the 
Bill would discourage investment in Lowland agriculture. Much was made of the 
supposed failure of dual ownership in Ireland. This was a difficult argument to 
counter as both parties had introduced land purchase measures in Ireland. The 
government attempted to do so by pointing out that the Scottish Bill did not provide 
for free sale, a critical component of dual ownership.
Certainly, the Liberals were encountering massive problems with their Scottish land 
legislation in the Lords. This problem was also encountered with other pieces of 
legislation produced by the government. It has been noted that the Lords did not 
attack Liberal legislation indiscriminately. Major social legislation had been passed 
in 1906, most importantly the Workman's Compensation Act. This would suggest 
that the Lords were operating tactically rather than ideologically. They tended to 
pick on soft targets, bills which lacked support from important sections of the 
Liberal constituency, like Birrell's Education Bill of 1906, which was unsatisfactory 
to non conformist opinion. As has been noted in a study of Campbell Bannerman's 
premiership the problems encountered with the legislative programme were also the 
"result of powerful restraining forces among the Liberals themselves".^
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The "restraining force" in the case of the Scottish land bill was the paucity of support 
for it within the cabinet. Knowledge of these problems was certainly not confined to 
the privacy of the cabinet room. Lord Hamilton of Dalzell had resigned from his 
position in charge of Scottish business in the Lords as he felt he could not involve 
himself with the Small Landholders b ill.^  Sinclair, despite the support of his long 
time political ally Campbell-Bannerman, felt himself increasingly isolated in cabinet 
by the autumn of 1907. He felt that only Asquith and Lord Lorebum, the Lord 
Chancellor were sincere supporters of his measure. R.B. Haldane, the Secretary for 
War felt that half the cabinet were opposed to the Bill and only Sinclair and the 
Prime Minister were wholeheartedly for i t .^  There had been an attempt to rally 
Liberal opinion behind the Bill in the summer of 1907. The Scottish Liberal 
Association, the voluntary wing of the party, organised a special conference in Perth 
to draw attention to the Bill. It was an undoubted success in terms of the turn out, 
with every constituency in Scotland represented. The political advantage was 
somewhat muted, however, with the Master of Elibank forced onto the defensive in 
his speech to counter rumours that the Bill was about to be dropped by the 
government. He attempted to introduce a more positive note by arguing that "it was 
the fixed and settled determination of the Government" to proceed with the bill. 
Liberal divisions were completely exposed in November when Lord Tweedmouth, 
in a speech at the same venue, stated that while he was not "lukewarm" about the 
Scottish Small Landholders bill, as he had been accused, he did prefer the 
arrangement of the English bill which left the creation of new small holdings in the 
hands of the local authority. This incensed the normally amiable Sinclair who wrote 
to Tweedmouth in the strongest terms pointing out that his speech had made the 
government "appear ridiculous and contemptible". In this he had the support of the 
faithful, but by now ailing, Campbell Bannerman, who felt the situation to be 
"nasty". Not the least embarrassing aspect of Tweedmouth's position was its 
coincidence with that of Rosebery.
The second defeat of the Small Landholder's Bill in the Lords left the government in 
a difficult position. By now it was clear that the Lords and the Conservatives 
objected to the extension of crofter tenure to the lowlands. Throughout 1908 pressure 
would be exerted on the government to divide the bill and make special provisions 
for the Highlands. As early as 1907 Balfour had argued that the Highlands would 
suffer if the Bill was rejected out of hand. The Unionists did not accept the radical 
conception of the land problem shared by the Liberals but they did accept that the 
Crofter Acts were in need of modification and some new Holdings could safely be 
created. The events of 1908 would see the government accused of using the Bill to
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deliberately escalate the confrontation with the House of Lords and ignoring 
opportunities to settle for legislation which would deal with grievances in the 
Highlands. The position of government institutions in the Highlands was 
becoming increasingly difficult. The Crofters' Commission and the Congested 
Districts Board were aware that their abolition was being attempted, but were 
equally aware that it would not be effected quickly. This was a particular problem 
for the CDB who were now required to support a policy different from that which it 
was constituted to implement.
Ill
The next section of this chapter will examine the important events of 1908. The 
position of the government with regard to the crofting counties will be examined, 
and the relationship between the MPs for those counties and the government will be 
scrutinised. The interesting position of the Scottish Land and Property Federation 
and the initiatives it took through its representatives in the House of Lords and in 
conjunction with the MPs for the Crofting Counties are especially worthy of 
consideration given the prevailing view that the debate on the Small Landholders 
Bill was characterised by complete confrontation between crofter and landlord, 
Liberal and Unionist.
There was surprise among Unionist opinion when Sinclair produced his Bill, largely 
unchanged, for a third time in February 1908. Many felt that the government was not 
so interested in attempting to pass land legislation as providing targets for the 
Unionist majority in the Lords in order to fuel the confrontation between the two 
houses and further the case for constitutional reform. In presenting the Bill to the 
Commons, Sinclair reached new heights of rhetoric in describing the benefits to be 
gained from an increased small holding population. He spoke of the "physical 
deterioration" of the nation stemming from rural depopulation and the consequent 
loss of industrial efficiency and military effectiveness. On a more practical level he 
tackled the problem of the consequences of the bill for the concept of ownership of 
land, arguing;
This Bill does not touch in any shape or form the question of 
ownership of land. It deals solely with conditions of occupation by the 
cultivating tenant.
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Whether this represented an attempt to make the debate more vociferous by 
deliberately annoying the Conservatives, or a genuine misunderstanding on Sinclair’s 
part of the way his Bill was perceived, is unclear. Certainly, the ongoing Vatersay 
dispute (see chap 5) indicated that Sinclair was unable to appreciate that landowners 
felt the procedure of creating small holdings with security of tenure under an existing 
proprietor to be an imposition which would have a deleterious effect on other parts 
of their estates. He found it difficult to understand why proprietors should prefer the 
government to purchase land if new small holdings were to be created. Lord Lovat 
wrote privately of Sinclair;
he regards a farm like a block of buildings up a
street, and cannot see why if one feu is let, why it may alter the value 
of other similar feus, in fact he fails absolutely to grasp the point. ^
Rightly or wrongly landowners, particularly outside the crofting counties felt that the 
creation of protected tenancies on their land, possibly against their will and with 
inadequate compensation was an infringement of their rights of ownership. Their 
power to set a rent for a holding or evict an unsuitable tenant was placed in the hands 
of the Land Commission which the Bill proposed to set up. This perception was
prevalent in the crofting counties. On the MacKintosh estates, at Moy and Brae
Lochaber in Inverness - shire, the Bill was strongly deprecated for going far beyond 
the terms of the 1886 Act and any amendments which that Act required. The 
principal criticism was the fact that it would enlarge the rights of the tenant and
abridge those of the la n d o w n er.* *  3
It was noted that the essential difference between the Highlands and the Lowlands 
was that in the former the equipment on a croft was provided by the tenant, so it was 
right that he should be compensated if he left the holding. However, in the Lowlands 
the improvements were made by the proprietor who owned them and to whom they 
reverted when a lease fell in. Consequently, there was no call for compensation to 
the tenant. Indeed by settling protected tenants on holdings which had been equipped 
by the proprietor was a definite infringement of his rights. On the other hand, the 
Liberal conception of ownership was more simple, tending to see land as absolute 
property unaffected by the type of tenants it was leased to. Sinclair himself argued in 
the Commons;
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The land remains the property of the landlord, to sell, to bequeath, or 
to mortgage. He retains his mineral, his timber and his sporting 
rights. He is to get fair rent for it equipped as it is, and a 
fair rent for his capital. His capital and his improvements
are protected by statutory conditions which he can enforce and which 
the land court are bound to help him enforce. 34
It was often argued that the effect of introducing dual ownership to the Lowlands 
would be to provide a disincentive for proprietorial investment in agriculture. Those 
opposed to the bill argued that a landowner was unlikely to invest in improving land 
if there was the possibility of it being used for the creation of small holdings possibly 
against his will. On the other hand Liberals were keen to point out that the operation 
of security of tenure in the Highlands had had the effect of releasing the tenants 
capital. Freed from the threat of eviction the crofter had the security to spend money 
improving his holding and especially his housing conditions. This process would be 
duplicated in the Lowlands if the Bill was passed. The Master of Elibank argued;
security of tenure seems to me to call forth the best characteristics of 
the Scottish race; and if can make the people prosper surely the land 
will prosper likewise. 3 ^
Faced by the overwhelming Conservative dominance of the House of Lords these 
arguments were academic. The Bill was rejected a third time in March 1908. 
Sinclair's problems increased in April when Campbell Bannerman resigned as Prime 
Minister and died three weeks later on the 22nd. Regardless of the relationship with 
his successor, Sinclair would never be as close to the new premier as he had been 
with Campbell Bannerman. As his biographer put it "the frank and friendly days 
with C-B were over. "36 Although publicly the new Prime Minister, Asquith, was 
committed to the Bill there is evidence to suggest that he did not accord it such a 
high priority as his predecessor. Certainly, there was no immediate reintroduction of 
the Bill and as late as October 1909 Asquith informed Scottish Liberals that while he 
saw the need for land reform he did not propose to "make a pronouncement as to 
time and place". Asquith was well aware of the divided nature of the party and the 
cabinet on this issue and did not want to exacerbate the situation by forcing the Bill 
on reluctant colleagues. 3^
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The situation in 1908 changed as far as the Highland MPs were concerned. They had 
seen Highland land reform linked to an unpopular general measure for Scotland 
which stood little chance of becoming law before a general election and 
constitutional reform. Fearful of facing a Highland electorate with nothing to show 
in the shape of land reform, they began to take steps to secure a measure specifically 
providing for the crofting counties. Unionist opinion in the North was amenable to 
such a move feeling that the Liberals had cynically neglected the interests of the 
Highlands for the purpose of engineering a dispute with the House of Lords. The 
Northern Chronicle, an Inverness newspaper with a distinctly Conservative editorial 
line asked;
When are the crofters to see that they are used as pawns in a political
game in which they are not interested.
The Scotsman bemoaned the Liberals "sacrifice" of the interests of Scottish 
agriculture and Highland grievances to "purely political tactics". Realistically, this 
should not be seen as a new found concern for the Highlands on the part of the 
Scotsman, merely a stick with which to beat the Liberals. ^
Lord Lovat, a Conservative Peer, had introduced a Bill in the House of Lords in 
February 1908. It was limited to the crofting counties, and provided for the merging 
of the Crofter's Commission and the CDB, both of which he argued were moribund, 
to create a new Land Commission which would have increased powers to settle 
crofters and create new holdings. He justified the introduction of another land reform 
Bill, while a government measure was before parliament, by the existence of a cross 
party Highland consensus on the issue. Further, he felt an individual initiative was 
necessary as he had no confidence in the government to listen to the claims of the 
Highlands as the effect of its actions so far had been "to sacrifice Highland interests 
in order to conjure up and strengthen an abortive attack on the House of Lords". 
However this was not purely an attempt to head off Liberal attacks on the House of 
Lords, although that objective existed, as the involvement of most of the crofter MPs 
in the effort to gain separate legislation for the Highlands demonstrates.
A memorial (see Appendix n) had been sent to the Prime Minister, signed by 18 
MPs including 5 of the 6 MPs for the crofting counties (the exception was John 
Dewar of Inverness Shire). They pointed out that the Small Landholders (Scotland) 
Bill would not pass until "grave constitutional issues have been decided". They went 
on to echo Lovat in his contention that a cross party consensus existed on the
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principles of land reform for the Highlands. They demanded a conference between 
the Commons and the Lords on the land issue and intimated their support for a 
private members Bill prepared by the member for Orkney and Shetland, John 
Cathcart Wason. The government rejected the idea of a conference between the two 
Houses despite the fact that such meetings had been part of Asquith's preferred 
method of settling disputes.^®
However, there were some Liberals who stuck to the party line, John Dewar the 
MP for Inverness shire was one, and Rev Malcolm MacCallum, a former Deer Forest 
Commissioner was another. They felt they would be deserting the lowlands if they 
argued for separate Bills. In general, the Liberal government declared their support 
for the structures in the Small Landholders Bill, no doubt they were concerned that 
should they do otherwise it would be regarded as defeatist. Nevertheless, such a line 
allowed them to feel, in the words of a Labour Movement commentator, that they 
had escaped from an "awkward situation".^ Despite this, a private meeting took 
place under the auspices of the Scottish Land and Property Federation, with Lord 
Lovat and the Liberal MP for Argyll shire, J.S. Ainsworth present. At this meeting 
the MPs were said to have expressed general agreement with the contents of Lord 
Lovat’s Bill. Their action in sending the memorial to Asquith and generally agitating 
for separate Bills bears out this contention. Another Highland landowner and 
prominent Conservative, the MacKintosh of MacKintosh, was told;
Weir, Morton & Co (MPs for Ross-shire and Argyll-shire 
respectively) are furious with the government, and think that Sinclair 
has sacrificied them and their crofter constituents to his desire to 
make a big splash himself.
The thesis that the best way to secure progress for the Highlands was to argue for 
separate legislation found some support in the government institutions in the 
Highlands. This is not surprising as these bodies had to deal with the practical 
consequences of the legislative delays. William MacKenzie, Secretary to both the 
Crofter's Commission and the CDB, wrote of the "clamant need" of legislation for 
the Highlands and admitted that the case for the lowlands "was not so pressing", he 
concluded;
There were good provisions in Lord Lovat's Bill of last year. In view 
of that fact I cannot think that the Lords would reject a reasonable 
government measure.^
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These events are important, not because they yielded any progress, none of the 
incipient private member bills proceeded very far, but because of the light they shed 
on the state of opinion on the land issue. Studies of the controversy have uniformly 
given the impression that the issue was a straight fight between Liberals in one camp 
and Unionists and proprietors in the Lords in the other. One has written of the "total 
opposition" of the House of Lords to land reform, and of the Liberals "good 
intentions" for the Highlands, while another has fulminated against the "hegemony 
of lairds" in Parliament.^ As has been shown above, the issue was far more 
complex. The opposition of the Unionists and most of the proprietors in the Lords 
was not total, but conditional. They were prepared to see reform of the 1886 Act in 
the Highlands and extension of the provisions of the more moderate English Small 
Holdings Act to the Lowlands of Scotland. In addition, the Liberal party was split at 
almost every level from the cabinet down, on the best way to tackle the land issue. 
This was recognised by the Master of Elibank when he refused to let a deputation of 
Scottish Liberals see the Prime Minister on the grounds of the "divided state of the 
party"; if one deputation was allowed access others arguing for different policies 
would demand similar treatment. Liberal division was countered by a Highland 
coalition crossing party and social lines, which pointed out to the government the 
importance of settling outstanding Highland grievances immediately.
There is also to be taken into consideration the fact that the rejection of the Small 
Landholders (Scotland) Bill caused many problems on the ground in the Highlands. 
Lord Lovat and others had argued that institutions such as the Crofter's Commission 
were moribund. However, it is important to understand why. In the case of the 
Commission its most important work, that of revising rents, had been completed. 
However, this could not be said of the Congested Districts Board, and they made 
clear in 1907 that it was the existence of a Bill for their abolition that was the main 
factor which restricted their activities. Of course, when the Board made this 
statement they were not to know that the Bill would not pass until the end of 1911. 
Thus they had to work for 5 years at a reduced level of intensity, while the problems 
which they had been constituted to deal with continued to proliferate (for a detailed 
discussion of this see chap 5 ) .^
The attitude of the government and the crofters in the disputes in the Southern 
Hebrides and Kilmuir were heavily influenced by the ongoing Parliamentary 
controversy over the Small Landholders Bill. Lady Gordon Cathcart was able to 
fight a successful rearguard action against the government's attempts to involve her
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in a scheme based on the provisions of the Small Landholders Bill. She was strongly 
opposed to such a course of action and was in a strong position to defend her point of 
view as long as the Bill was not passed. She was able to set the agenda for the debate 
and introduce her own conditions at any time because the government had no 
legislative structure to back up their arguments.
IV
1909 saw John Sinclair elevated to the House of Lords with the title Lord Pentland. 
Asquith assured him that the reason for the move was to redress the lack of effective 
government management in the Lords. Sinclair felt that there was more to the move. 
He resented his removal from the Commons. His biographer described it as akin to 
"vanishing from real political life". It was certainly the case that Sinclair had made 
few political allies with his persistant advocacy of the Small Landholders (Scotland) 
Bill. Given his close association with this Bill it would have been inexpedient of 
Asquith to dismiss him before it reached the statute book. The impression that 
Sinclair was regarded as a necessary, rather than an integral, member of the cabinet 
is strengthened by the fact that he was dismissed almost as soon as the Bill was 
passed, in February 1912.^
1909 and 1910 were dominated by the larger dispute with the House of Lords over 
the budget of 1909. The two general elections of 1910 saw the Liberal vote hold up 
in the Crofting Counties while it was being eroded elsewhere. Indeed, the Liberals 
performed better in Scotland than at any time since 1885 and once again swept the 
crofting counties. This performance was not matched in rural England where there 
was a marked swing back to the Unionists, leaving Liberal strength concentrated in 
industrial areas. Many felt that it was support for the Scottish land legislation 
which kept the Liberal vote so healthy in Scotland. Certainly, land was one of the 
major issues at both elections. The Unionists fought them on a land policy of 
affording purchase facilities through local government to existing small holders and 
granting amendments of the crofter’s act where necessary. This policy was distinctly 
unattractive despite the undoubted unity of the party behind it. Nevertheless, both in 
Scotland and south of the Border, Unionists were in little doubt that it was the land 
issue and widespread distaste for landowners which had lost them the election in 
Scotland. Austen Chamberlain candidly admitted that as long as land was an election 
issue his party would have little success in Scotland.^® The Liberal Party succeeded 
in polarising the land issue in its favour. The traditional Scottish antipathy to the 
landlord was skillfully exploited by invective against the "House of Landlords", who
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were portrayed as the culprits in holding up the Small Landholder's (Scotland) Bill. 
This argument was very successful despite the best efforts of the Scotsman, which 
pointed out "it is the Secretary for Scotland not the House of Lords that is 
responsible for the lack of any new legislation on the Highlands".^
Although Scottish land legislation was off the agenda from mid 1908 to mid 1911, 
1910 provides an interesting footnote on the depth of the Liberal commitment to the 
cause of the small holder. The death of Edward VII in May 1910 led to the Liberals 
and the Conservatives convening a conference on constitutional issues to prevent the 
necessity of forcing a crisis on the new monarch. By the middle of the summer this 
conference was deadlocked. David Lloyd George, the Liberal Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, produced a plan for a coalition government which would circumvent 
constitutional issues and press on with the work of social reform. This was very 
much an individual initiative without the explicit blessing of Asquith. It is interesting 
in this context because Lloyd George produced a lengthy paper laying out the basis 
for such a coalition and included in it a section on land reform. He argued, "the small 
holdings craze is of a very doubtful utility" and went on to point out the lack of 
agricultural expertise among small holders, before concluding that a system of 
"farming on a large scale with adequate capital" would be the system most worthy of 
state su p p o r t .T h e  incipient coalition did not materialise, but the memorandum 
demonstrates that another member of the Liberal cabinet was lukewarm in his 
commitment to the idea of extending small holdings. Although the object behind the 
memorandum, to attract Unionists to a coalition, should be kept in mind when 
considering the views of Lloyd George it does show in the words of one historian 
that he "regarded the small holding programme as politically divisive and 
economically dubious".^
V
Given the controversy generated when it was first introduced in 1906 and continuing 
down to the second rejection by the House of Lords in 1908, it is curious to find that 
the Small Landholders (Scotland) Bill was passed without acrimony in 1911. This is 
an apparent paradox which has not been adequately discussed. Even the most 
perceptive commentator on the subject allots only a paragraph to the events of 1911, 
hinting that it was "the destruction of the Lord's Veto" which secured its successful 
reintroduction. Another monocausal explanation has been provided by a more recent 
writer who ascribes its passage to "public pressure".These are certainly pertinent 
points. However, there are others to be considered, notably, the circumstances and
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rhetoric which accompanied the reintroduction of the Bill. It was introduced as a 
private members bill by Sir Donald MacLean, the member for Peebles, and Arthur 
Murray of Elibank.^ This fact set the tone of the subsequent deliberations at a less 
intense level than had been the case in the 1906 to 1908 period. This was evident in 
the House of Commons at the second reading stage in June 1911, when the Lord 
Advocate declared;
We are in a judicial frame of mind. We have learned a good deal 
during the last few years. I think we are prepared to meet each 
other on fair and even friendly terms. I hope the promoters of 
this Bill will not dwell unduly upon the new heaven and new earth 
that we sometimes hear predicted of land measures.
Even the acerbic and individual Liberal member R.C. Munro Ferguson, chose to 
remark on the beneficial effects of the more consensual style of debate which had 
emerged on this issu e d
Nevertheless, changes in tone, by themselves, would have been insufficient to bring 
about the rapid settlement which occurred. Changes in the substance of the Bill 
proved to be instrumental in this regard. Two such changes stand out. Firstly, in the 
case of compensation claims amounting to more than £300 the landlord was 
accorded the right to call in an independent arbiter. Secondly, and more importantly, 
was the creation of a new category of tenants, to be known as "statutory small 
tenants". As noted above, one of the principal problems with the 1906 to 1908 Small 
Landholders (Scotland) Bills, had been a worry that the provisions of the Crofters 
Holdings (Scotland) Act were to be uncritically extended beyond the crofting 
counties. Clause 32 of the 1911 Bill went some way to dealing with this problem. It 
redefined, and extended crofter tenure beyond the crofting counties. Yearly tenants 
of holdings of less than 50 acres, or holdings rented at less than £50 were to be 
known as "small landholders". They were to have security of tenure, the right to have 
their rents fixed by the Scottish Land Court, and the right to be compensated for their 
improvements when they left their holdings. Statutory small tenants were those, 
mostly outside the crofting counties whose improvements had been paid for by their 
landlords. They were admitted to the partial protection of the Act. This politically 
necessary compromise on the differing conditions between the crofting and non 
crofting counties was unpopular among the more doctrinaire Liberals, such as J.A. 
Bryce, MP for Inverness Burghs. They regarded it as an unnecessary admission of 
error in earlier versions of the B ill.^
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As has been noted by Brown, the new limitations faced by the Lords played a part in 
this process. In the period 1906 to 1910 they had selectively disrupted the Liberal 
programme, attacking vulnerable legislation. The Parliament Act invalidated such a 
tactic. Rather than opposing the bill outright without any hope of success, the Lords, 
and the opposition generally, took a more constructive attitude. By judicious 
argument at the Committee stages in both Houses they were able to extract some 
concessions. One notable success surrounded the administration of the Contagious 
Diseases of Animals Act. In the interests of effective action in this important area, 
responsibility for dealing with notifiable diseases was not devolved to the new Board 
of Agriculture for Scotland. Rather, it was retained by the Board of Agriculture and 
Fisheries in London, to be administered on a UK wide basis. With such small 
changes the opposition accepted the inevitability, if not the complete desirability, of 
the Bill's passage and allowed it to pass without a division.
The Small Landholder’s (Scotland) Act made important changes to preceding land 
legislation and codified a series of Acts which now became known as the Small 
Landholders (Scotland) Acts, 1886 to 1911. The Crofter's Commission and the CDB 
were abolished, after a profoundly unsatisfactory 5 year hiatus in their work. Their 
roles taken on by the Scottish Land Court (SLC) and the Board of Agriculture for 
Scotland (BoAS). The most important changes which were made to the 1886 regime 
concerned the machinery for extending the area under small holding tenure. The 
limited provisions of the 1886 Act were replaced by an apparently radical process by 
which holdings could not only be enlarged but completely new tenancies could be 
established on privately owned land. The consent of the landowner would make the 
process simple, but, if this was not forthcoming BoAS could place before the SLC 
the necessary details and an element of compulsion could be introduced. In the event 
of a mutually agreeable scheme the landlord would be compensated by an amount 
decided by the SLC. If the claim exceeded £300 the claim could be settled by 
arbitration.^
Under the 1911 Act a sum of £200,000 was to be made available for the purpose of 
Scottish land settlement. This was to be made up of £15,000 under the Agricultural 
Rates Act of 1896 and a further £185,000 to be voted annually by parliament. This 
was to be known as the "Agriculture (Scotland) Fund", and was principally to be 
used for equipping the new holdings created under the act. However, all
1 80
compensation claims and the administrative expenses of the Board had to be paid out 
of it. It is important to note that this sum was for the whole of Scotland and not for 
the exclusive benefit of the Crofting Counties, as had been the case with the £35,000 
available annually to the CDB.
VI
One of the less important events of these controversial years was the creation of a 
new Highland Land League in 1909. Strongly critical of its predecessor's close ties 
to the Liberal Party the new League was based on the assumption that "official 
Liberalism has been the deadly enemy of the Highland proletariat". It proposed an 
alliance of crofters and workers to campaign for the nationalisation of the land and 
the advancement of Labour in the Highlands. Thomas Johnstone, editor of the ILP 
inclined newspaper Forward, came to the leadership of the League with a 
background as a trenchant critic of landlords. His propagandist critique of their 
social position, Our Noble Families, originally written for Forward, became a best 
seller. Nevertheless, the League could never hope to match the intensity of the 
crofter's movement of the 1880s. In the 1880s the depth of the perception of 
grievance in the Highlands was much greater than in the Edwardian period. Further, 
the movement in the 1880s had been strong at the grass roots whereas the new 
League was largely the creation of a small number of urban based activists. The new 
League was much more sectarian than its predecessor. The close ties with the 
Liberals were largely a feature of the post 1886 period when the original League was 
in decline. Prior to that, the strength of the movement had been its political 
independence.
The new League has been largely written off by historians. It has been condemned as 
"lacking in mass character", "ephemeral" in its impact and with only a small 
"Highland following". Its influence on the debate on the Small Landholders 
(Scotland) Bill does not suggest that this historiographical trend is in need of 
alteration. It singularly failed to break the Liberal monopoly in the crofting counties 
and its main policy of land nationalisation was not seriously considered by either of 
the main parties. In the event its pre war activities were limited to minor publishing 




In terms of the ongoing debate on Highland policy the years 1906 to 1911 are 
significant for the Liberal advocacy of the idea of dual ownership and the specific 
rejection of land purchase and land nationalisation. The Small Landholders 
(Scotland) Bill attracted criticism from all quarters. Unionist opinion, notably in the 
concerted campaign by the Scotsman, was firmly against the extension of dual 
ownership to the Lowlands. Many Liberals, some of them landowners, like Munro 
Ferguson and Rosebery, were equally opposed to these provisions. Another portion 
of Liberal opinion, while committed to the concept of the multiplication of small 
holdings, was concerned that Sinclair's Bill was badly thought out and preferred the 
more moderate provisions of the English Smallholder's Act. Opinion in the growing 
Labour movement was not well disposed to the Bill either, condemning it for being 
insufficiently anti landlord. Finally, the majority of Crofter MPs were opposed to the 
attitude of the government to the Highlands. The feeling was that the Bill was being 
used to provoke the Lords and was not a sincere attempt to improve the lot of the 
crofter. As early as 1907 Thomas Shaw, the Lord Advocate, was discussing the 
Small Landholder's (Scotland) Bill in the context of the "coming conflict with the 
House of Lords". This demonstrates that if it was not deliberately employed to 
provoke the peers, leading Liberals were certainly aware of its disruptive 
p o ten t ia l .T h e  campaign of informed agricultural opinion in the form of the 
various landowners and factors organisations should not be underestimated.
The scale and diversity of the opposition to the Bill makes it difficult to consistently 
argue that idealogical obstruction by the Unionist peers was the primary obstacle to 
its passage. This thesis can only be adopted after an uncritical acceptance of Liberal 
propaganda of the time, which skillfully portrayed the debate in these terms. Some 
Liberals argued in 1913, in debates on the Scottish Home Rule Bill, that it was the 
absence of a Scottish parliament which had delayed the passage of the Small 
Landholders (Scotland) Act for so long.^
Although Sinclair often referred to the Crofter's Holdings (Scotland) Act as an 
authoritative precedent for his proposals, it is difficult to argue that the Small 
Landholders (Scotland) Bill represented a serious, objective attempt to settle 
outstanding issues in the Highlands. Indeed, the perception that the Liberals were 
ignoring the crofting counties in favour of provocation of the upper House led to a 
tactical realignment of Highland opinion in 1908. Liberal MPs and proprietors from 
the Scottish Land and Property Federation came together to lobby the government
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for separate Highland legislation. This further detracts from the simple Liberal 
versus Unionist, tenant versus proprietor, interpretation of the debate. It also 
damages the reputation of the Campbell Bannerman and Asquith governments, on 
this issue at least, as administrations prepared to sacrifice ideology for practical 
solutions. Above all the arguments for land reform in this period, whether articulated 
by Liberals like Sinclair, or Labour movement figures like Thomas Johnstone, took 
little account of the need for specific Highland policies. Rather they were based on 
nebulous ideas of the national benefit to be gained from rural regeneration.
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CHAPTER SEVEN.
Land Settlement, 1911 to 1919.
After years of frustration during the protracted passage of the Small Landholders 
(Scotland) Act, 1911, expectations for land settlement were high. Liberal rhetoric 
had presented the Act as a panacea for the problems of the Highlands, and a curative 
for a plethora of social ills. This had increased the expectations of progress which 
greeted the new Act. Amidst the excitement there were some sobering voices. The 
Conservative national press were decidedly lukewarm on this question. Of course, 
political opinion, as much as objective thought, played its part in the formation of 
these views. 1
The Act came into operation in April 1912 when the institutions created by its 
provisions began their work. The Board of Agriculture for Scotland (BoAS) and the 
Scottish Land Court (SLC) took over from the Congested Districts Board and the 
Crofters Commission. The BoAS was composed of three executive officials, headed 
by a Chairman, Sir Robert Wright. Prior to his appointment, Wright had been 
principal of the West of Scotland College of Agriculture. There was a division of 
labour between the other two members of the Board. R.B. Greig was given the task 
of supervising the Board’s duties in the areas of agricultural education and 
improvement of live stock husbandry. John Sutherland, a former Oban Solicitor and 
Estate Agent, was appointed specially to deal with the creation of small holdings. He 
was to have control of the entire work of the Land Division of the Board. His final 
decisions were based on the information gathered by a network of Sub- and Assistant 
Sub- Commissioners who were allocated geographic areas of responsibility. A 
Former Scottish Office Civil Servant, H.M. Conacher, filled the post of Secretary to 
the Board. ^  The Scottish Land Court (SLC) continued the legal functions of the 
Crofter's Commission. The Chairman of the SLC was David Brand's successor in the 
Chair of the Commission, N J.D. (now Lord) Kennedy had the same rank as a Judge 
of the Court of Session. He was of Highland descent his father having been a Free 
Church Minister in Sutherland. Prior to his appointment to the SLC and during his 




The initial tasks of the Board were to establish the demand for land and to identify 
land available for the creation of small holdings. The availability of land was 
governed by section 7 (16) of the Act. Generally, farms of less than 150 acres, home 
farms or land under a lease in force at Whitsunday 1906 (1911 in the case of the non­
crofting counties) could not be taken for small holdings. An obstacle in this initial 
search for land was the highly particular nature of the demand. Many applicants, 
either demanded to be settled on particular lands, either in their immediate locality, 
or in the area of their origin. A "disinclination" to consider alternatives was a 
problem for the Board.'** Questions can also be asked about the scale of demand. In 
total there were 5352 applicant to BoAS, 3370 for new holdings and 1982 for 
enlargement of existing holdings. Of the applications for new holdings, 2760 came 
from the crofting counties. More importantly, 1300 of these came from the Outer 
Hebrides, and Lewis in particular. The accuracy of these figures as a measure of the 
true demand for land can be questioned. It was the case that new facilities for land 
settlement encouraged a huge number of applicants of varying qualifications to try 
their luck. The Board anticipated that this bias in favour of the Crofting Counties 
would even out over time as tenants in the South of Scotland became aware of the 
benefits to be gained from the operation of the Act.**
It is important to describe the procedure by which a small holding scheme was 
carried out under the 1911 Act, before going on to consider in detail the events 
surrounding particular schemes across the Highlands.** When a body of applications 
was received, and some potentially available land had been identified, a small 
holdings scheme could be contemplated. The Sub-Commissioners for the particular 
areas had a duty to keep themselves informed as to farms which were, or were about 
to fall, out of leased Farms were then inspected by the Sub-Commissioners and 
their reports submitted to the Small Holdings Commissioner. If the scheme was to 
proceed negotiations were opened with the management of the estate in question. By 
1915 BoAS were aware that estates could slow the process down at this stage, if they 
so desired. For this reason, BoAS officials were instructed to act promptly and be 
vigilant over potential delaying tactics. At this point there were three alternatives. 
Settlement could proceed by agreement, in which case the estate had no right to 
subsequent compensation if the scheme failed. An unopposed compulsory order of 
the SLC could be sought. This would occur if the proprietor had no real objections to 
the scheme, but wished to ensure the right to subsequent compensation, under 
section 17(2) of the 1911 Act, if the scheme should prove a failure. This was the
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cause of many problems. The SLC was flooded with cases which could have been 
better dealt with by a more simple procedure. If the negotiations did not yield 
agreement application could be made to the SLC for a compulsory order, for which 
the approval of the Secretary for Scotland was required. The procedure before the 
SLC involved the hearing of witnesses and counsel's opinion for each party, BoAS 
and the estate. In addition, the SLC had a duty to inspect the ground in question. If 
approved by the SLC, the next stage was the selection of holders for the small 
holdings. Genuine proprietorial observations were taken into account at this staged
The finances of BoAS were governed by section 5 of the 1911 Act. The Agriculture 
(Scotland) Fund was composed of £15,000 under the Agricultural Rating Act of 
1896 and supplemented by a maximum of £185,000 voted annually by Parliament 
This was considerably in excess of the £35,000 placed at the disposal of the CDB. 
Two general points can be made here. Firstly, the BoAS had a much wider area to 
cover. Secondly for reasons discussed immediately below, the procedures of the 
1911 Act were a much more expensive method of constituting small holdings. The 
Board themselves hinted that the limits of the Agriculture (Scotland) Fund would be 
the most important constraint on their work.^
There were many calls on this money during the settlement of a small holding 
scheme. The tenant of land being used for land settlement could claim compensation 
for the disruption to his tenancy. The landlord could demand compensation for 
damage to the letting value of his land caused by the creation of small holdings. 
BoAS officials were warned by the Small Holdings Commissioner to distinguish 
carefully between "direct" loss, such as increased management overheads and 
"indirect" loss "such as the possible depreciation of value of the estate in 
consequence of the establishment thereon by small holders" This question of whether 
landlords had the right to claim compensation for the loss of "selling value" plagued 
the Board. Landlords argued that the establishment of small holdings on an estate 
withdrew "many of the advantages of ownership", making the subject less 
marketable. The Board felt that such a claim was not covered by the Act. Further, 
they disputed whether such a depreciation actually took place. There was little 
evidence one way or the other and the debate quickly became sterile. ^  if the 
compensation claimed by a proprietor or a tenant exceeded £300, the final award 
would be settled by an arbiter appointed by the Court of Session. Otherwise the SLC 
settled the amount. The demand for compensation beyond £300 could be genuine or 
it could be a tactic to delay the scheme. This was a badly drafted clause. The 
proprietor did not have to establish a claim of more than £300, merely intimate that
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he would be claiming compensation in excess of that sum. Once some experience 
was gained of the working of the Act it was felt that there was no real consistency in 
the awards of the arbiters. This was not surprising among a group of randomly 
chosen individuals who could not look to the Act for any guidance. The 
compensation had to be met out of the Agriculture (Scotland) Fund. Clearly a large 
number of compensation awards would prejudice the ability of the BoAS to set up 
small holding schemes. They could only abandon schemes in which they felt that the 
compensation was excessive, hardly an ideal course of action. * ^  Apart from 
compensation the Board had to bear the inevitable losses consequent on the 
establishment of small holdings on privately owned land. These occurred on several 
fronts. There was a difference in the value of farm buildings to the landlord or tenant 
farmer, and to small holders. Indeed, they could be useless to the latter. The rent of 
the land under small holdings could be less than when the subject was rented as a 
whole farm. The stock on the farm may not have been relevant to the needs of small 
holders and would have to be sold at a loss compared to the acclimatised value. ^  
Thus, it can be seen that the act was not a straightforward piece of legislation. It had 
many potential loopholes. The relationship of the complicated structure of the Act 
with proprietorial responses to the Board's attempts to form new holdings will be the 
theme of the remainder of this chapter.
II
With the establishment of these general points it is now possible to proceed to an 
examination of land settlement in a number of different areas in the Highlands. This 
serves to demonstrate the diversity of conditions, as well as the reality of the 
operation of the Act as compared to the theory as developed by the Small Holdings 
Commissioner. As noted above, the bulk of demand for new holdings came from the 
Outer Hebrides, and in course of time the bulk of BoAS activity would be 
concentrated in that area. This activity will be scrutinised with regard to Lewis, the 
Gordon Cathcart Estates in the south of the Long Island. Finally, North Uist and 
Harris will be considered in tandem. Despite this concentration other areas are 
worthy of note. Notably, the Island of Tiree on the estate of the Duke of Argyll, but 
also the estates of his fellow magnate which covered practically the whole of the 
County of Sutherland. Issues to be considered will include, the range of proprietorial 
and crofter response to the attempts of the Board to implement the Act, as well as 
the problems generated by the highly complex structure of the Act.
192
Lewis was the site of the most long standing and deep seated difficulties. Various 
institutions had failed to come to terms with the land issue in Lewis. Expectations 
for speedy progress were high in the years prior to 1914. The Board, at the outset of 
their work in this area, were well aware of the difficulties involved. Lewis was 
particularly characterised by scarcity of land and poverty stricken applicants. ^
These expectations over ran in the western parish of Uig at the end of 1913. 14 
crofters in the townships of Valtos and Kneep cleared the neighbouring farm of Reef 
of its stock of 200 sheep and 5 head of cattle. ^  This 600 acre farm had been the 
subject of attention by the Deer Forest commission in the 1890s. In the first decade 
of the new century the CDB had examined the farm and discovered it to be 
unsuitable for the formation of small holdings. Expectations had been increased by 
the 1911 Act and the raid was a symptom of the fact that even by 1914 frustration 
had grown.I** It was isolated and largely composed of Machair land with little 
ground suitable for cultivation. This aside, in terms of the 1911 Act it was "statute 
barred" as its rent was less than £80. There was a school of thought in the island that 
the 27th section of the Act, which referred specifically to Lewis, superceded this 
provision. This section denied landholder status to tenants of holdings rented at more 
than £30 or extending to more than 30 acres. It was widely held that such farms 
were available for the creation of small holdings. Indeed, it was in this area of Lewis 
that the demand for this clause had originated. However, a combination of a refusal 
by the BoAS to implement section 27, and the fact that they shared the view of the 
CDB that the farm was unsuitable for small holdings, ensured that the demands of 
the raiders were denied. There was a clear gap between the expectations of the 
people, which had been conditioned by the rhetoric surrounding the land issue in the 
period 1906 to 1911, and the reality of the Board's power, which was limited by the 
provisions of the 1911 Act. Colin MacDonald, an Assistant Sub-Commissioner in 
Lewis wrote to the Small Holdings Commissioner telling him that, "it was next to 
impossible to get the men to realise that the Board has no power to deal with their 
case".^
Nevertheless, the problems over Reef farm caused a certain amount of consternation, 
both at BoAS and in the Scottish Office. There were a number of reasons for this; 
firstly, the fact that the problems came so soon after the passing of the 1911 Act, and 
before BoAS had had the opportunity to achieve any significant progress in Lewis. 
Indeed^the fact that the BoAS had made little progress in Lewis was a factor in the 
origins of the raid. As the Superintendant of Police in Stornoway noted, "the whole 
proceeding is a game to hurry up somebody". Some elements in the Board, led by
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Robert Greig, were inclined to start negotiations with the estate over R eef.^  
However, the consensus of opinion was that although the raid was primarily a 
publicity stunt, it could have worrying consequences if it was not handled correctly. 
Experienced officials were well aware that once agitation began in Lewis it was 
difficult to eradicate. Secondly, there was a worry that if raids were seen to 
favourably influence the new regime, it was likely to encourage their repetition.^ 
However, despite the potential political consequences of the raid, the Lord Advocate 
did not consider it serious enough to initiate a criminal prosecution, and advised that 
the estate should proceed with a civil action. The raiders were sentenced to 6 weeks 
for breach of interdict in March, but were released the following month after giving 
an undertaking not to encroach on the farm. ^
A major factor in the Reef difficulties were the parallel attempts by the BoAS to 
implement Small Holding Schemes in Lewis. The Board prepared schemes for four 
farms; Galson in Ness in the north west, Orinsay and Stimervay in Lochs in the south 
east, Camish and Ardroil in Uig, and Gress, north of Stornoway. These farms 
covered a total of nearly 23,000 acres and it was proposed to constitute around 130 
small holdings.^®
The proprietor of Lewis, Major Duncan Matheson, was represented by the famous 
firm of Edinburgh Solicitors, Skene, Edwards and Garson. They represented a 
number of Highland proprietors, and had experience of crofting law going back to 
1886. In each of the four cases considered here, Matheson, through his solicitors, 
reacted negatively to the proposals of the Board. They argued that the formation of 
small holdings on the estate had not been successful in the past. They ascribed to 
small holders a tendancy to let rent arrears accumulate, and to be deficient in the 
stewardship of land. They also noted that the proprietor, and the rest of the non 
smallholding population would face an increased burden of rates. ^  There were two 
reasons for this; firstly, the creation of small holdings would decrease the overall 
rateable value of a parish and secondly, small landholders received a number of 
rating dispensations which meant that they only had to pay 3/8ths of half of the rates 
for their holding. They also pointed out that the sporting value of the estate would 
be reduced. This was an unlikely eventuality as none of the farms had any real 
sporting value. This was a very vague area as sporting values were so subjective. If 
loss of sporting value could be proved by the proprietor it was to be paid for by a 
free grant by the Board. However, they were extremely reluctant to do so unless the 
land being taken for small holdings was used exclusively for sport. If it was merely a 
case of the estate having shooting rights over tenanted land, the sporting, as
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compared to the agricultural value of the land was almost impossible to calculate and 
hence compensation could not readily be paid .^  it would seem that the four Lewis 
schemes fell into this category. At each stage of the procedure Skene, Edwards and 
Garson were obstructive and uncommunicative. They accused the Board of 
supplying insufficient information about the schemes. By December 1913, in the 
case of Galson, the negotiations had reached the stage of application to the Land 
Court. They responded by taking out an interdict against this application. This was 
withdrawn in January 1914. However, obstruction continued with the estate 
demanding more time and more information at each stage of the SLC proceedings.^ 
This pattern of events continued until 1916. By then it was clear that the estate 
would oppose every move of the BoAS. At this stage the BoAS considered its 
options, whether to proceed, or not, and if not, whether to postpone, or abandon the 
schemes. In the event, with most of the applicants on active service, a postponement 
was sought. The SLC was informed that the Lewis applications were to be 
withdrawn until the end of the war. There had been divisions in BoAS over this 
policy with the Chairman holding out against it. The postponement was only carried 
out on the sanction of the Secretary for Scotland. In effect, this was an indefinite 
suspension. The BoAS had to weigh the costs of continuing the schemes against the 
likelihood of renewed lawlessness if they were withdrawn. This obstruction had 
exacerbated the intense demand for land in Lewis, as one of the Assistant Sub 
Commissioners noted in 1916;
... the Lewis people, having had these farms dangled before them for 
some years will break the peace if the thing is postponed more or less 
indefinitely.
This would certainly have been the case in "normal'1 circumstances. However, 
wartime introduced critical differences which saved the Board in this regard. The 
level of recruitment in Lewis had been exceptional. Thus, those who would have 
been ringleaders and activists in a renewed cycle of raiding were absent. Further, the 
public response to raiding was unlikely to be favourable during wartime. The Board 
were aware at this stage in the war that the level of recruitment in the island would 
compel them to take action at the end of the war, whenever that might b e .^
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Recent writing on the failure of the Small Landholders Act in Lewis has 
concentrated on the spoiling role of the proprietor. The most recent historian has 
argued that the sole reason for the failure of the Act in Lewis was Skene, Edwards 
and Garson’s "stonewalling t a c t i c sC e r ta in ly ,  the obstructive tactics were an 
obstacle to land settlement. During the Board's deliberation on the fate of the Lewis 
schemes, Skene Edwards and Garson's "various means of obstruction" were given 
high priority in the Board’s explanation of its own failure.^ Nevertheless, amongst 
the record of the failure of these four schemes other reasons can be discerned. A 
large part of the problem was the quality of land in Lewis. It has been noted that 
neither the CDB nor BoAS considered the farm of Reef suitable for small holdings. 
The other farms were far from ideal either. Orinsay and Stimervay was isolated as 
the road system in that part of Lewis was almost non-existent. The arable land was 
not plentiful and the old arable, now under sheep, was of doubtful quality. Camish 
and Ardroil was supposed to be a potentially prosperous scheme because of the 
prospects for fishing in the area. However, the Sub- Commissioner noted that 
although this may have been true at one time it was no longer so. Given modem 
methods of fishing small holders could not hope to compete. There were also 
difficulties with working the arable land due to drifting sand. Indeed, a BoAS official 
regarded Galson as the only farm he had seen on Lewis which was suitable for small 
holdings.
There was also an ongoing debate, between Skene Edwards and Garson and the 
Board, as to whether the Lewis applicants were fit to take on a small holding. The 
former were decidedly of the opinion that they were not. The BoAS seemed to be 
divided on this question. In 1912 one BoAS official argued that the people of Lewis 
had "no real agricultural aptitude". This would seem to be a rogue opinion as, 
generally, the Board were not overly critical of the abilities of applicants. Neil 
MacLean, an Assistant Sub-Commissioner with the Board, directly contradicted the 
estate's position, his belief was that they had "considerably extended" the extent of 
arable land in Lewis. ^  There was unlikely to be a meeting of minds on this issue. 
Skene, Edwards and Garson had built a reputation on preventing land settlement in 
various ways since 1886. In this case the proprietor they were representing was 
equally opposed to the formation of small holdings on his estate. On the other hand 
the BoAS network of local officials were often quite close in their opinions to the 
applicants for land. After all, they were usually, natives of the area in question and 
the close contact they had with the applicants may have reduced their objectivity.
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Despite these points, there can be little doubt that the fundamental difficulty was the 
structure of the Small Landholders (Scotland) Act. Its labyrinthine complexities 
were exploited by Skene, Edwards and Garson to good effect. The lengthy 
procedures, and the number of different institutions involved (BoAS, SLC and 
Scottish Office) were ideal for the development of obstructive tactics. By 1914 the 
Board were in a position to admit this themselves.
There were many areas in the act which could lead to confusion. The differing 
interpretations of Section 27, the so called "Lewis Clause", had led to problems in 
Reef in 1913 and 1914. Essentially, what the estate were doing was exploiting the 
lack of definition in the Act as to what constituted a "scheme". Section 7 sub section 
3 established that it was the Small Holdings Commissioner's duty, once he had 
established the existence of demand and available land, "to negotiate with the 
landlords of such land with a view to the adjustment of a scheme for the registration 
by agreement of any one or more new holders in respect of such land". There was no 
indication as to how much detail the landlords had to be provided with in the course 
of such negotiations. Nor, indeed, was there any indication as to what should 
constitute "negotiation". Skene, Edwards and Garson exploited both these areas to 
the full. They constantly questioned that the information sent to them by the Board 
was sufficient to constitute a scheme in terms of the Act. When BoAS eventually 
accused them of refusing to negotiate and were about to proceed to apply to the SLC 
for a compulsory order they retorted pointing out that it was the Board's failure to 
supply information which had caused the delays, and that they would be happy to 
negotiate if the Board would supply them with more information. They constantly 
attempted to put the blame on the Board for the delay in coming to agreement and 
even went so far as to, "take exception to the sub- commissioner's statement that any 
attempt to negotiate can only result in a "useless waste of time"" Indeed, in the case 
of Galson, by November 1913, the two parties could not even agree if there had been 
any negotiations! ^  *
The hard pressed officials of the Board were under no illusions that it was the 
structure of the 1911 Act which was really at the root of their problems in Lewis. In 
the crucial year of 1916 the Board officials were discussing the schemes in the 
context of the need for amendment of the 1911 A ct.^
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III
The second major arena of BoAS activity were the Southern Hebridean Estates of 
Lady Gordon Cathcart. They covered Benbecula, South Uist and with the exception 
of the northern part of the Island, Barra. She was also, and had been for over thirty 
years, represented by Skene Edwards and Garson. The CDB had implemented a 
number of schemes on her estates, in the North of Barra, in Vatersay and in South 
Uist. In this period four schemes were developed in the Southern Hebrides. Three 
were on her Ladyships estate, all on the island of South Uist, at Ormiclate, Bomish 
and Milton, at Glendale and at Askemish. The fourth, at Eoligarry in Barra, was on 
land which had been bought by its tenants at the time of the formation of small 
holdings in the area by the CDB in 1900.^ The Board proposed the formation of 
133 new holdings and 47 enlargements, and the land involved covered around
25,000 acres.^
There were a number of differences between these cases and the situation in Lewis. 
Supposing all the farms had been taken for small holdings there would still have 
been a considerable cottar problem. In the case of South Uist, the population was 
much smaller and the congestion, although serious, not chronic. The Sub 
Commissioner for the West Highlands argued in his submission to the SLC in the 
case of Ormiclate, Bomish and Milton that the three schemes which had been 
prepared, if implemented, would represent a complete solution to the land and 
housing problems in South Uist.****
Skene, Edwards and Garson were unimpressed with the Board’s arguments in these 
cases. They used broadly the same arguments but they did not pursue the obstructive 
tactics to the same extreme. They argued, which they could not do in Lewis, that 
South Uist was saturated with small holders. Schemes implemented by the CDB had 
seen the establishment of 80 holdings. They did not accept the argument that the new 
holdings created would represent a complete solution of the problem in the island 
because they had heard it before. The CDB had claimed that the formation of 50 
holdings would have the desired effect. They claimed now that none of the South 
Uist farms was available, or suitable, for small holdings. Further, they attempted to 
establish that the demand for land in South Uist was not genuine, arguing that "there 
were no really necessitous cases to be dealt with". The Board disagreed arguing that 
due to the smallness of the holdings the demand for land was "very strong and 
urgent
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The estate pursued the line of argument that crofters were agricultural vandals. This 
had been a constant refrain of Lady Gordon Cathcart since 1886. She was 
fundamentally opposed to the crofting system for a variety of reasons, agricultural 
and social. As has been noted throughout this study she took pains to articulate her 
views to the government at every possible juncture. This period was no exception. 
The Board were informed that it was undesirable to extend the crofting system 
because it "keeps the energetic man down to the level of the least enterprising". The 
fact that that the applicants for land were imbued with the culture of crofting made 
them "unsuitable for small holdings" according to the estate. They went to 
considerable lengths to impress the BoAS with evidence of this unsuitability. It was 
pointed out that the crofter was as negligent in looking after grazing as he was 
incapable of working arable. Particulars of the fate of an enlargement given to 81 
crofters in 1897 were produced to back up this case.^
A recent author is accurate when she describes the estates attitudes to the abilities of 
crofters as "contemptuous". However, it may not be quite so accurate to argue that 
the Board "did not share" this attitude. ^  Indeed, it is questionable whether one can 
discuss the "Board's view" without making some important qualifications. The Board 
used a large number of Assistant Sub-Commissioners to report on the farms which 
they were interested in. There could be no consistency of view among these men. 
Certainly, they were not likely to be employed by the Board if they were opposed to 
the idea of land settlement. Even within the group who were enthusiastic there were 
some differences of view. It has been noted above how one Assistant Sub- 
Commissioner in Lewis was very impressed with the ability and endeavour of the 
crofters in relation to the arable land in the island. The Sub-Commissioner who 
reported on the South Uist farms took a more sophisticated attitude. He suggested to 
the BoAS that "more of the success depends upon the tenant than on the holding". 
He went on to enumerate the qualities required for successful running of a small 
holding. As well as industry, considerable knowledge of stock husbandry and 
marketing had to be allied to knowledge of agriculture and sound business sense. His 
conclusion was that "the value of land in the Hebrides would be improved if crofters 
practiced better agricultural habits".^ Whether his view was widely shared in the 
Board is difficult to establish from the available evidence. In an ideal world, 
agricultural ability and knowledge could have been the main criteria for choosing 
small holders and only the most suitable farms would have been broken up for small 
holdings. However, land settlement was as much a political, as an administrative, 
and technical task and many other influences had to be taken into account.
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There were three additional factors which influenced the Board in these schemes. 
Firstly, the revival of incidents of land raiding. Secondly, as in Lewis, the structure 
of the Act, and thirdly, the less than ideal nature of the farms affected by the 
schemes.
The scheme for Ormiclate, Bomish and Milton had progressed to maturity with the 
setting up of 99 new holdings and 44 enlargements. Perhaps because of this 
frustration boiled over at Glendale in the south of the island. The BoAS decided to 
postpone the scheme due to wartime conditions and the fact that the "a good deal had 
already been done in South Uist, at considerable cost, under the scheme for 
Ormiclate, Bomish and Milton". December 1916 saw a threat to raid the farm and 
this, allied to the fact that the lease was to expire at Whitsunday 1918, led the BoAS 
to consider reviving the scheme. However, the likely cost of compulsory proceedings 
and the subsidising of applicants deficient in capital were enough to dissuade them 
from doing so .^  The Board were also not assured of straightforward progress once 
the farm was out of lease. There was nothing to stop a proprietor reletting a farm 
even when it was under consideration by BoAS for a small holding scheme. There 
were strong suspicions that some estates were doing this deliberately in an attempt to 
hamper the work of the Board, and to collect the maximum amount of compensation 
possible.^* In the case of Glendale the postponement of the scheme, in 1918, was 
greeted with a raid. Lady Gordon Cathcart had been opposed to the taking of the 
whole farm for small holdings. The Board offered an alternative scheme in which 
only half of the farm would be affected, but proprietorial opposition remained 
implac able. Eventually, she relented in the spring of 1919. Part of the reason for 
this change of heart may have been the intervention of Sir Reginald MacLeod, 
former Under Secretary for Scotland and Skye landowner. He took care to explain to 
Lady Gordon Cathcart that she need not lose out financially by agreeing to a scheme. 
The BoAS would take over the stock and equipment on the farm and make good any 
difference between the farm rent and the fair rent, set by the SLC, for the new small 
holdings. Demand was such that the Board had to amend their original scheme for 12 
new holdings to accommodate 2 2 .^
There was also a raid at Askemish in late 1919. This was a clear example of the 
BoAS being forced into a scheme which they would otherwise not have 
contemplated through the pressure of raids, and the absence of suitable alternatives. 
The sub-commissioner stated bluntly, "Askemish Farm is not the sort of place I
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would wish to select for small holdings if I had a choice". The estate management 
claimed not to take the raid seriously and blamed government weakness for the 
renewed raiding and advocated that the raiders should be firmly dealt with. 
However, by 1920 Lady Gordon Cathcart relented, as she tended to do, and allowed 
a scheme to proceed."*'*
The scheme at Eoligarry in the North of Barra was similarly troubled by land raids. 
Despite having been offered potato ground, cottars raided part of the farm in April 
1917. The Board declined the offer of purchase and stated their determination to 
proceed through the 1911 Act. The inevitable delay led to further raids in September 
1917.^ The difficulty was increased by the fact that Eoligarry was the only land left 
on Barra which was remotely suitable for the creation of small holdings. The 
demand was such that the BoAS realised that they would have to take the whole of 
the farm. Further, as it was an owner occupied estate if any of it was left untouched 
it would be claimed as a home farm and hence excluded under section 26 sub section 
3(g). There were of course the usual objections to using the 1911 Act. The sub- 
commissioner advocated purchase, using the Congested Districts (Scotland) Act, 
1897, which was supposed to have been superceded by the 1911 Act. The reasoning 
being that the compensation and arbitration expenses would exceed the cost of an 
immediate purchase. The owners, through the inevitable Skene, Edwards and 
Garson, offered to sell at £12,000. The members of the Land Court favoured this 
option. Their advice was eventually taken in the spring of 1919 and Eoligarry was 
purchased."^
The case of Eoligarry represents the extreme of the growing view within the Board 
that the 1911 Act was more trouble and expense than it was worth. It was a special 
case, a small owner occupied estate in an area of congestion with no suitable 
alternatives for land settlement. Nevertheless, there was a strong strain of 
dissatisfaction, based on experience, with the 1911 Act. “ ' It was
the act itself as much as proprietorial opposition or the difficulties caused by raids 
which had held up progress in the southern Hebrides. The Board's influential Sub- 
Commissioner for Small Holdings in the Highlands was clear in his view of the 
worth of the 1911 Act. He referred to it variously as "absurd and mischevious" and 
"imperfect and unsatisfactory". His view was passed on by the Board to the Scottish 
Office. They argued, in reference to Askemish farm that the cost of using the 1911 
Act "would be heavy relatively to the results secured".
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It is clear that in the southern Hebrides, as well as in Lewis, monocausal 
explanations of the failure of the Small Landholders (Scotland) Act, focusing on 
proprietorial opposition to the BoAS's land settlement schemes are simplified 
misrepresentations of a complex picture. The next section will demonstrate this 
further. In North Uist and Harris the element of proprietorial opposition was much 
less prominent, but the BoAS's record in these islands in this period was equally 
unsuccessful.
IV
The land issue in North Uist should be examined alongside that of Harris. The 
picture was complicated by events on the island of Taransay, off the South West 
coast of Harris. This island was the scene of a raid in July 1914. The raiders had 
previously agreed to move to North Uist as part of the BoAS scheme for the farm of 
Cheesebay. This raid has been placed alongside that of Reef in Lewis as a symptom 
of dissatisfaction with BoAS's ponderous activity.^ However, care must be taken, 
when examining land raids, to draw distinctions between them. The Taransay raid 
has the hall marks of having a great deal to do with the cottars' relations with the 
local tenant farmer. It was noted by the police that formerly they had good relations 
with him, to the extent of assisting him with his farm, "now they will do nothing for 
him" was the p olice conclusion. BoAS were determined not to let them settle and to 
proceed with the scheme for North Uist, in which they would be involved.
The scheme for Cheesebay involved the setting up of 40 new holdings on the 4,100 
acre farm. It was not an ideal location for small holdings as it was typical of the 
North Uist landscape, heavily interspersed with small lochs. In an echo of the debate 
between the Duke of Argyll and the BoAS in Tiree, the estate stated their preference 
for fewer and smaller holdings. They also objected to the influx of Harris cottars as 
they felt it "would create strife with the l o c a l s B o A S  were of the opinion that in 
selecting applicants for a scheme they were not limited to those who reside "in the 
immediate vicinity of the farm or even in the same parish or county". They had 
obtained legal opinion which confirmed this view. Section 7(2) was to be read 
alongside 7(3) which "provides generally" for the satisfaction of demand for small 
holdings. ^  The difficulties with this scheme led to some thought on the question of 
migration in general. Indeed, it was questioned whether this scheme could really be 
called migration. Certainly, movement of the same distance in the lowlands would 
not be called migration and no such objection would be taken to it. If proprietors and 
applicants for land persisted in their negative attitude to movement no progress could
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be made "unless the view is taken that congestion in the Highlands is never to be 
relieved except from the estate on which it exists (surely an impossible attitude)". 
This scheme was another which fell into the category of those which the Board 
considered postponing for the duration of the war. The possibility of expensive 
arbitration was a major factor in favour of postponement. However, the Taransay 
element of the equation complicated matters. It was widely recognised that Taransay 
was "one of the most miserable spots in the Hebrides" and that the Board would be 
ignoring its duty if nothing was done to relieve congestion there. There was also the 
possibility of renewed raids if the cottars had the prospect of settlement on North 
Uist removed. The Board realised that they would have to revive the scheme after
pataM,*e
the war/vthey anticipated the strong claims of returning servicemen. They were aware 
that they would be open to a justified case of vilification if they were not ready, at 
the conclusion of the war, to put the scheme into effect "as part of the general policy 
of relieving congestion in the Outer Hebrides".^ One historian has used the 
Cheesebay scheme as an example of how landlords in the Highlands obstructed the 
operation of the 1911 Act. This is somewhat unfair, there are many better examples 
of proprietorial negativism. Indeed, in this case the proprietor, Arthur Cambell Orde, 
was at least willing to put forward suggestions as to how the scheme might be 
altered. At his suggestion the number of holdings to be formed was reduced from 52 
to 32. This had the side effect of not accomodating all of the applicants from 
Taransay. BoAS did have a duty to take reasonable landlord suggestions into account 
during the negotiation. Land settlement could not work if the proprietor whose land 
was being used for small holdings had no input to the process. Similarly genuine 
proprietorial suggestions should not be confused with landlord opposition. This is of 
course not to deny that the latter did not exist. ^
V
Tiree, on the estate of the Duke of Argyll was a major arena of BoAS activity. A 
number of distinctive features merit examination. The attitude of the proprietor was 
one such feature. The estate became involved in the discussions surrounding the 
attempted creation of small holdings on the island without ever being obstructive. In 
the other parts of the Highlands examined so far, the limitations on the Board have 
been chiefly political or financial. In the case of Tiree the obstacle was physical, 
although the potential for successful settlement on this island was high due to its 
fertility and the history of large holdings which had been encouraged by the estate 
management.
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The Board prepared schemes for five farms, Hynish, Greenhill, Baugh, 
Balephetrish, and Heylipol. It was proposed to form 71 new holdings and 8 
enlargements and the schemes encompassed 3557 acres. **4 The demand for land was 
strong. There were 126 applicants for 4 new holdings and 4 enlargements at Baugh, 
for example. Numerous other indicators of a high demand for land led the Small 
Holdings Commissioner to conclude that the demand was "pronounced" and that 
action should be taken with "urgency". However the Board had noted that 
concentrated activity by them in a particular area tended to swell the demand 
abnormally.****
This large demand, mainly from the sizeable cottar population, taken with the 
limited amount of farmland available for land settlement, 3500 acres, set the context 
for the debate about the size of holdings which would charactarise the land issue in 
Tiree. For political reasons the Board wished to satisfy as much of the demand as 
possible. This debate came particularly to the surface over the farm of Balephetrish. 
It extended to 1400 acres, and it was proposed to establish 8 new holdings and 4 
enlargements. The scheme had been withdrawn during the war following a raid, and 
the realisation that the compensation awarded to the tenant by an arbiter was greater 
than the capital value of thg farm.**** The scheme was revived in the early part of 
1919. By that time 63 new jholdings and 27 enlargements of holdings had already 
been formed on Tiree. Nonetheless, there were still 218 outstanding applications for 
new holdings and 48 for enlargements. 94 of these applicants specified Balephetrish 
as their preferred siite of settlement.**  ^The Duke was prepared to assist the Board in 
this scheme, on the condition that the holdings formed were larger than those in the 
previous schemes. He advocated the formation of holdings of a rent of £30 to £40. 
As an incentive for the Board, he offered to allow the application to the SLC to go 
forward unopposed and let them set the level of compensation.^ The Duke's 
analysis had unlikely allies in the shape of former cottars, who had been given land 
in the scheme for Greenhill farm before the war. They complained to the Secretary 
for Scotland of "the scraps given off in Greenhill instead of moderately sized 
holdings from which we could make a decent living". They found they were still 
burdened with cottars. They even went so far as to claim that their holdings were so 
small that it was not worth while building houses. The Board were well aware of 
the political imperative for creating large numbers of small holdings. By this method 
more of the demand would be satisfied and the potential for lawlessness reduced. 
This was noted in 1913 while preparing the Hynish scheme for the Land Court;
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... while the Board realise that it is desirable to make the holdings of 
substantial size they found it was impossible in an Island like Tiree 
to approximately meet the needs of all the applicants without 
diminishing the size of the holding.**®
The Board eventually settled 27 applicants on large new holdings and 14 on smaller 
units in 1922. This was carried out under post-war legislation. The BoAS, under 
pressure of threats of renewed lawlessness, contemplated buying the land but 
eventually proceeded with a scheme leaving it in the hands of the Duke.*** Despite 
this political influence, by the time of the post-war Balephetrish scheme the Board 
had come to realise that the formation of a large number of small holdings, would 
not eradicate congestion in the long term. The Duke's offer of an unopposed scheme 
proved too tempting to turn down.
Thus, in the case of Tiree, as well as the usual political pressures and financial 
limitations allied to the customary problems of the procedures of the 1911 Act the 
Board found they had physical and intellectual problems to deal with as well. Thus, a 
recent historian's conclusion that the operation of the 1911 Act in Tiree was largely 
trouble free, merely because there was no proprietorial obstruction, is puzzling in the 
extreme.
VI
The attitude of the Duke of Sutherland was at the opposite extreme of that of 
Matheson and Lady Gordon Cathcart. Indeed, his habit of offering large pieces of his 
estate to the Board for land settlement, sometimes as gifts, was disconcerting. The 
first instance was in 1912. In response to a speech by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, he offered 200,000 acres of deer forest to the government, at £2 per acre. 
Subsequently, he reduced the price to £1-2/6 per acre. He followed this up with a 
further offer of 200,000 acres, of mostly sheep grazing, in the parish of Tongue. Of 
course, the Duke could well afford such generosity. At this time he was the largest 
land owner in the country. His estates totalled 1.3 million acres, most of it in 
Sutherland, but he also owned valuable land in Shropshire and Staffordshire. The 
timing of such an offer was also propitious. Sheep farming was no longer profitable 
and mature mutton, such as was commonly produced in Sutherland, was going out of 
fashion consumers seemed to prefer lamb. So in the words of the Glasgow Herald it 
represented "excellent business" to try and off load it to the government. The theme
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of Lloyd George's argument was that there was a vast amount of land in the 
Highlands, otherwise suitable for small holdings, under deer. This was a widely held 
radical belief which, despite the reality of its findings, the Royal Commission 
(Highlands and Islands) 1892 had not dispelled. The reactions of Lloyd George and 
other Liberals to the Duke's offer was disingenuous. In the ascerbic words of Lord 
Lovat, after having "harped continually" on the agricultural value of such land they 
now "turn round and say that it would not keep a mouse".
A third offer by the Duke of Sutherland involved the 16,000 acre sheep farm of 
Shinness near Lairg.^ It was rented at £527, with a valuable sheep stock of 3500. 
This farm was under lease until Whitsunday 1918 when the Duke proposed to allow 
the BoAS to carry out a scheme of land settlement. The BoAS described this offer as 
"patriotic". The scheme contemplated the formation of 21 "self supporting" small 
holdings. Each holding was to be supplemented by a share in the hill grazing and a 
stake in a sheep club stock. The Board predicted that these arrangements "assured 
...exceptional success".*^
Despite expenditure of nearly £15,000 in loans and grants to the holders a number of 
problems with the settlement soon emerged. They did so on two fronts, that of the 
fate of the sheepstock and the expense and quality of the housing on the settlement. 
The former was to become a particular problem in land settlement in Sutherland after 
the war. However, the events in Shinness presaged such difficulties. The capital of 
most holders was insufficient to be able to afford the valuable stocks which were 
commonly found in a classic sheepfarming county as Sutherland. In the case of 
Shinness, the holders were given entry to their holdings at Martinmas 1919. 
However, they refused to sign bonds for the ownership of the sheep stocks and it 
remained in the management of the BoAS at considerable expense. **** The holders 
could not be persuaded to take it over until 1923. By 1928 the club stock was in 
financial difficulties.**  ^There was little the Board could do to prevent such a state of 
affairs. The stock could be sold, but if sold at auction they would not realise their 
valuation price, and the Board would have to bear the loss.There was a general 
problem with handing over the management of large sheep stocks to small holders. 
The majority of them had no experience in the complex business of the management 
of such a stock. This had been noted with reference to a farm in Tiree. A sub­
206
commissioner pointed out that the management of a sheep stock involved constant 
buying and selling to maintain the value of the stock and this "can only be 
undertaken with success when capital, ripe experience, considerable skill and 
judgment is at the command of the tenant".Through no fault of their own, few 
applicants for small holdings could be expected to have these qualifications.
The second problem with the Shinness settlement surrounded the housing of the 
settlers. Vast sums of money had been spent on the houses. However, unlike the 
pattern prevalent in the Outer Hebrides, where the holders largely built their own 
houses, at Shinness contractors did the work at great expense; so great that 
suspicions of profiteering were voiced. In 1915 BoAS officials had been warned of 
the dangers of burdening small holders with large housing costs. Even with the low 
level of interest on BoAS housing loans expensive buildings could cripple a holder's 
chance of success, especially when the holders were men of limited capital, as many 
were. Extravagant buildings could make the holding difficult to let, in the case of an 
outgoing tenant. The SLC would not compensate holders on the true value of the 
buildings, but on their value "to the holding".However, in the case of Shinness, 
despite the considerable outlay, the quality of the buildings was not high and 
complaints continued through the 1920s and 1930s. The necessary improvements 
were not made until after the Second World W ar.^
Compared to other areas discussed, the prospects for dealing with the land issue in 
Sutherland would seem to have been good. Proprietorial opposition was not a factor 
and there were few physical constraints. Large, potentially self supporting, holdings 
could be contemplated. However, the expected progress did not ensue. Part of the 
problem may have been that the Board were carrying out land settlement on 
somebody else's terms. Given the slow progress over the years since 1911 the Board 
could not afford to turn down the offers of the Duke. However, left to their own 
judgment would they have chosen a subject such as Shinness, with only 1300 arable 
acres out of a total of 16,000, as suitable for land settlement? The Borgie scheme, 
like Glendale in Skye, was viable because it had scope for subsidiary income, 
through the forestry work available for the holders. Yet again, the complex political 
dictates generated by the structure of the 1911 Act, which reduced the pace of land 
settlement to a crawl, forced the Board to grasp any opportunity to satisfy demand.
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VII
As well as proprietorial opposition to individual schemes of land settlement, there 
was also a more general campaign against the provisions of the 1911 Act. This was 
conducted by the Scottish Land and Property Federation, an organisation which had 
been set up for the very purpose of preventing the Act from becoming law .^  There 
was a feeling among landowners following the setting up of the BoAS and the SLC 
that the Act was an attempt to "despoil their property". This was particularly 
prevalent in the non-crofting areas, where there had been no previous experience of 
the operation of such institutions.^ The bulk of the membership of the SLPF came 
from the non-crofting areas. Nevertheless, its views on the course of land settlement 
are worthy of discussion.
They particularly targeted the SLC and its Chairman, Lord Kennedy, for criticism. 
They asked their members to detail experiences of the proceedings of the SLC. 
Based on this evidence they argued that the SLC was an unsatisfactory tribunal. 
Faults included Lord Kennedy's unjudicial manner, his acceptance of hearsay 
evidence, his distrust of expert evidence led by proprietors and his clear bias towards 
landholders throughout his work.^
Comment on the SLPF campaign, and of landlord opinion on this issue in general, 
has concentrated on the worries about the political complexion of the relevant 
institutions. Certainly this was prominent in the campaign. The SLC was compared 
unfavourably to the old Crofter s' Commission which was held in high regard by 
landowners and crofters alike. Much of this was due to the reputation built up by Sir 
David Brand. ^  However, the root of the opposition lay deeper than this. The SLPF, 
although not representative of all landowners, was fundamentally opposed to the 
whole concept of land settlement. They stated this clearly in 1914 when they argued 
that the creation of small holdings by compulsion was an "intrusion of the rights of 
ownership". By contrast, the Board regarded the setting up of new small holdings as 
the "primary purpose of the A ct".^ The SLPF was the voice of active landlordism 
and it would have been surprising, given its history, if they had not campaigned 
against the operation of a nationwide system of land settlement. A factor which had 
much greater influence on the implementation of public policy in the Highlands was 
the individual proprietor who slowed down the process of land settlement on his own 
estate.
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Despite their vociferous espousal of it in the 1906 to 1911 period, some Liberal 
opinion was soon turning against the terms of the 1911 Act. Lloyd George set up a 
number of small committees to investigate the land issue, rural and urban, 
throughout the country. The Chairman of the Scottish Committee was J. Ian 
MacPherson, MP for Ross-shire, and an acolyte of the Chancellor. Lloyd George’s 
motivations for such a comprehensive examination of the land issue were manifold. 
He believed, that it was impossible to tackle social inequalities without first taking 
on the power of the landed classes. The corollary of this was that land reform would 
make all social reform possible. Faced with mounting fiscal demands, Lloyd George 
believed a national land tax would be the best way of raising revenue. The Land 
Enquiry Committees were to provide a basis for a subsequent Land Campaign which 
was to put the land issue at the top of the political agenda. The period 1912 to 1914 
was one of great difficulty for the Liberal Party. They were losing by elections and 
were embattled, as ever, on the Irish question. By June 1914 Liberal backbenchers 
were becoming restive and complaints on the budget reached the ear of Asquith. 
Moderate Liberal opinion was unhappy with the land proposals and many were 
concerned at the range of objectives being pursued under the guise of the Finance 
Bill. For their part, the Unionists were quite happy to sit back and observe the 
implosions in the Liberal Party. Problems were compounded when the land 
proposals in the Budget were dropped in June 1914. This enraged the radicals in the 
Party.^
Despite the failure of the longer term objectives of the Land Enquiry Committee, the 
Scottish Report is an interesting commentary on the 1911 Act. One author has 
described its tone as "strongly anti-landlord". It was unlikely to be anything else 
given its origins and context. Nevertheless, they made many sensible criticisms of 
the Act. They lamented the right of the proprietor to go the Court of Session to have 
an arbiter appointed to adjudicate compensation of more than £300. The potential 
expense to the Board, as has been noted, was the cause of a number of schemes 
being dropped. It was felt that the heads under which compensation could be claimed 
should be reduced. The problem of proprietors letting farms while the Board was 
contemplating a small holding scheme, was also recommended for reform. The 
limited financial resources of the Board, especially given the lack of capital among 
many applicants, was held to be a major obstruction to land settlement.'^
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By 1914, the Small Landholders Act, had few friends. Frustrated applicants, 
unhappy landowners, and now the disaffected element in the Liberal Party who had 
created it, all added to the difficulties of the Board, who were trying hard to 
implement this most imperfect piece of legislation. A further difficulty was the task 
of trying to continue operations in wartime. The most obvious problem here was the 
fact that many of the Boards officials were on active service and operations had to 
be conducted using a skeleton staff. John Sutherland, the Small Holdings 
Commissioner, the key official for land settlement, was an especially significant 
absentee. In addition, many of the estate officials were also absent on active service, 
as were many potential applicants. A second problem was the rise in prices of the 
materials required for land settlement, such as timber, iron, wire, lime, and cement. 
The price of stock and farm implements also increased severalfold. This stretched 
the finances of the Board, which were reduced in the war years, and burdened the 
new holder with high annual charges.^® For these reasons land settlement was 
largely in abeyance during the war. The rise in the price of stock caused considerable 
problems. The Board could not afford to take over farms which had large sheep 
stocks because of the likelihood of a large difference between the acclimatisation 
and market values. Despite these difficulties some effort was made to implement 
schemes which had been conceived before the war.
Despite a vast bulk of government records relating to land settlement in this period, 
the available historiography is limited. What there is gives priority to proprietorial 
opposition in the comparative lack of success of land settlement. Some stress has 
been placed on the weaknesses of the 1911 Act.*^ More detailed examination has 
led to the conclusion that weaknesses in the Act were the fundamental difficulty 
faced by the BoAS. The imperfections allowed some proprietors to prevent the 
Board from carrying out its duty and hold it to ransom over the issue of 
compensation. The general provisions of the Act lacked clarity and definition. It is 
important to relate this to the origins of the Act. As has been noted in Chapter 6 the 
legislation was designed with short term political objectives in mind. The operation 
of the Act clearly demonstrates that these objectives militated against technical 
efficiency. The BoAS and the SLC were criticised for the speed at which they 
worked and were accused of political bias. There may have been some substance in 
such allegations. However, it should be understood that they were working with an 
imperfect implement. Further, the political environment in which they were created, 
and the political objectives of the 1911 Act made it difficult for them to appear 
apolitical.
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As has been discussed, there were also difficulties which originated in the problems 
which the Board faced. Available land did not, and could never, match the precise 
demands of the applicants. The problem was potentially exacerbated when a Court of 
Session decision in 1917 created the class of absentee crofters. Previously, it had 
been the case that to qualify as a small landholder one had to live and continue to 
live within two miles of the croft. However, the ruling established that it was 
sufficient if this condition was satisfied on the 1st of April 1912, when the 1911 Act 
came into force. This did not affect new BoAS settlements as they chose their 
landholders from a large field of applicants in most cases. It was a problem in that 
established croft land could fall into the hands of people who were not particularly 
motivated to utilise it effectively. This could be incongruous in areas where the 
demand for land was high.^l Another problem arose when the BoAS discovered, as 
had the Crofters' Commission and the CDB before them, that crofters were reluctant 
to migrate. This elevated the physical constraints on land settlement in the Hebrides 
to high importance. This forced the Board to create holdings of a smaller size than 
they, or more helpful proprietors, were comfortable with. Settlements created by the 
Board tended to struggle in economically testing conditions. Indeed, this difficulty 
was beginning to emerge, even within the short period examined here. The fact that 
land settlement proved problematic, even in areas where proprietorial cooperation 
was forthcoming substantiates the conclusion that other factors merit attention.
VIII
Despite the difficulties, some progress was achieved. It is important to examine the 
extent of this. The following table shows the amount of land both arable and pasture 
utilised, in acres; the number of new holdings (NHs) and enlargements (Es) created. 
The level of land settlement (NHs + Es) is presented for each county as a percentage 
of the real demand (RD) satisfied. The real demand is calculated by subtracting the 
withdrawn, or unsuccessful, applications from the total number of applications.
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County._______NHs Es________RD % RD Settled
ARGYLL 1 55 94 1409 17.7
CAITHNESS 73 100 691 25.0
INVERNESS 195 128 3234 6.9
ROSS 14 14 1865 1 .5
SUTHERLAND 45 61 1308 8.1
TOTAL 482 398 8507 10.4
TABLE 7:1, Land Settlement under Small Landholders' (Scotland) Act, 1911, 
April 1912 to December 1919.^
An overall figure of 10.4 per cent settlement of real demand could only be regarded 
as unsatisfactory. A number of the figures substantiate the conclusions of the 
geographical areas studied here. The high number of holdings on Tiree inflate the 
per centage settlement in Argyll. The high demand for, and complete failure of, land 
settlement in Lewis, is reflected in the disast rous per centage settlement in Ross. 
Even in areas of comparatively low demand, such as Caithness, where only 25 per 
cent could be settled, the success rate under this act was low.
However, a statistical exercise such as this can only present part of the overall 
picture. Suspicions have been raised here, concerning the viability of the policy of 
creating large numbers of small units. So, even the high figure of settlement for 
Argyll, for example, cannot be used as an infallible index of successful land 
settlement. The figures do demonstrate clearly that the 1911 Act, for all the reasons 
explored here, was an imperfect vehicle for land settlement in the Highlands. Further 
legislation was required. It came in 1919. The development of policy under the new 
legislation will form the substance of the remainder of the chronological section of 
this thesis.
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Land Settlement from 1919
The Land Settlement (Scotland) Act, 1919, was passed in very different 
circumstances to its predecessor in 1911. All parties attempted to avoid the 
controversies which had characterised debate over land legislation hitherto. The Lord 
Advocate, T.B.Morrison, winding up the first reading of the Bill in August 1919, 
referred to the "very strong disposition on all sides" to bury the former arguments on 
land policy. However, opening the same debate the Secretary for Scotland, Robert 
Munro, had presented the Bill in much the same rhetorical manner as the 1911 Act. 
The "freshness, freedom and peace" of rural life was contrasted to the "drive, 
artificiality and fever" of an urban existence. The political power of the Coalition 
had much to do with the ease with which the act was passed. The <KCt was presented 
as an attempt to fulfill the pledge given to recruits that they would receive land on 
their return from the war.* This, however, was only a part of the motivation of the 
Coalition government. By 1919 the deficiencies of the 1911 Act had become all too 
clear. There had been some wartime activity on the land issue. 1916 had seen the 
passage of the Small Holdings Colonies Act. This allowed the BoAS to acquire, 
either by purchase or lease, land to extent of 2000 acres. There were no associated 
financial provisions. This, allied to reduction of the parliamentary vote to the 
Agriculture (Scotland) Fund in wartime, ensured that little would be achieved under 
this act. An amendment was made in 1918 which extended the amount of land to
200,000 acres. The continued lack of finance was a major obstacle to progress and 
the restriction that 75 per cent of the land be arable excluded much of the Highlands. 
1916 had also seen the Sailors and Soldiers (Gifts for Land Settlement) Act. This 
empowered the BoAS to accept gifts for land settlement. These were not numerous. 
These minor pieces of legislation could not, and were not intended to, provide a 
comprehensive solution to the Scottish land problem. The Land Settlement 
(Scotland) Act was the Coalition's attempt to provide this.
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The debate between two competing mechanisms for creating new small holdings was 
a constant theme of the history of government policy in the Highlands since 1886. 
The Crofters’ Act and the 1911 Small Landholders Act both provided for the creation 
of new holdings on privately owned land. The 1897 Act provided facilities for 
crofters to become the owners of their holdings. The 1919 Act contained elements of 
both ideas. Part I empowered the Board to acquire land, compulsorily if necessary. 
The Board could then act as landowners, or sell the land on to applicants for small 
holdings. The powers of the 1897 Act for the assistance of owner occupiers and the 
adaptation of holdings remained in force. More importantly perhaps, given the 
events of recent years the second part of the Act was an amendment of the 1911 
Act. Three areas of amendment are of particular note. The role of the SLC was 
reduced. The BoAS now had the power to issue an order for the establishment of 
new holdings, without reference to the SLC. The sanction of the Secretary for 
Scotland was required. If he had reservations concerning the scheme he could ask the 
SLC to inquire. The procedures for compensation were also altered. The landlord's 
right to appeal to an arbiter for claims of more than £300 was removed. All claims 
were now to be settled by the SLC. The landlords* right to claim compensation for 
loss of selling value was abolished. The House of Lords unsuccessfully tried to 
amend the Bill to reintroduce this provision. Munro condemned such an amendment 
as likely to prove "fatal" to the successful operation of the Act and admitted that it 
was this clause more than any other which had made the 1911 Act "unworkable". He 
could no longer claim compensation for the loss of more than three years profit 
consequent on the establishment of small holdings on his estate. In 1920 it was 
noted, that while the high compensation awards had been a major obstacle to the 
operation of the 1911 Act, the new procedures limited compensation awards 
effectively. ^
A wholly new area in the Act were the provisions for the preferential treatment of 
ex-servicemen. Preference was to be given for a period of two years after the passing 
of the Act. Later, a public announcement was made that no applicant would be 
preferred if his application was not received by 1st March 1921. The Board did not 
enforce this rigorously, and the ex service preference lapsed in 1926. The ex service 
applications were certainly a major proportion of the demand for new holdings in the 




1920 2273 1720 76
1921 1416 617 44
1922 814 453 55
1923 606 384 63
1924 705 342 49
TABLE 8:1, Ex Service Demand fo r  Land Settlement, 1919-1924,A
This pattern of demand was consistent with that surrounding earlier pieces of 
legislation. Demand tended to peak when legislation was new and fall away later. 
The ex-service dimension tended to complicate matters and may have dissuaded 
civilians from applying in the early post war years. As can be seen from these figures 
the civilian demand rose proportionately as time went on. The corollary of this was 
that much of the ex-service demand in the immediate post war years was nominal. 
The mere existence of the opportunity for ex-service men, encouraged some, who 
would not otherwise have done so, to apply for land. The BoAS attempted to deal 
with this problem in 1922 by issuing a circular to all ex-servicemen whose 
applications had been received before January 1922. As a result, 1584 applications 
were removed from the Board's lists. Either, because the men intimated that they no 
longer wished to be considered for land settlement, or because they did not reply to 
the circular or the reminders that followed it.^
The finance provisions of the Act are also of interest. The Board were empowered to 
borrow from the Public Works Loans Commissioners (PWLC) a sum of up to £2.75 
million. In July 1920, only seven months after the passing of the Land Settlement 
Act the cabinet considered that demand for land was much higher than the available 
funds could cope with. The possibility of discontinuing land settlement was 
rejected, on account of the social, as well as law and order consequences. Due 
consideration was given to the fact that pledges had been made at the time of 
recruitment and during the 1918 election campaign. It was agreed that a Cabinet 
Committee should be set up to consider the "policy and machinery of land 
settlement". The Secretary for Scotland, Robert Munro was included on this 
Committee.** The members of the Committee submitted memoranda at the outset of 
their investigations. These contain much detail on the land settlement problem. The 
principal theme running through their submissions, was that the problem was 
administrative and that it could be solved by devolving responsibility for Highland
222
Land Settlement to a separate body. Lowland land settlement could be brought into 
line with the English County Council arrangements.^ The Secretary for Scotland 
differed from this view. He argued that the financial provisions of the 1919 Act were 
inadequate. He conceded that economies could be made to release more money for 
land settlement. It was his belief that it would be necessary to settle 1000 holders per 
anum to keep pace with demand. He concluded;
the present centralised new machinery could, I believe, cope with this
number with a certain strengthening of the Technical Departments.^
The main objection to the idea of decentralisation was that it should be funded by 
local contributions. Munro felt that it would not be politically possible to add to the 
burden of rating in the Highlands. There were also grave doubts as to the value of 
seeking the cooperation of Highland County Councils in land settlement since they 
had no experience in the field. Munro repeated his view that the problem "was 
entirely one of money". The view emerged from the Committee's deliberations that 
the problem of land settlement in the Highlands was entirely different from that in 
the rest of the country, and that there was a good case for preferential treatment.^
The report of the committee was submitted to the Cabinet in late November 1920. It 
confirmed that the Highland land settlement issue was unique. It was recommended 
that Land Settlement should be put under the sole direction of the Director of Land 
Settlement, Sir Arthur Rose, who would have direct access to the Secretary for 
Scotland. Economies should be effected by acquiring land which was already 
equipped and by reducing the size of new holdings. Expenditure was to be tightly 
controlled. Robert Munro dissented from elements of the report, particularly the 
administrative provisions which amounted to a sidelining of the BoAS in favour of 
the Director of Land Settlement. He also differed from one of the suggested methods 
of economising. It had been recommended that loans to new holders to purchase 
stock should be limited to 50 per cent of the value of the stock. He pointed out that 
this would be "an insuperable obstacle" to the settlement of ex service men. ^
The Committee also recommended that an extra £1 million should be made available 
to the BoAS for land settlement. The bulk to be allocated to the Crofting Counties. 
This represented a victory for Munro. When the report was at the draft stage it was 
only proposed to allocate an extra £333,000 to Scottish land settlement. Munro
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argued that this "would be of little value in solving the problem". Subsequently, it 
was agreed to find an extra £750,000. It was suggested that this could come from 
the arrears of the Agriculture (Scotland) Fund, which had been suspended during the 
war.
In many ways this Committee exemplified problems which could be traced back to 
the 1906 to 1911 period, when Highland and Lowland land settlement were 
conjoined. It was the contention of many in the Highlands that this was a mistake. 
The war added to the immediacy of the problem, and the land raids, which were 
common in the immediate post war period, added to the case for special facilities for 
the Highlands. Clearly, it would be politically impossible to radically alter the 1919 
administrative regime so early in its life. The alternative was to instruct the Director 
of Land Settlement to favour the Highlands without making a policy statement to 
that effect. The Cabinet gave effect to this shift in policy in January 1921. ^
The second point to emerge was that Highland land settlement should not be 
regarded simply as part of the general post-war reconstruction policy. Further, it was 
not simply an ex service problem. The impression that it was has remained because 
of the conjunction of the end of the war and the new legislation. Also land settlement 
in this period was taking place across Europe. The problems faced on the continent 
were much greater and qualitatively different as in some areas much farm land had 
been destroyed by the fighting and there was a general history of peasant 
proprietorship.^ Land settlement in the Highlands was an ongoing process with 
roots as far back as 1886, although it was given new impetus by the debate on 
reconstruction.^ The 1919 Act was not a new policy departure, but the latest in a 
series of Acts dealing with Highland land. This allowed the Highlands to be regarded 
as a special case. Indeed, the ex service preference could on occasion be an obstacle 
to land settlement in the Highlands. In the case of Raasay, discussed below, none of 
the applicants for new holdings were ex service men. They were, however, 
applicants of long standing and it was impractical to ignore them. The problems 
being discussed by the Committee was a manifestation of the ongoing crofting 
problem, and not a new ex service problem.^ The 1919 Act had been passed to 
accelerate land settlement and to amend existing legislation. Although the 
government rhetoric in 1918 and 1919 concentrated on the idea of fulfilling a pledge 
to war veterans, the internal discussions in the government made clear that the Act 
was primarily intended as an improvement to existing procedures. The problems 
with the 1911 Act were such, and were evident so quickly, that the war probably 
delayed, rather than encouraged, amendment. ^
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The Board's rights to borrow from the Public Works Loans Commissioners was 
reduced to £3 million following the Report of the Geddes Committee on National 
Expenditure in 1922. This Committee has often been seen as a reaction to the heavy 
expenditure incurred in the immediate post-war era. It followed on the heels of the 
vocal anti-waste movement, which had campaigned vigorously for reduced public 
expenditure. The political impact of the anti-waste movement was among the factors 
which forced the government to act. The Treasury may have been suspicious of the 
Geddes Committee, suspicions motivated by institutional jealousy of outsiders 
involvement in the policy making process There can be no doubt, that as far as 
Scottish land settlement was concerned, they shared the same parsimonious view. 
Nevertheless, the Geddes Committee echoed the 1921 Cabinet Committee in stating 
that the Highlands were a special case, exempt from the wider economies in the 
Board's operations which were recommended. The main areas which were affected 
by the "Geddes Axe" were Lowland land settlement, which was to return to the pre­
war basis, and the administration and personnel costs of the Board. ^
A recent author has argued;
... the intial impetus for land settlement during the war years did not
emanate from the Highlands of Scotland but from England.^
This is a striking thesis. It is based on the existence of Committees in the Department 
of Agriculture and Fisheries which considered the settlement of ex servicemen on 
the land. Certainly such Committees did advocate land settlement. Further they 
recommended settlement in colonies, by tenancy, not purchase. There is no 
evidence to link these recommendations with Scotland. The ideas were consistent 
with the details of English land settlement. The discussion in this chapter will show 
that the impetus for post war land settlement in Scotland, and the Highlands in 
particular, came from the experience in the crofting counties since 1886.
The 1919 Act represented a considerable improvement on its 1911 predecessor, with 
the removal of the SLC stage leading to much quicker settlement of schemes. 
Nevertheless, procedure was still complicated and complaints about the ponderous 
nature of the BoAS soon arose.
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The island of Lewis took up a considerable proportion of the time and energy of the 
BoAS. A new factor was the personality and wealth of its plutocratic proprietor 
Lord Leverhulme. He had acquired the island in 1917. The BoAS had had 
considerable problems with the previous estate management, under Major Duncan 
Matheson which had fundamental objections to land settlement. The 1911 regime 
could not cope with such obstruction, as has been noted. These problems, 
compounded by wartime difficulties, had led to a situation, in 1916, where all four 
land settlement schemes for Lewis farms were suspended. ^  In May 1917 the Board 
considered that it was time for the proceedings to be revived. It was not proposed to 
carry out the schemes there and then, but rather to prepare them so that they could be 
implemented quickly following the end of the war. Particularly, the BoAS wished to 
proceed beyond the arbitration s tag ed
The Board contacted the new proprietor to establish his views on land settlement. 
They found that he was opposed not only to land settlement but also to the crofting 
system. He had grandiose schemes for the development of the island. He aimed to 
develop the fishing industry along modem lines. Processing facilities were to be 
built at Stornoway. The infrastructure of the island was to be improved, particularly 
roads and bridges. Leverhulme even had ideas for the construction of a railway 
system . Leverhulme argued that he had bought the estate without being aware of the 
existence of the schem es.T h is seems unlikely, but if true, represents a major 
failure on the part of his legal agents. It is possible that Skene Edwards and Garson 
chose not to specifically advertise the fact that these schemes were pending, in an 
effort to make the property seem more attractive. By 1917 Matheson was in a near 
bankrupt condition and was desperate to sell Lewis. Despite this possibility, 
Leverhulme must have been aware of the existence of the general ongoing process of 
land settlement.
Leverhulme regarded crofting as an unhealthy and uneconomic mode of life and its 
extension by the government a "gross waste of public money". He pointed out that a 
croft occupied only a small proportion of a man’s time for a very small return. He 
regarded a croft as a millstone round a potential wage labourer's neck. At this stage 
he was only in favour of granting very small allotments which could be worked in 
the employee's spare time. He pointed out that the Lewis farms were not big enough
2 2 6
to meet the demand for small holdings even if they were all utilised, and a partial 
settlement could only lead to more agrarian trouble. He suggested that the Board 
should not proceed with the schemes until they had had an opportunity of evaluating 
his contribution to the island.
The Board and the government were reluctant at this stage, while the new legislation 
was going through parliament, and just after it was passed, to give such an 
undertaking. At the same time, they were aware of the scale of Leverhulme's 
commitment to the island. They did not want to be identified as the cause of him 
withdrawing his schemes, with all their potential benefits. It was estimated, in March 
1919, that the demand for small holdings and enlargements in Lewis extended to 
1273 applications. Against this, the schemes which the Board had prepared for the 
farms of Galson, Gress, Camish and Ardroil, and Orinsay and Stimervay could only 
cater for 150 applicants. However, if Leverhulme's opposition to land settlement 
was dropped another 254 holdings could be created on farms with rentals in the £30 
to £80 category. The Board were keen that land settlement should proceed alongside 
Leverhulme's plans. It was hoped that the latter would absorb a considerable amount 
of the latent demand for land. Leverhulme's absolute position stemmed from the fact 
that he believed that the breaking up of farms, particularly those near Stornoway, 
would prejudice the milk supply for the enlarged urban population.^ The Board 
warned Leverhulme, that while they appreciated his good intentions and the scale of 
his investment, the level of commitment to crofting tenure amongst the population 
should not be underestimated. Further, he was warned that should he persist in his 
absolute opposition to land settlement, his popularity would be eroded.
The issue was complicated by the renewal of raiding in Lewis, when the veterans of 
the Great War returned. News of raids at Tong, Coll and Gress reached the BoAS at 
the end of April 1919. The raiders declared they would have nothing to do with the 
schemes of the proprietor and declared their absolute and unconditional demand for 
land. They were willing to deal only with BoAS whom they regarded as having a 
duty to provide them with new holdings. Thomas Wilson, the Board's senior Sub 
Commissioner in the Hebrides, reported that raids could be expected at Galson, 
Camish and Ardroil, and Reef.^ The farms of Coll and Gress became the focus of 
the three cornered struggle between the raiders, Leverhulme and the BoAS. For the 
raiders and the proprietor the issue was straightforward. The former wanted land and 
the latter wanted to carry out his schemes which required the land coveted by the 
raiders. The situation was more complex for the BoAS. They had a statutory duty to 
attempt to carry out schemes of land settlement. Coll and Gress were "available" as
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defined by the Act. However, they realised that they would be open to a justified 
case of villification if they were perceived as the cause of Leverhulme carrying out 
his threat to cancel his schemes, if land settlement on these farms was carried out. By 
the Autumn of 1919 the raiders had been persuaded to leave the farms.
1920 saw the situation become much more serious. The three dimensional nature of 
the argument in Lewis become clearer. Indeed, 1920 was a difficult year for the 
Board. In the Autumn they decided that their funds were fully committed and they 
announced that they could not consider any new schemes. Compulsory procedure 
could be used to carry out land settlement on Gress but in the case of Coll, which 
was rented at less than £80, Leverhulme’s co-operation was required. Renewed 
raids in January 1920 produced a crisis situation.Leverhulme adopted a twin track 
approach. He abandoned all his schemes in the rural districts of Lewis and decided to 
concentrate solely on Stornoway and on Harris. He also took out interdicts on the 
raiders, in an attempt to prevent them from occupying Coll and Gress. It was one of 
Leverhulme’s constant refrains that his relationship with the people of Harris was not 
blighted with problems caused by an isolated minority who insisted in raiding farms. 
They had of course appealed to his vanity by renaming the township of Obbe in his 
honour.
Misinterpretation followed the government's attempt to deal with the raiders in the 
Autumn of 1920. The Lord Advocate, T.B. Morrison, was sent to Lewis to meet with 
the raiders and ascertain their views. He obtained from the raiders an undertaking 
that they would withdraw from Coll and Gress and not renew their occupation until 
the following spring. He made no mention of a promise that land would be found for 
them. For their part, the raiders believed that such a promise had been made. They 
agreed to withdraw in their own words "in the confident belief that there will now be 
no further delay on the part of the Board". ^  Whatever the truth of the contending 
claims surrounding the Lord Advocate's mission to Lewis the raiders certainly 
perceived that they had elicited a promise from the Board. Further, the BoAS were 
putting pressure on the Government in October 1920. They described the immediate 
aftermath of Morrison's report as an "opportune moment" to proceed with land 
settlement. They noted that this window of opportunity would close if no progress 
was made by the spring. ^
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Leverhulme spent the winter of 1920 organising meetings throughout Lewis in 
which his schemes were put to the vote. The majority of these meetings endorsed his 
plans. Significantly, those in the district of Back, where Coll and Gress were 
situated, were more equivocal. As a scientific test of opinion these meetings did not 
satisfy the Board. They were aware that the simple passing of resolutions could be 
easily manipulated to convey the desired impression. Despite these worries, the 
Secretary for Scotland acceded to the demand of Lord Leverhulme that he should be 
allowed to pursue his development schemes for ten years in return for a pledge that 
no farms would be broken up for land settlement. Before doing so he had informed 
the Cabinet of the situation in Lewis. He pointed out that the conditions demanded 
by Leverhulme, a cessation of raiding and a pledge that BoAS would not use its 
compulsory powers for ten years, could not be met in full. It is also clear from 
Munro’s memo to the Cabinet that he would have preferred land settlement and the 
development schemes to proceed simultaneously. He felt that Leverhulme's schemes, 
if successful, could provide a more comprehensive solution to the problems of the 
island than any government policy. Thus, he recommended that Leverhulme should 
be given "his chance". In return for this, Lord Leverhulme offered five farms on the 
west c o a s t . T h es e  were; Maelistra, Camish and Ardroil, Timisgarry, Reef, and 
Dalbeg. They were quickly settled using Part II of the Land Settlement Act and the 
holders were given entry to the 57 new holdings and 170 enlargements at 
Whitsunday 1921. Unfortunately for the future peace of the island, the Coll and 
Gress raiders would not accept land on the west coast.32 They still regarded 
themselves as the parties to an agreement with BoAS that they would receive 
holdings on the farms of Coll and Gress. The Secretary for Scotland was at pains to 
assure them that no such promise existed. 33
June 1921 saw the third of an annual series of raids on Coll and Gress. These were to 
have profound results. Leverhulme had no hesitation in stopping all his development 
works. In September, Munro informed Leverhulme that, from his point of view, the 
agreement of December 1920 had been breached and he intended to proceed with 
land settlement on Coll and Gress. He justified his action in terms of the duty 
conferred on him, as Secretary for Scotland, by the 1919 Land Settlement Act. 
Munro has been criticised for the "alacrity" with which he withdrew from the 
agreement of December 1920. However, at the time the agreement was reached 
Munro was far from convinced of the value of Leverhulme’s plans. Further he was 
aware of the likely effect of the agreement. He informed the Cabinet,
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I fear that if and when a public announcement is made that only a 
very small and local scheme of land settlement is to proceed, raiding 
will be renewed, and Lord Leverhulme will cease his operations.
This risk, I think, must be faced. ^
Munro was not only uneasy about concluding the agreement but less than sanguine 
about its value. It is not surprising that he should have taken the first opportunity to 
withdraw from it.
Coll and Gress contained only a small proportion of arable. A scheme was also 
proposed for Orinsay and Stimervay in Lochs, described as of "little agricultural 
value". An appeal was made to the Treasury to grant the necessary money without 
the usual detailed estimates being supplied. The "special urgency" of land settlement 
in Lewis was used as a justification for this unusual procedure. The Treasury agreed 
reluctantly on the condition that the expenditure per holding was limited to £200 per 
holding.^
As there were more applicants than holdings a ballot had to be conducted. 
Leverhulme tried to persuade the Board, without success, that the raiders should be 
excluded from it. The Board were well aware that their exclusion would lead to 
renewed and intensified trouble. It was decided that involvement in a raid would not 
be regarded as a disqualification for a holding.
1922 saw repeated threats of raids on the farm of Galson on the West coast. 
Leverhulme was opposed to a scheme for this farm. However, the government 
argued that their promise, of December 1920, not to use compulsory powers, need no 
longer stand, as Leverhulme had breached his part of the bargain by stopping his 
development works. Galson, 6115 acres in extent, was the last remaining substantial 
farm which had not been broken up. BoAS had prepared a land settlement scheme 
for it in 1912, but this had never been implemented due to the combined difficulties 
of the war and the unsatisfactory provisions of the Small Landholders Act. The new 
scheme involved the creation of 57 new holdings. The government still retained a 
slight hope of Leverhulme restarting his works and were worried lest the use of 
compulsory powers occasion a "complete break" with him. By January 1923, it was
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clear that all works were at a standstill and were likely to remain s o .^  In the 
following month, the Board approached the Treasury to sanction expenditure of 
£10,069 for the 57 new holdings on Galson. The Treasury were advised to grant this 
request as the "district is d a n g e r o u s " . ^  Despite Leverhulme’s opposition the scheme 
went ahead.
By 1924, all the large farms, and some of the smaller ones, had been utilised for 
land settlement. Leverhulme was taking steps to dispose of Lewis and concentrate 
his activities on the less troublesome island of Harris. Leverhulme's proprietorship of 
Lewis has led to considerable debate.
It has been argued that the departure of Leverhulme from Lewis was a lost 
opportunity for the Island. It has been further conjectured that some judicious 
compromise by the raiders and the government, as well as Leverhulme could have 
seen land settlement proceed alongside the development works. These questions are 
impossible to answer. However, it should be borne in mind that Leverhulme held the 
crofting system in utter contempt, and had done so from his earliest connection with 
the island. He was an "individualist" and felt that action taken in common could 
never be successful. Land settlement, in his view, "made the permanent solution of 
the problems of Lewis impossible".^® There does not seem to be a basis for 
compromise in such an attitude. Nevertheless, Leverhulme was capable of agreeing 
to land settlement in certain circumstances. His agreement to the schemes on the Uig 
farms in the winter of 1920-21 was in his view a realistic price to pay for the security 
of an agreement with Munro that the compulsory powers of BoAS would henceforth 
be suspended.
There were a number of factors which added to the difficulty of the situation. Coll 
and Gress had become the focus of the Lewis land problem. The proximity of these 
farms to Stornoway had allowed Leverhulme to argue that land settlement would 
prejudice the milk supply to that town. This argument was attacked at the time by 
BoAS officials. Historians have also pointed out its weakness. There may have been 
a point for discussion here, but Leverhulme elevated it to a fundamental obstacle to 
the breaking up of the farms. The Board's view was that if Stornoway developed as 
Leverhulme anticipated, Coll and Gress would never be able to supply it with milk. 
Prior to the granting of the West Coast farms, in 1921, Leverhulme used every 
argument at his disposal in an attempt to dissuade the Board from breaking up the 
farms. Although compromise should have been possible on this point, in reality, it 
was extremely unlikely given Leverhulme’s aim s.^
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The raids, particularly at Coll and Gress but also at Orinsay and the threats at 
Galson, undoubtedly intensified Leverhulme's opposition to land settlement. It was 
his view that the raiders were an isolated minority and that their view was abhorred 
by the rest of the population. He informed the Board "out of the 32,000 people in 
Lewis, only 30 are raiders", and described the raiders as a "small number of 
misguided m en".^ The level of support for Leverhulme has always been a difficult 
point to resolve. The point has been made that Lewis divided into an urban portion 
firmly behind his schemes and a rural one which was more sceptical. Certainly, the 
establishment figures in Stornoway, business men and senior local government 
officials, were supportive of Leverhulme.^ In the rural areas, Leverhulme made 
much of the fact that in 1921 he was able to gamer 9000 signatures for a petition 
supporting his schemes. The series of public meetings organised later that year also 
seemed to indicate majority support for him. However, there were problems with 
both these tests of opinion. The petition was a straight question of support for the 
development plans. Leverhulme, however, used it in an attempt to isolate the raiders. 
Clearly, most people were likely to support the plans with their promise of 
prosperity. This did not preclude them from sympathy, at least, with the raiders. The 
Lord Advocate reported that it was his impression that the majority of the population 
wished land settlement and Leverhulme's development schemes to proceed together. 
The meetings were subject to the same problem. In addition, the Board did not 
regard them as valid because there was no way of ascertaining whether the 
attendance was representative or not. They would have preferred an individual, 
rather than a mass, test of opinion.
Much attention has been given by historians, particularly Hunter, to a meeting held 
at Gress in March 1919, supposedly attended by 1000 people. Leverhulme addressed 
this meeting, outlined his schemes and predicted the prosperity which they would 
bring about. The intervention of one of the anti- Leverhulme faction drew a 
rapturous response. However, so did Leverhulme's contribution. The date of this 
meeting is significant. March 1919 was prior to the first of the raids on Coll and 
Gress and prior to the main government attempt to persuade Leverhulme to give up 
the farms for land settlement. Therefore, caution should be exercised in pointing to it 
as definitive evidence of support for, or opposition to, Leverhulme's projects. 
Nicolson's comment, "it was not easy then to assess where the majority feeling lay" 
seems the most sensible c o n c l u s i o n . ^
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Nicolson admits that this is a difficult issue to resolve. His interview with surviving 
Coll raiders casts little light on it. They argued that the rest of the population 
"understood" what they were doing. Interestingly they also pointed out that the raids 
did not necessarily indicate opposition to Leverhulme, merely, that they considered 
their claim to the land to be of more importance.^ This kind of impressionistic 
evidence is difficult to evaluate. What seems clear, is that Leverhulme quickly 
developed an intense dislike for the raiders and their actions. So much so, that he 
wished to exclude them from the ballot for holdings on the farms. It is possible that 
Leverhulme, as a businessman, was not used to dealing with obstacles that could not 
be cleared immediately with a judiciously applied sum of money. Clearly, the 
commercial world which he was used to could not prepare him for the complexities 
of dealing with land raids in Lewis. Even Government officials with long years of 
experience found this task of considerable difficulty.
In an attempt to prevent Coll and Gress being taken for land settlement, Leverhulme 
pointed out that these farms would not be sufficient to satisfy the demand for land on 
the island, and that if they were taken it would only increase the potential for trouble. 
He also argued that it was impossible to create "economic" or self sufficient holdings 
on the farms. It was obvious that Coll and Gress, indeed, all the farm land in Lewis, 
was insufficient for this purpose. However, it seems contradictory for Leverhulme to 
point this out if he truly believed that the raiders were in such a small minority. 
Settlement of Coll and Gress may have taken the heat out of the situation. The fact 
that other farms were settled before Coll and Gress only added to the feeling of 
grievance among the r a i de r s . I t  seems that most of the population of Lewis were 
prepared to give Leverhulme's schemes the benefit of the doubt while they were 
likely to go ahead. Once that likelihood passed they returned to their demands for 
land. In 1919, the total demand for new holdings and enlargements in Lewis 
amounted to 1273 applications. The corresponding figure for 1923, after the 
settlement of the four west coast farms and the suspension of Leverhulme's 
development schemes, was 1098.^
Insufficient attention has been paid to the years prior to Leverhulme's proprietorship. 
The land raids were not isolated, discontinuous events. There had been a 
longstanding attempt by government institutions to create new holdings in Lewis. 
The CDB, and the BoAS up to 1921, had been singularly unsuccessful in this regard. 
The demand for land in the Leverhulme period must be placed in this context. 
Similarly attempts to put the period into a general framework of confrontation 
between crofter and proprietor must be questioned. The divisions in the crofting
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community and the difficulties in attempting to evaluate Leverhulme's position 
invalidates this approach. Indeed, it could be argued that Leverhulme was an easier 
proprietor to deal with than Matheson had been. He was far from reticent in stating 
his position. Matheson had tended to hide behind a screen of legal technicalities.
Despite the attention on the Leverhulme period, the most noticeable point about it 
has been ignored. This is the fact that, despite the opposition of the proprietor, 
practically all the available farmland in Lewis was utilised for land settlement. In the 
period 1919 to 1925, 237 new holdings were created on 11 farms at a total cost of 
£71,809.^ This clearly demonstrates the superiority of the Land Settlement 
(Scotland) Act over all other preceding legislation.
II
In contrast to the difficulties which the Board encountered in Lewis the operation of 
the 1919 Act in Skye was much more straightforward. Skye had been the scene of 
major land settlement in the first decade of the century. The events at Kilmuir and 
Glendale have been discussed in depth above. Nevertheless, there was still 
considerable outstanding demand for land. The principal area of activity for the 
Board in the post war period was in the west and south of the island. Employing the 
provisions of Part I of the 1919 Act, the Board acquired 60,000 acres from 
MacLeod of MacLeod. The family were in dire financial straits, and the £56,809 
which they received for it in 1920 were much needed. The Board, in attempting to 
convince the Treasury that the expenditure was useful, referred to the intensity of 
demand in Skye and the likelihood of trouble if nothing was done. The estate 
contained 80 small holdings in need of enlargement. The entire 60,000 acres 
allowed the Board to create 142 new holdings and enlarge a further 75, at a total cost 
of £140,136.^ The references to raiding can partly be explained as BoAS tactic to 
persuade the Treasury of the immediate need for expenditure. Nevertheless, there 
was some substance to the claim. Over the period 1919 to 1922, there had been 
seven raids in Skye, including three on the land which the Board purchased from 
MacLeod of MacLeod.*^ In addition the Board received nine statements of intent to 
raid, three of which emanated from the former MacLeod Estate. ^
The problem for the Board was how to evaluate the seriousness of these threats. As 
can be seen, some of them did turn into actual raids, so care had to be taken. Most of 
the threats seemed to come in the winter months and may have been stimulated by 
boredom as much as grievance. Indeed, in this period the Board were inundated with
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threats of raids, from all over the crofting counties, a large number of which, could 
be, and were, safely ignored. In Skye and the Outer Hebrides, however, a 
longstanding tradition of raiding meant that threats from these areas merited cautious 
treatment.
One of the reasons for the persistence of the disturbed atmosphere in Skye after the 
purchase of this land was that the Board could not proceed immediately to break it 
up. Leneman is correct to use the word "piecemeal" to describe the way the BoAS 
dealt with this estate. This was forced on them by the fact that the tenant farms on 
the estate only became available to the Board as the leases expired. ^
The farms of Drynoch and North Talisker came into the hands of the Board in 1923. 
The latter was used to settle migrants from Lewis and Hams. This was the first large 
scale migration scheme since the idea became part of government policy in 1897. 
Difficulties with migration had plagued every government institution since then. 
Even in this post war period, when the demand for land was so high, the Board noted 
that many applicants would only accept land in a particular a rea .^  A migration 
scheme had wider significance than the mere movement of people from one place to 
another. It represented an honest attempt to see land settlement as a total policy 
rather than an ad hoc method of settling various local difficulties. Several strands 
existed in the Board's thinking in this regard. There was a desire to deal with the 
congestion in Lewis and Harris. The land available for land settlement in these 
islands was insufficient to deal with the local demand. This fact, added to the 
complications raised by Leverhulme, led to unrest. The potential contribution of a 
migration scheme in quelling such unrest was emphasised by the Board in their 
various submissions to the Treasury on the matter. The argument was successful, as 
the Treasury granted £30,000 for the scheme. A package of special concessions with 
regard to equipping and stocking the holdings went with the money. One of these is 
of particular note. In normal circumstances, the Board were not allowed to provide 
assistance of more than 75% of the value of stock. In the special circumstances of 
the migration scheme the Treasury consented to this figure being raised to 85% .^
The North Talisker settlement was eventually composed of 68 holdings. 63 of the 
holdings were tenanted by migrants from Lewis and Harris and the total population 
approached 400. The settlers were able to pursue a number of different methods of
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earning money. Some went to the east coast to fish and others were involved in the 
tweed industry. There was a club stock, with 1600 sheep, on the grazing land of the 
farm. Arable cultivation took some time to gather momentum. On the whole the 
variety of activity gives the impression of a thriving settlement. A BoAS official 
noted in late 1924;
Looking to the settlement as a whole its present position is as good as 
that of most island communities, while the possibility of the holders 
improving the position are distinctly greater than were open to them 
in Lewis and Harris.
The settlers were certainly better off, all else being equal, as tenants of the BoAS 
than of a private landlord. Individual proprietors varied enormously. Many regarded 
the running of their estates as a serious business, and gave much thought to the best 
means of doing so. Others did not. However, with a government institution as 
landlord there was an element of stability which was lacking even with the best of 
private landlords. Further, the support facilities offered under the BoAS were second 
to none. As well as the various forms of monetary and practical assistance which 
were available, Board tenants had access to agricultural education facilities and 
expert advice on matters of cultivation and husbandry. Private landlords : 
provided equipment ' ~ \n ifte crofting counties^ the
crucial differenceAwas that they would charge a market rent based on the value of 
their contribution. BoAS allowed the SLC to set a fair rent for all new holdings 
created under their auspices. Drawing on the recollections of a number of the settlers 
a recent author has presented a picture of this as a successful and thriving 
community.**^ Like Glendale, the most successful of the CDB settlements, Talisker 
with its club stock had scope for income other than the bare holdings of the settlers. 
The involvement of the settlers in the Tweed industry added another dimension to 
the settlement.
There were a number of other schemes in Skye in this period. The 1911 Act was 
employed to create 21 new holdings at Drinan and Glasnakille, near Elgol on the 
Strathaird estate. Using the provisions of part II of the 1919 Act 22 new holdings and 
66 enlargements were formed on the Watemish Estate. The 16,000 acre grazing farm 
of Scorrybreck, North of Portree, was acquired under Part I of the 1919 Act. The 
farm of Claigan, adjacent to Dunvegan, was also broken up under Part II, although 
in the face of proprietorial opposition from MacLeod of MacLeod, to create 15 new 
holdings. The principal points of interest concerning these schemes are twofold. In
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terms of policy it proved easier to carry out schemes under Part I of the 1919 Act, ie 
purchasing the land outright prior to settlement. After all, Part II of the 1919 Act was 
a more efficient version of the unpopular 1911 Act. Secondly, it is interesting to note 
that the BoAS deliberately used the fact that farms had been raided and others were 
under threat, as a tactic to persuade the Treasury to sanction expenditure. In the 
period 1919 to 1925, the Board's efforts in Skye resulted in the creation of 218 new 
holdings and 143 enlargements of existing holdings.
Skye was one of the most fruitful areas of operation for the Board in this period. So 
much so that the BoAS Director of Land Settlement admitted to a Skye farmer;
we have so much land being subdivided in Skye at the moment that
the immediate pressure is relieved to a great extent ^
This success was based on a fortuitous state of decay among the proprietors of Skye. 
MacLeod of MacLeod was practically insolvent and was only too happy to divest 
himself of 60,000 acres and receive £56,000 for them. The MacDonald estates were 
under Trusteeship, due to the mental incapacity of Lord MacDonald. The Trustees 
were keen to realise as many assets as possible. Hence, they responded favourably to 
the Board's enquiries concerning the farm of Scorrybreck, described by one 
government official "as one of the best sheep farms in S c o t l a n d " . ^  The conditions 
for taking over farms under Part I of the Act were propitious. Part II schemes 
remained a source of contention. This is entirely consistent with the proprietorial 
reaction to land settlement since the 1880s. Landlords, when faced with a proposal to 
break up a farm, would rather have it taken off their hands altogether, than become 
involved in the business of creating and administering small holdings
III
It has been noted that the Board used the existence and threat of raids in Skye to their 
advantage in some cases. It should be noted that this was not always possible. Two 
cases in particular stand out  ^ Strathaird in Skye, and Raasay. These cases are 
important in themselves as examples of land raids. However, their real importance 
lies in the impact they had on the government's response to raids. The perennial 
government dilemma was that granting the requests of raiders would only encourage 
other raids, while not doing so would only intensify the original grievances.
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Raasay had come to the attention of the Board before the war. However, little could 
be done because of the inadequacies of the 1911 Act. It was owned by William 
Baird and Co. Ironfoil&ers, based in Coatbridge. They were interested in Raasay 
only for the exploitation of its iron ore deposits. They were not keen to have small 
holdings established. With the improved facilities of the 1919 legislation the idea of 
a scheme for the island was revived. By 1920 Baird's industrial operations in Raasay 
were at a standstill. The BoAS had begun negotiations for a scheme of migration for 
men from Raasay and the neighbouring Island of Rona, and consequent enlargement 
of the remaining Raasay crofts. These negotiations were interrupted when cottars 
from Rona took possession of lands at the south eastern end of Raasay. The usual 
process of the serving and breaching of interdicts led to the raiders incarceration in 
late 1921. The Secretary for Scotland, Robert Munro, responded to this situation 
with uncharacteristic firmness, declaring that, henceforth, raiding would operate as a 
bar to land settlement.^ The Board of Agriculture took a different view to that of 
the Scottish Office. They were much more sympathetic to the plight of the raiders. 
Thomas Wilson, who had visited them in prison, was at the forefront of this view. 
There was no doubt that the conditions on Rona were dreadful. The problem was that 
only one of the raiders possessed the ex-service qualification, so they could not be 
given priority consideration, if the letter of the law was followed.
While the Scottish Office was declaring against land raids the Board were 
approaching the Treasury with a proposition to purchase Raasay. They were more 
aware of the realities of the situation. The only possible method of preventing the 
raiders from reoccupying the land was to "project a scheme at once". The Treasury 
were horrified at the potential expense of purchasing Raasay and settling penniless 
cottars on new holdings. They were eventually persuaded to allow the Board to go to 
£20,000 in an effort to purchase. The island was secured in March 1922, for £18,000. 
Tentative BoAS predictions indicated that a further £14-15,000 would be required to 
take over the sheep stock and equip the new holdings. The initial settlement of the 
island was hampered by an outbreak of typhus and only 7 applicants were settled in 
1922. More progress was made the following year with over 30 applicants settled.
There are a number of issues worthy of exploration. Clearly, there was a good deal 
of sympathy for the conditions which the raiders had to tolerate on Rona. The Lord 
Advocate described them as "dreadful". However, at the executive level in the 
Board, and in Dover House, this sympathy was tempered by awareness of the wider 
context. Dreadful congestion existed in other parts of the Highlands, and raids had 
occurred elsewhere. They could find mo politically defensible argument for priority
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treatment for Raasay. Indeed, in 1920, when prioritising various land settlement 
schemes, the Board did not highlight Raasay. There was also a shortage of money for 
land settlement in 1920, another reason for not taking action. ^  The BoAS Sub 
Commissioner's, who were in contact with the raiders, persuaded the Board that the 
only way of dealing with the difficulty was to purchase the island. They, of course, 
did not have any high political considerations. Their brief was to ascertain the most 
effective way of dealing with given situations as they found them. There was also the 
usual worry about whether giving in to raiders would encourage raids in other places. 
This had been a worry since the 1880s. Many felt that the continuation of raiding 
throughout the period since the 1886 Act was caused by an initial failure to deal with 
it firmly. However, the issue was not as simple as this. There was a general 
expectation of land settlement in the Hebrides. It was the Board's failure to satisfy 
this demand, an almost impossible task, which perpetuated raiding. Raiders had 
never shown any signs of being discouraged by a firm hand. Indeed, it tended to 
inflame already heated situations. The Board had little choice, as the CDB had 
discovered, but to deal sensibly with the demands of the raiders.
A similar situation had arisen at Balranald in North Uist. here two separate raids had 
occurred by 1921 and extreme difficulty was encountered in removing the raiders. 
The Board proposed the establishment of 16 new holdings and 32 enlargements. 
Once the raiders were removed, the BoAS faced the dilemma of going ahead with 
the scheme and including those who had broken the law. The Board tended to view 
the raids as a symptom of frustrated land hunger, rather than a challenge to their 
authority. They realised that the only prospect of peace was to proceed with the land 
settlement scheme. The estate was acquired at Whitsunday 1922 and a revised 
scheme for 22 new holdings and 30 enlargements was implemented.^
In the Raasay case the ex-service priority was an obstacle to land settlement. This 
was a general problem faced by the Board. In some areas it was impossible to find 
sufficient ex servicemen to proceed with a scheme. The virtual exclusion of civilians 
prejudiced the possibility of schemes for both categories. Clearly the men from Rona 
were needy applicants, regardless of their wartime activities. However, the 
government had realised that there was political mileage in generous treatment for 
war veterans. The problem was that in the Highlands land settlement was not a post 
war innovation. The Treasury, under pressure from BoAS recognised this fact; they 
commented in 1922;
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Men have been waiting for holdings for some time, and their 
demands have been actively renewed since the war. In the peculiar 
circumstances of the crofting districts, the preference given by 
the 1919 Act cannot be absolute.^
IV
Despite the considerable amount of land settlement activity which had occurred on 
the Gordon Cathcart estates prior to 1919, there were a number of farms still 
available for settlement. Askemish, made available for small holdings in 1919, 
proved a source of continuing difficulty, as has been discussed in Chapter Seven. 
Activity in the post 1919 period concentrated on the farms of Drimore and 
Drimsdale, in South Uist, and Nunton, in Benbecula.
The Board had made enquiries about Drimore before the war but decided to drop the 
scheme in 1915.^ However, 1919 saw renewed applications for this farm. The 
estate still opposed to land settlement. They argued that the farm was an 
intrinsic part of a cluster of three farms, which were worked as a group, and which 
constituted the home farm of the estate. Ultimately, the farm was raided in 
November 1919.^ The tenacity of these raiders in holding onto the land, and a 
second raid in December 1920, induced the estate to enter into negotiations with the 
Board. The raiders were still in possession in March of the following year, making 
the proper working of the farm impossible and producing more entreaties from 
Skene, Edwards and Garson to the Board to constitute small holdings! The fact that 
the tenant of the farm was prepared to offer the Board concessions on his departure 
from the farm encouraged consideration of a scheme. A scheme for the constitution 
of 11 new holdings and 46 enlargements was prepared and sanctioned by the
Treasury.^
The pattern of events in South Uist and Benbecula mirrored very closely those of 
earlier periods. The estate initially stated strongly its opposition to land settlement, 
but seemed to cave in when raids occurred. This pattern was repeated in the case of 
Nunton farm in Benbecula.
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This pattern of vacillation in the face of pressure had its origins in the growing 
disillusionment on the part of the elderly Lady Gordon Cathcart with her Long Island 
Estates. By August 1921, her Solicitors informed the Board that it was their view 
that "the day for private ownership in these parts is passed". They advised the 
proprietor that due to the "never ending" trouble of the estate it would be in her 
interests to dispose of it. Contacts were made with the Board in an attempt to arrange 
a sale. Surviving evidence is not categoric as to why nothing came of these 
contacts.^® However, having regard to the prevailing political conditions it would 
seem likely that the Board would find it difficult to gain Treasury sanction for the 
heavy expenditure such a purchase would involve. Further, the Board would not 
have much to gain from such a transaction. By the early 1920s most of the farms on 
the estate had already been broken up. By acquiring the land the Board would only 
be increasing its management expenses at a time when they were under pressure to 
economise.
By the mid 1920s, the Board found that the land settlement activity in thejpng Island 
had been such that all the available land for small holdings had been exhausted. This 
is not to argue that all the demand for land had been satisfied. This was the area with 
the longest history of government sponsored land settlement. The proprietor of North 
Uist had been the first to approach the CDB with land. Considerable activity had 
taken place on the islands of Benbecula and South Uist. The small islands of Barra 
and Vatersay were almost entirely in the hands of crofters by this time. The Board 
warned that in future applicants from that region would have to consider migration 
or emigration if their demand for land was to be fulfilled.^
Developments in Sutherland and Caithness are also worthy of examination. In the 
case of the former, there was a considerable continuity with the years before 1919. In 
that period there had been no shortage of land, but it was found that the agricultural 
conditions of the county, with its heavy reliance on sheep farming, militated against 
successful land settlement. The most notable example of this continuing trend 
concerned the farm of Eriboll, in the north west of the county. It had been purchased 
in 1919, for £12,000. By the time the Bo AS obtained entry in 1921, they found that 
the price of the stock had risen by 45 per cent compared to 1919 estimates. 
Applicants were not forthcoming for the 16 small holdings which it was proposed to 
form on the land. The reason being lack of capital among the applicants. Unlike 
Skye, the Treasury were not prepared to relax the stipulation that new holders should 
pay 25 per cent of the price of their stock. In the absence of local applications, the
241
Board briefly considered migrating 39 Lewismen to Eriboll. This was abandoned on 
the grounds of expense. The loss on the sheep stock and the cost of managing the 
estate, led the Treasury to describe Eriboll as "an expensive incubus". In September 
1926 the BoAS accepted £10,000 for Eriboll. £2000 less than they had paid for it, 7 
years earlier.
The problem behind this failure was the fluctuations in stock prices in the 
immediate post war era. Sheep, in particular had risen in value. This created a 
number of problems. Not only were new holders burdened with high annuities for 
their stock, a problem which was accentuated when prices began to decline in the 
mid 1920s. There was also the problem of compensating the outgoing sheep farmers 
at high values. The problem was exacerbated when sheep prices plummeted in late 
1921. Holders burdened with high annuities were now faced with drastic reduction in 
their income. It also created a problem for the BoAS in cases where they had taken 
over sheep at the height of the market, and were forced to pass them on to holders 
after the drop in prices. The Treasury were disturbed at the prospect of being asked 
to bear the loss. The Board made much of the fact that the drop in prices was 
unexpected. The Treasury, however, had been aware of its likelihood as far back as 
1919, and had warned the Board in 1920.^
In Caithness, the major issue to emerge was the the size and economic viability of 
the holdings. The subjects acquired for land settlement in Caithness tended to have a 
larger proportion of arable land than elsewhere in the Highlands. For example, the 
holdings proposed to be formed on the farm of Upper Dounreay, were almost half 
arable and half pastoral. The farm of Watten was composed of 640 acres of arable 
land and 2,800 acres of pastoral. At Ormlie 306 of the 410 acres on the farm were 
arable.^ The distance of Caithness from central markets, transport difficulties and 
the lack of employment opportunities meant that a larger size of holdings was 
defensible. In the case of Watten, the Treasury asked for the size of holdings to be 
reduced and more men settled. The Treasury view of efficiency was to settle the 
maximum number of men. After all, the KLTR, Sir Kenneth MacKenzie, had 
informed them that ex service land settlement was never likely to be "economic" 
and that "the object is to try and get the ex soldier settled at as small as cost as 
pos s ib l e " . The  size of the holdings was a problem in attracting applicants. 
Equipment costs were high, particularly for buildings. Many applicants were short of 
capital and reluctant to take on heavy burdens. For those who did the problems were
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exacerbated by the sharp fall in agricultural produce in 1922. The continuing concern 
of the Board was reflected in 1923 by a decision to allow holders settled before 
1922, in Lowland and Highland arable areas, to apply to the SLC to have their 
buildings revalued in the light of current prices.
This debate was echoed in a scheme for Borlum farm, on the Lovat Estates in 
Inverness-shire. It was 56 per cent arable and the BoAS proposed forming four large 
holdings of between 65 and 98 acres. The Treasury once again complained of the 
expense of creating small numbers of large holdings. BoAS argued that special 
consideration should be given to the Highlands because of the poor quality of much 
of the arable land. Although the holdings were large, the rents were relatively low, 
between £18 and £27.^  Perhaps the key to the attempts at land settlement in 
Caithness, and at Borlum, was that there was not the same political imperative for 
maximum settlement in order to prevent raids. There was more scope to indulge in 
"ideal" land settlement. Large holdings, likely to sustain a family without recourse to 
ancillary employment, could be contemplated.
V
The ^jjanhWv^ contribution of the 1919 Act to the ongoing policy of land settlement 
is presented in the following tables. The first shows the area of land, both arable and 
pasture, used for new holdings and the number of new holdings (NHs) and 
enlargements (Es) created. Further the level of land settlement (NHs + Es) is 
presented as a percentage of the real demand (RD) for land. The real demand is the 
total demand minus the applications rejected by the Board or withdrawn by the 
applicants. The first line of figures for each county refers to the holdings created on 
privately owned land, (P), the second to estates acquired by the BoAS, (E).
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County NHs Es_________RD____% RD Settled
ARGYLL 226 103 1370 29.8 P
52 27 E
CAITHNESS 26 5 826 15.4 P
84 13 E
INVERNESS 275 288 3942 30.5 P
467 172 E
ROSS 312 369 2111 34.1 P
40 — E








TOTAL 1571 894 9600 26.1
TABLE 8:2, Land Settlement in the Crofting Counties, 1912 to 1925
The contribution of the 1919 Act to land settlement can be seen. The percentage of 
demand settled by 1925 was a vast improvement to the figures for the pre 1919 
period. An overall settlement rate of 26.1 per cent compared to 10.6 per cent in the 
earlier period, (see table 7:1 for land settlement prior to 1919). The level of 
consensus on policy in this period was important in this success. The significant 
amount of settlement undertaken on privately owned land, especially in Sutherland, 
can be seen. Only limited conclusions can be drawn from such statistics. They 
provide no clue to the qualitative elements of the policy.
The next comparative table refers to land settlement in the Hebrides. This is the 
heartland of the crofting community and it is noticeable that the demand was higher, 
and the rate of settlement higher, than in the rest of Scotland.
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Island NHs Es RD % RD Settled.
SKYE 59 51 P
278 114 1304 38.5 E
HARRIS 32 27 P
— - - 337 14.8 E
N.UIST 4 31 P
87 55 447 39.6 E
S.UIST 140 87 P
— — 546 41 .6 E
BARRA 3 33 P
67 — 392 26.3 E
LEWIS 262 278 P
— — 1344 40.3 E
500 507 P
432 169 4340 31 .8 E
TOTAL 932 676 4070 39.5
TABLE 8:3, Hebridean Land Settlement, 1912 to 1925?^
The Hebrides show a consistently higher level of settlement than in the Highlands 
generally or Scotland as a whole. These areas were the scene of the most vociferous 
demand for land. In Skye, Lewis and the Southern Hebrides, land settlement was 
taken to its maximum level by 1925. It is interesting to note that this was only 
sufficient to settle around 40 per cent of the real demand for land. The lower figures 
for Harris and Barra are worthy of note. In the former island the support of the 
population for Lord Leverhulme's schemes in this period minimised land settlement 
activity. In Barra, there had been considerable land settlement in previous periods 
and only a small amount of land was still available in the 1920s.
This period is the first with which this thesis has been concerned which saw real 
success in the implementation of a government's Highland policy. This success has 
been given due consideration by historians. One has argued that, by the 1920s
... the agrarian and social injustices perpetrated by the creators
of the land system that had taken shape during the clearances 
had been permanently removed - from the crofting community's
hebridean heartland at any rate.
2 4 5
More recent work by the same historian, though, has noted that the success of land 
settlement in the 1920s did not protect the crofting community from economic 
depression in the 1930s.®® There can be no doubt that significant progress was 
made. As has been noted here, land settlement was taken to its maximum level in the 
"heartland" of the crofting community. Practically all the available land in Skye, the 
Uists, Barra, Tiree, and most notably, in Lewis, was utilised.®* Prior to 1919 no 
progress had been possible in the latter island. Even after 1919 the Board of 
Agriculture had to overcome considerable difficulties.
The quantitative "success" of land settlement in this period was not achieved without 
some difficulty. The Board faced difficulties from two quarters. The demands of the 
crofting community for more land were vociferous. They were articulated most 
prominently through the tactic of the land raid. Raids in this period were numerous, 
but largely confined to the Hebrides. Their impact was singular. The Board noted in 
1914 that the demands of the crofters were limited. This was consistent with the 
pattern of agitation since the 1880s.®  ^ The political imperative for maximum 
satisfaction of existing demand served only to distort the pattern of land settlement. 
Smaller holdings than the Board considered ideal had to be created. This 
perpetuation of uneconomic holdings did nothing to prevent, or blunt the impact of, 
economic depression in the 1930s. This was particularly the case in Lewis. As has 
been noted, in Tiree proprietorial influence helped to ensure the creation of larger 
holdings. The Board noted in December 1924 that the creation of economic holdings 
was confined to the east of the crofting area. This was with the exception of Skye 
where the vast acreage available for land settlement was critical. ®^
The second problem faced by the Board was the attitude of the Treasury to land 
settlement. Prior to 1919, Scottish land settlement was financed by Parliamentary 
vote. The Land Settlement (Scotland) Act empowered the Board to borrow from the 
national exchequer. This necessitated the involvement of the Treasury to sanction 
expenditure. They often voiced disquiet over expenditure on land settlement and the 
results of that policy. The Board had sufficient political awareness to emphasise the 
volatile situation in the Highlands. Generally, they reflected on the importance of 
land settlement as a social policy which could not be judged on by economic results 
alone. By judicious use of such arguments the Board did fairly well in the ongoing 
debate with the Treasury over expenditure.®^
2 4 6
Post-war land settlement in the Highlands should not be seen as discontinuous. 
Recent work, although technically competent, fails to put it in the context of the 
ongoing policy debate since the 1880s.®** Rhetorically, it was part of the post war 
reconstruction policy. In reality, it was the culmination of various attempts to deal 
with the Highland land issue since 1886. For this reason, the preference given to ex 
service-men was not so relevant in the Highlands as elsewhere. Although those 
demanding land adapted their rhetoric to suit prevailing political conditions the real 
basis of their demand went much deeper. The Board were in no doubt that the ex- 
service qualification caused as many problems as it solved.®® Land raids, such as 
occurred in this period were not a new phenomenon, as the content of this thesis 
makes clear. In this period as in others the raids were localised, specific and limited 
in their demands. They should be seen in the context of preceding raids and not the 
contemporaneous unrest among ex servicemen which troubled the government in 
this period.®^
Thus, although the policy of the governments of the post 1919 period was the most 
productive of any since 1886, it was not perfect. Qualitative considerations, such as 
the size of the holdings created should be borne in mind when measuring this 
success. Further, the myriad obstacles raised, by the Treasury and the crofters leads 
to the placing of question marks against the durability of this policy in periods of 
economic stress.
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This thesis has been concerned with the development and implementation of 
government policy in the Crofting Counties. The period under examination is one 
particularly worthy of scrutiny. In 1883 the government could reject calls for a Royal 
Commission for the Highlands by arguing that they could not be seen to be taking 
special action in a particular area of the country. Indeed, they could deny that there 
was such a concept as a peculiarly Highland issue to be dealt with. * The Napier 
Commission and the Crofters (Holdings) Scotland Act of 1886 were the first, and 
most important breaches in this mode of thought. The former established the extent 
of the Highland issue. The latter, although explicitly rejecting the notions of the 
Report, was critical in this regard. After some considerable debate within the Cabinet 
the Highland area was defined. The definition which encapsulated the majority of 
parishes in the counties of, Argyll, Inverness, Ross and Cromarty, Sutherland, 
Caithness, Orkney and Shetland, remains in force to this day.
However, it has been challenged. The abortive Bill of 1895 included provisions to 
extend the crofting area to include areas in upland Aberdeen and Banff - shire and 
highland Perthshire, where conditions akin to crofting certainly did exist. The failure 
to extend the crofting area to such districts has led some to make the somewhat 
pedantic point that the Highlands are a wider notion than the crofting counties.^ The 
Congested Districts (Scotland) Act of 1897 also employed a specialised version of 
the criteria laid down in 1886. However, the statutes of 1911 and 1919 laid this 
definition aside. They applied to the whole of rural Scotland. This has led some 
commentators to argue that crofting suffered from a "loss of identity" in the years 
from 1911 to 1955, when crofter legislation retreated to the crofting counties. ^  
However, if the analysis extends beyond the terms of the acts to the substance of 
policy this view must be qualified. The stormy passage of the 1911 Act was partly 
caused by the problem of Lowland proprietors' fear of crofting legislation. 
Consequently, the Bill was modified at a late stage to accommodate their worries. 
These modifications did not affect the provisions for the crofting counties.^ It is one 
of the ironies of this period that after much worry about the effects of crofting type 
legislation on the lowlands one of the most important lasting effects of the extension 
concerned the crofting counties. This was the creation of the absentee crofter in
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1917. A case which had originated in the Lowlands reached the Court of Session, 
where it was held that a landholder need not continue to reside on, or within two 
miles of, his holding as long as those conditions were satisfied at the passing of the 
1911 Act.5
So, in effect, there were two separate policies originating from the one piece of 
legislation. The situation after 1919 was even more complex. The government were 
facing heavy fiscal pressure on their expenditure and the BoAS did not escape the 
effects. Faced with the prospects of a reduced budget after 1922 they chose to focus 
most of their attention and the bulk of their money on the Highlands. The potential 
instability in the Highlands generated by the land raids which occurred in this period 
were a potent factor in this decision.** So, despite the changes in the geographical 
range of Scottish land legislation in this period the crofting counties as a special area 
worthy of a particular and unique policy remained a constant. Indeed, the situation 
had come full circle. In 1883 the government argued that tenurial problems in the 
Highlands could be dealt with in the general legal framework governing relations 
between landlord and tenant. Forty years later, when legislation which had its 
intellectual origins in the crofting counties was extended to the rest of Scotland, the 
government were forced to concede that such a framework could not cope with the 
special demands of the Highlands, which still merited exceptional treatment.
As one would expect the geographical range were not the only features of legislation 
and policy to change. The forty years from the mid 1880s to the mid 1920s saw 
governments of many different hues, Liberal, Conservative and Coalition. The 
Highland land issue was on the political agenda, at various levels, for most of this 
period. In periods like the mid 1880s, 1906 to 1911 and 1919 to 1925, it was quite a 
high priority for government. The aims and content of policy varied over the period. 
The impression has often been given that the four major pieces of legislation 
examined in this thesis, the statutes of 1886, 1897, 1911 and 1919 represented a 
continuous line of cumulative development. Flaws and failure in one policy would 
be rigorously identified and eliminated in the next act which would faithfully build 
on the previous ones7 Connected to this is the idea that the increasing level of 
government intervention which each act represented was logical. 1886 was an act to 
regulate tenurial relations which developed by 1919 into provisions for the state 
itself to act as the landowner.
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There are two major problems with these ideas. Firstly, the 1886 Act was not 
intended as the basis for a new code of legislation, rather it was to be the final 
solution to a problem which, in Gladstone's view, had plagued British government 
for over a century. It was decidedly not meant to herald a new and permanent phase 
of interventionist policy in the Highlands. Further, it was intended to right the 
wrongs which had been perpetrated by the various forms and phases of agricultural 
and social reorganisation which had taken place in the Highlands over the preceding 
century. In short, it was retrospective, rather than prospective. Of course, Gladstone's 
intellectual desire to salve the Victorian liberal conscience on this question is a 
motive not to be underestimated. Secondly, and most importantly, to see policy from 
the 1880s to 1920s as cumulative ignores the political and intellectual tensions 
between the different acts and the policies which they promoted.
The principal theme running through this thesis has been the identification and 
examination of this debate. Essentially, there were two contending concepts behind 
the policies advanced in this period. The first, normally associated with Liberal 
administrations was concerned with giving existing tenants protection and security in 
their relations with the landowner. This has sometimes been called "dual 
ownership".® Although the landlord still retained ultimate ownership of the land, the 
improvements and buildings were owned by the crofter. The Liberals had developed 
this policy in Ireland in 1881. They took it further in 1911. As well as extending it 
beyond the crofting counties they included provisions whereby new holdings could 
be created on privately owned land, even against the wishes of the proprietor. On the 
other side of the debate stood the concepts of land purchase and peasant 
proprietorship. These were associated with Conservative governments. Much of the 
impetus for this policy came from landowners. At first sight this may seem 
incongruous. However, from their perspective it was logical and consistent. Much of 
the proprietorial interest in croft land had been removed by the 1886 Act. The work 
of the Crofters Commission had reduced rents to a nominal level. Proprietors felt 
that it would be helpful to complete the process and transfer the entire ownership of 
the croft to the crofter. There was an element of Conservative ideology in such 
thinking. To endow crofters with the responsibilities of ownership would hopefully 
move them in a conservative (if not a Conservative) direction. This policy was 
tentatively applied from 1897 to 1906. The success rate was not high. A combination 
of factors ensured this. The undercapitalised nature of the crofting economy meant 
that crofters were unlikely to be able to afford the necessary annuities. The lack of 
funds available to the Congested Districts Board to acquire land to be sold on to 
crofters. Finally, the conservatism of the crofters killed the policy. The failure of the
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regime can be seen by its eventual conversion into state ownership of the land which 
was purchased for peasant proprietorship. This led some mischevious polemicists to 
herald the advent of land nationalisation in the Highlands under a Conservative 
government.9 The loyalty to the 1886 regime was too strong. This was not an 
esoteric or ideological judgement on the part of the crofters. They were unwilling to 
enter into a purchase agreement at the cost of the low rents and rating concessions 
which they had acquired in 1886. The security which they had under the existing 
regime was tantamount to ownership. This policy was never resurrected after its 
initial failure. Part I of the 1919 Act did empower the government to buy land. 
However, there was never any intention to sell it on to crofters. The government, in 
the shape of the BoAS was satisfied to act as landowner. After all, this was the 
eventuality which had to be resorted to in 1908 when the Kilmuir crofters refused to 
buy their holdings from the CDB.
This contentious debate between the two parties has not been fully appreciated by 
historians who have examined this period in a cursory fashion. Many have simply 
been concerned to note the progress made in the period which culminated in the 
1919 Act. This has been presented as the statute which finally returned the land of 
which Highlanders had been deprived during the previous century and a half. 
However, it was in reality a honest attempt by the coalition government to build a 
non-ideological approach to land settlement. It was characterised by its flexibility, 
encompassing arrangement for new holdings to be created on privately owned land 
or on estates purchased by the BoAS. It was built on a reflection of the failure of the 
ideologically motivated statute of 1911. Undoubtedly, this was the statute under 
which the greatest progress was made. A large number of new holdings were created 
compared to previous acts. Significantly the quantitative success was most evident in 
the Hebrides and particularly in Lewis. Until the early 1920s it had proved 
impossible for the CDB or the BoAS to create new holdings in that most congested 
of islands. This was through a combination of the weaknesses of existing legislation 
and proprietorial obstinance and eccentricity.
It is critical, then, in understanding the development of government policy in this 
period to note the contending ideological origins of the different policies 
implemented in this period. The ideological motivation reached its peak in the period 
from 1906 to 1911. In these years the Liberal government made no real effort to hide 
the fact that they held wider objectives than the mere creation of new holdings in the 
Highlands and beyond. They had an open agenda of trying to create a new model of 
life in the countryside which would appeal to those in the overcrowded cities and
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contribute to a general movement of population from urban areas which would be to 
the general good of the nation. However, it is the conclusion here that there was also 
a hidden agenda. The various Small Landholders (Scotland) Bills were employed 
cynically in the campaign against the House of Lords. The conjunction of Highland 
and Lowland provisions in the Bills was highly controversial and caused most of the 
problems in the Upper House. A cross-party campaign, which included landowners 
and the representatives of crofters, emerged. They argued that it would be sensible 
to introduce a separate measure for the Highlands, where there was a real demand for 
a measure to deal with identifiable grievances. No such amendment in the 
programme of the government was made until after the reform of the House of 
Lords. Limited accommodation in this regard was allowed, in the shape of 
amendments to the 1911 version of the Bill. The crudely ideological origins of this 
Bill were betrayed in its short working life. Very little progress was achieved. It 
proved to be riddled with loopholes which were exploited by landowners, notably 
Matheson of Lewis and Lady Gordon Cathcart, who were horrified at the extension 
of the concept of dual ownership which it represented. The Conservatives, although 
they were motivated to a certain extent by ideological considerations, were so to a 
lesser degree and in a more constructive fashion. The problem with their policy of 
land purchase was that it had minimal support in the crofting community. They had 
not based its introduction on any solid base or test of opinion.
Although, objectively, the ideological treatment of the Highland land issue militated 
against great progress towards its settlement, such a treatment was inevitable. Policy 
is created in a political environment whose defining characteristics are debate and 
differences of approach to any given problem. The Highland land issue in this period 
was no different. It had originated in an atmosphere of polemicism in the 1880s and 
this continued down to 1919 when the political power of the Lloyd George coalition 
was able to carry a flexible and comprehensive measure which cut through the 
debates of the previous generation.
The role of landowners has always been a controversial issue in Highland history. In 
this period they have been condemned and relegated to the sidelines. * * The level of 
involvement of proprietors in policy over the period under consideration here gives 
such a view the appearance of a considerable historical misjudgement. To argue that 
landowners were more important than has hitherto been assumed is not to place a 
value judgement on the morality or culpability of their activities. One major flaw in 
most of the assertions concerning proprietors is that they have tended to speak of 
them as if they were a monolithic force. The conclusions here are partly based on an
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examination of a wide range of proprietorial c o r r e s p o n d e n c e . ^  The first point to 
emerge is the multifaceted nature of political attitudes among proprietors. In the 
debates surrounding the 1886 Act the range was considerable. From the constructive 
and thoughtful interjections of Cameron of Lochiel to the crude and reactionary 
contributions of Fraser of Kilmuir.^ This is not to argue that landowners did not at 
times act in concert. In 1884-5 they came together to formulate proposals to deal 
with the grievances of the crofters. Later in the decade the importance of the 
Memorial of Highland proprietors to the Marquis of Lothian and its impact on policy 
has been noted. In the 1890s, Lochiel and MacLeod of MacLeod, as befitted their 
Conservative allegiances, were both influential advocates of land purchase. ^  
Proprietors responded to the Royal Commission of 1892 by setting up an 
organisation, The Highland Property Association, at a meeting in Inverness 
convened by Lochiel. This was not mere reaction. It involved the systematic 
gathering of information on the structure of estates in an attempt to protect the 
landowning interest. ^  However, it is in the period 1906 to 1911 that the landlord 
position is most interesting. Contrary to their Lowland counterparts, Highland 
landowners like Lord Lovat, another Conservative, were keen to see legislation pass. 
Indeed, It was in this period that the Scottish Land and Property Federation was set 
up specifically to combat the threat of legislation, it was dominated by proprietors 
from Lowland Scotland.
Others were influential on the ground. Lady Gordon Cathcart persuaded a reluctant 
government to lay aside their preferred option for the settlement of the Island of 
Vatersay on her estate. They would have wished to create new holdings but leave the 
ownership of the land in the hands of the proprietor. Her ladyship prevailed at almost 
every point in the lengthy debate over this small, but politically important piece of 
land. The government were eventually persuaded against their wishes to buy the 
island. The fact that this was perhaps the last time a proprietor was able to compel a 
government to do something illustrates the reality of their changing role over this 
period. After 1911 they were able to exert negative influence. Certain proprietors 
could still be obstructive if they so desired. The history of the Island of Lewis after 
1911 demonstrates this clearly. Faced with the complexity of the 1919 Act there was 
little they could do. It included not only provisions for the government to buy land 
but also a more efficient method of the despised concept of "dual ownership". 
Further, Highland estates were in a state of decay and their main produce, hill sheep 
were unremunerative.
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So, the assertion that the 1886 Act saw the end of meaningful proprietorial influence 
in the Highlands is a simplification of a more complex process. Proprietors were able 
for a period in the late 1880s and 1890s to have their preferred options adopted by 
receptive Conservative administrations. In the first decade of the new century they 
had to struggle harder to make their voice heard. From 1911 to 1919 they were 
reduced to blocking tactics, exemplified by Matheson of Lewis. ^
As well as considerable diversity among landowners there was considerable diversity 
of physical and social conditions in the Crofting Counties for the government to 
contend with. Often this shaded in with differing proprietorial attitudes. The island 
of Lewis presented special problems for the government throughout this period. In 
the period immediately following the 1886 Act it was the area with the highest level 
of rent arrears for the Crofters’ Commission to deal w ith .^  The social condition of 
the island was a concern of government in the 1880s and remained so throughout the 
period. The many investigations carried out by government revealed it to be the area 
with the most chronic congestion, the poorest land, and the highest incidence of 
cottars and squatters. In addition the Congested Districts Board reported that the 
level of agricultural practice and stock husbandry on the island was lamentable. The 
prospects for dealing with these problems locally was hampered by the minimal 
revenue which the local authorities were able to raise from the island. This was a 
function of congestion, exacerbated by the fact that many agricultural "subjects" 
were not entered on the valuation roll and hence not assessed, but nevertheless 
received full services. All the problems of the Highlands seemed to be concentrated 
on the one island. Congestion, lack of capital and paucity of opportunity. These 
problems were compounded by the uncooperative nature of the estate management. 
No new holdings were formed in Lewis on any scale until 1923-4. This demonstrates 
the continuing power of proprietorial negativism. However, even when the 
government had broken up every farm on the island for small holdings it still did not 
satisfy the demand for land.
In other Hebridean areas similar problems existed but not to the same extent. 
Progress was possible in Skye due to good fortune as much as good planning. The 
landholding structure on the island was in a state of flux in this period. The 
traditional proprietors, Lord MacDonald and MacLeod of MacLeod were in terminal 
decline. Fraser of Kilmuir was heartily sick of administering a crofting estate by the 
early 1890s and was only too happy to sell out. This state of affairs allowed the 
government to intervene and purchase much of the island in the post 1904 period 
both through the CDB and the BoAS. The estates of Lady Gordon Cathcart, from
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Benbecula south also saw considerable government activity. She tended to begin 
from an absolute position of non cooperation and undertake a controlled retreat from 
it in negotiations with the government. Even this tactic could be nullified by the 
1919 Act. By the 1920s the aged proprietrix was demoralised and wished to sell her 
estates. On these estates by the early 1920s most of the land suitable for land 
settlement had been utilised. Unlike Lewis this was sufficient to deal with the vast 
bulk of the demand for land.
The County of Sutherland provides a contrast to the Hebrides. Here there were 
congested crofting townships on the margins of vast acreages of sheep farms. The 
CDB and the BoAS were able to carry out substantial schemes of land settlement. 
The Duke of Sutherland was generally cooperative. Indeed, at times too cooperative. 
His habit of offering large swathes of his estate to the government created a new set 
of problems. The political atmosphere of the wartime and post-war period made it 
very difficult for the government to refuse such offers, even if they were not wholly 
suitable for their purposes. There was certainly no shortage of land in Sutherland and 
the demand for it was as vociferous as anywhere in the Highlands.
There were other areas of the Highlands where there was very little government 
activity throughout the period. The districts of Lochaber, Badenoch and Easter Ross 
are notable in this regard. In such areas there was an easier co-existence between 
large scale farming and crofting. Indeed crofting townships were relatively isolated 
among farms of considerable sizes. In Lochaber and Badenoch there was also a 
strong history of club farming among the crofting class. Although classic crofting 
conditions did exist in these areas the diversity of land holding marked them out 
from the heartland of the crofting community in the Hebrides and West Highlands.
The incidence of crofter agitation in this period was almost continuous. It is 
important, nevertheless, to distinguish between the different phases of agitation. 
Prior to 1886 there was a movement which has been dubbed "The Crofters' War". It 
was concentrated in the Hebrides and particularly in Skye. The initial spontaneity of 
this movement cannot be denied. Its political impact was to alert the government to 
the existence of the Highland land issue. Beyond that its impact was minimal. It was 
never able to positively influence government. The arrival of the Crofter MPs at 
Westminster came too late to be important in the making of the 1886 Act. After 1886 
the focus of the agitation shifted to Lewis and to the task of amending the Crofters 
Act. It was singularly unsuccessful in this regard. After a few large scale and stage 
managed incidents the agitation declined to small scale incidents and then petered
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out. From this date there were a number of land raids and other incidents. However, 
they were related not to a general political campaign but to a series of specific and 
localised issues. The dispute over Vatersay, the argument over the farm of 
Scuddaburgh in Skye or the conflict over the farms of Coll and Gress in Lewis. 
These incidents seem to have been largely driven by a small number of committed 
activists who held considerable sway over the rest of the communities in question. 
What is striking about the whole course of crofter agitation are its extremely limited 
objectives. The institution of landlordism was not under threat. As has been noted it 
continued to be influential until quite late in this period. Crofters achieved limited 
gains in 1886 and with the exception of trying to bring more land into this regime 
were content. Their relationship with their proprietors had been modified to such an 
extent that his involvement in the crofter's day to day life was minimal.
The incidence of land agitation in the Highlands and in Ireland in the same period 
has led to simple comparisons between the tw o .^  However, the agitation, and the 
government policy in Ireland displayed a number of crucial differences from the 
Highlands. The Irish agitation was much more intense and widespread than anything 
which occurred in the Highlands. It was also much more sophisticated. Complex 
structures of protest, such as the Plan of Campaign from 1886, were developed. The 
important feature which separated the two experiences was the link between land 
and nationalism in Ireland. This gave the land movement impetus and direction. The 
Highland land movement was parochial by comparison. Indeed, attempts to link it to 
wider political concerns was a critical factor in the decline of the crofters' movement. 
Irish small tenants, with the greater objective of Home Rule in view were much more 
eager to embrace the concept of ownership of their holdings. Consequently, 
governments of both parties pursued this policy vigorously. Scottish crofters, with 
their limited objectives were satisfied with the substance of the 1886 regime which 
left them as tenants. Attempts to interest crofters in ownership were abandoned 
effectively in 1908 and not revived for a further 68 years. ^
Another aspect of crofters' behaviour which has largely escaped the attention of 
historians is their standard of agriculture and stock husbandry. This was a concern of 
every government institution in the Highlands in the period covered here. As the 
Congested Districts Board discovered, improvement was not simply a matter of re­
education but a part of the whole process of social improvement. The grafting of new 
structures, in the way of the Common Grazing Acts of 1891 and 1908, on to 
traditional undercapitalised crofting was neither a successful nor a sufficient 
approach. Nevertheless, progress was made and by the 1920s the assumption of the
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role of landlord by the state was a crucial innovation. The technical support given by 
the Board, later the Department, of Agriculture for Scotland has been a major 
contribution to life in crofting communities. Nevertheless, the environmental 
amenability of crofting has declined with the increasing dominance of sheep in the 
crofting economy over the succeeding period.^
Although some attempt has been made here to quantify the progress of land 
settlement, the crucial issue is the qualitative aspects of policy. It was the intention 
of both the CDB and the BoAS to create holdings which were large enough to 
provide a meaningful income for the holder. In the longer term it is one of the 
cardinal failures of policy in this period that they were not able to do so. The 
political environment in which policy had to be implemented militated against it. In 
periods and localities where the demand for land was high the cost of creating larger 
holdings was the small number of applicants for land who would be satisfied. The 
potential for continued trouble would remain. What both institutions tended to do 
was to settle as many holders as was possible with little regard for the longer term. In 
the event this proved destructive given the economic and social travails of the 
Highlands in the 1930s.^ Indeed, the legacy of the land settlement era remained 
potent in much later years. In the 1950s the government returned to the task of 
reorganising crofting townships, 'their task was to deal with the decayed structure 
created in the 1920s. Consolidation of holdings and rationalisation of townships 
proved as politically sensitive as the original land settlement programme. Although 
the effects of the interface between the technical and political aspects of land 
settlement can be lamented their inevitability in a political system necessarily 
responsive to popular pressure should be recognised. The general concept was not 
confined to Scotland, a Peruvian economist argued in the 1930s that the land 
problem;
... appears in all its magnitude as a socio economic - and therefore
political - problem. And every desire to change it, for example into a
technical agricultural problem within the dominion of agronomists, is
a vain endeavour. 22
The crofting system, as established in this period, and only modified in minor 
respects since, is often held up as the saviour of the highlands. It is, allegedly, an 
ideal system for retaining population in the Highlands and hence maintaining the 
social and cultural health of a distinctive part of the United Kingdom. However, the 
rigidity of the system is the principal legacy of this period. The 1886 Act established
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a regime which was explicable only as an attempt to silence crofter rhetoric of the 
1880s. The impression in the crofting community that it was a rational response to 
their perceived just demands engendered a loyalty to it which remains to this day. 
The only meaningful reform of the landlord tenant relationship after 1886 has been 
the substitution of the state as a landlord in certain areas after 1919. However, the 
crofting system could only operate efficiently if the principles of primogeniture were 
applied rigorously. Congestion was perpetuated if more than one representative of 
the succeeding generation wished to retain a hold on the land. This clashed with the 
mentality of the crofting community, which can only be described as static. The 
examples of successful migration are more the exception than the rule in this period. 
The experience of the attempt to move the Sconser crofters across Skye discouraged 
further attempts at migration. It was not until the early 1920s, with the transfer of 
cottars from Lewis and Harris to Skye, that a successful migration can be found. It 
was the tendency of crofters' families to remain at home regardless of the social and 
economic consequences which most puzzled Lady Gordon Cathcart about the 
crofting system.23
Some of the lustre was taken off the crofting regime by the economic conditions in 
the 1930s. This combined with the Second World War to create a new problem for 
government. The root of it remained the rigidity of the extant 1886 regime. The 
problem of absentee crofters and decay in the crofting community in the post war era 
could not be challenged due to the inflexible provisions of existing legislation. The 
existing regime retained sufficient residual loyalty among remaining crofters to 
stymie government attempts to deal with the major problem.
In final conclusion, the period from the 1880s to the 1920s bequeathed a 
questionable legacy to future generations of Highlanders. The system created by the 
interplay of politics and public policy on the Highland land issue, may have had an 
internal consistency for contemporaries but its incapacity for change, which quickly 
emerged, has been its most notable characteristic.
267
1. See 3-4.
2. H.A.Moisley, "The Highlands and Islands - A Crofting 
Region?", Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers, 31, 1962, 83-4.
3. D.J. MacCuish, "Ninety Years of Crofting Legislation 
and Administration", TGSI, 50, 1976-78.
4. See 180.
5. Court of Session Cases, 1917, 453-63, Rogerson v
Chilston.
6. See 222.
7. J.P. Day, Public Administration in the Highlands and 
Islands of Scotland, (London, 1919), 231-2;
W.C.MacKenzie, The Highlands and Islands of Scotland: A 
Historical Survey, (Edinburgh, 1937), 296-8; D.Turnock,
Patterns of Highland Development, (london, 1970), 70.
8. SRO, Dept of Agriculture and Fisheries, Miscellaneous 
Files, AF 43/6/13, Memo on Dual Ownership.
9. C. Stewart, The Highland Experiment in Land 
Nationalisation, (London, 1904), 3-4.
10. See tables 7:1, 8:1 & 8:2.
11. J. Hunter, The Making of the Crofting Community, 
(Edinburgh, 1976), 196; D. Cannadine, The Decline and 
Fall of the British Aristocracy, 386.
12. Hunter, Crofting Community; & I.F.Grigor, Crofters 
and the Land Question, 1870 to 1920, (PhD Thesis, 
University of Glasgow, 1989), are the two historians most 
inclined to make generalisations of this kind. Neither, 
it should be noted, have examined the records of Highland 
estates to gain a more detailed view of proprietorial 
concerns.
13. See 17-18.




18. Grigor, Crofters and the Land Question, I, 44-5.
19. G.D. Goodlad, "The Liberal Party and Gladstone's Land 
Purchase Bill of 1886", Historical Journal, 32, 1989,
268
627-41; F.S.L. Lyons, John Dillon, (London, 1968), 82-
110; A.Warren, "Gladstone, Land and Social Reconstruction 
in Ireland, 1881-87", Parliamentary History, 2, 1983; S.
Warwick-Haller, William O'Brien and the Irish Land War, 
(Dublin, 1990) 81-158.
20. J. Ritchie, "Some effects of sheep rearing on the 
natural condition of Scotland", Scottish Journal of 
Agriculture, 2, 1919; K.W. Braid, "Bracken as a
colonist", Scottish Journal of Agriculture, 17, 1934;
A.S. Mather, "The Alleged Deterioration of Hill Grazings 
in the Scottish Highlands", Biological Conservation, 14, 
1978; C.S. Orwin & E.H. Whetham, The History of British 
Agriculture, 1846 to 1914, (Cambridge, 1964), 295-6.
21 . Scottish Economic Committee, The Highlands and 
Islands of Scotland: A Review of the Economic Conditions 
with Recommendations for Improvement, (1938), 143-4 &
178-9.
22. J.C. Mariategui, 7 Ensayos de Interpretacion de la 
Realidod Peruana, (Lima, 1933 ed) , 34; quoted by 
T.R.Ford, Man and Land in Peru, (New York, 1971 ed), 88.
23. See Chap 4, 6-8; Chap 8, 13-14.
24. Turnock, Patterns of Highland Development, Chap 4.
269
APPENDIX NO I.
THE COURSE OF THE LAND AGITATION IN THE 
HIGHLANDS, 1886 - 1895.
1886
MAY.
Raid at Greenhill Farm, Tiree.
JULY.
Deforcement at Balephuil, Tiree.
OCTOBER.
7th, Troops arrive in Skye.
18th, Tiree men sentenced to terms of imprisonment.
25th, Deforcements at Herbusta and Bomeskitaig, Skye.*
26th, Deforcement at Garalipin, Skye.^
NOVEMBER.
Fence damaged at Eoligarry, Barra. **
1887
MAY.
Deforcement at Clashmore, Assynt, Sutherland. ^ Intrusions on farms at 
Lochinver and Durness, Sutherland. ^
NOVEMBER.
22nd, Raid on Park Deer Forest, Lewis. ^
25th, Troops arrive in Lewis.^
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DECEMBER.
Stock mutilated, boats damaged, Ballalan,
Lewis. ^
Deputation of crofters inform tenant of 
Aignish Farm, Lewis, of intended raid.^
1888.
JANUARY.
9th, Raid on Aignish Farm. Clash betweencrofters and police.
Raid on Galson Farm. ^
Dyke breaking at Clasmore, Assynt Sutherland.^
Deputation of crofters inform tenant of Camish Farm, Lewis, of intended ra id .^  
Acquittal of Park raiders. ^
FEBRUARY.
Order by Cathcart Estates prohibiting 
crofters giving land to cottars. ^
Dyke breaking at North Dell Farm, Lewis. ^
Aignish rioters receive prison sentences. ^
Dyke breaking at Dalmore and Dalbeg, Lewis. ^
MARCH.
Dyke breaking at Galson and Holm farms, Lewis.
Deforcement at Valtos, Kilmuir, Skye.^
APRIL.
Building used by salmon fishing tenant at Barvas, Lewis, burned down. 20 
Land League meetings in G le n e lg .^
MAY.
Fence breaking at North Dell farm, L e w is .  ^
Attempted diversion of River Barvas, Lewis.^
AUGUST.
Demonstration to mark the sale of the Kilmuir Estate, S k y e .
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OCTOBER.
Withdrawal of troops from Lewis.
NOVEMBER.
Rumours of renewed raid on Park Deer F o re s t .  2^
1889
MARCH.
Dyke breaking at Galson, Lewis. ^
1890
JUNE.
Demonstration at rent collection, Glendale, Skye. 2? 
Deforcement at Watemish, Skye.28
JULY.
Deforcement at Claddach Kirkibost, North Uist. 29 
SEPTEMBER.
Eviction of pensioner, North Uist.^O 
OCTOBER.
Buildings damaged, sheep killed, Borve,
Bemera, Harris. ^
NOVEMBER.
Case of wilful fire raising, Borve,Bemera, Harris. ^
1891
MARCH.
Raid on Orinsay Farm, Lewis. ^




Dyke breaking at Clashmore, Assynt, Sutherland. 85
1893
MAY.
Deforcement at Airdens, Creich, S u th e r la n d .  86 
JUNE.
Intrusion on Monkstadt farm, Kilmuir, Skye.8^ 
AUGUST.
Deforcement at Staffin, Kilmiur, S k y e . 88 
SEPTEMBER.
Deforcement at Airdens, Creich, S u th e r la n d .  89
1894
OCTOBER.





Fence breaking. Baiblesgarry, North U is t .  ^ 2
1. Glasgow Herald, 26/10/86
2. Glasgow Herald, 27/10/86
3. SRO, HH 1/139.
4. SRO, GD 40/16/4/24-25.
5. SRO, GD 40/16/4/27.
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Memorial to the Prime Minister with Reference to Crofter Legislation. ^
The rejection by the House of Lords of the Small Landholders (Scotland) bill has 
convinced us that until grave constitutional issues have been decided land legislation 
cannot be secured upon these lines. While there is general agreement as to the end to 
be attained, there is profound divergence of opinion as to the method. The extension 
of the Act so as to include other districts where similar conditions prevail; the 
creation of new holdings both for crofters and cottars, so as to relieve congestion 
and to colonise depopulated areas; the amendment of the 1886 Act in particular 
where the experience of 22 years has proved amendment to be desirable; the 
creation of new holdings and allotments in suitable localities throughout Scotland - 
on all these and on many minor points both parties are agreed. Conservative peers 
though rejecting the government Bill, have introduced measures, inadequate indeed, 
but admitting the necessity for action, and indicating a willingness to go some way at 
least to meet us. The moment, then, is opportune for a serious attempt to find 
common ground, and, by judicious compromise, to pass a really satisfactory 
measure. If land reform in Scotland is to be postponed till after a constitutional 
conflict with the House of Lords, other questions may arise and obscure the issue; 
the favourable conjunction of circumstances may pass away; rural depopulation will 
continue, while England and Ireland, under less controversial Acts will be rearing a 
race of prosperous small holders.
The Master of Elibank, in a letter to the Times on 13th March, 1908, wrote:-
Had the Committee stage of the Bill been granted (i.e. in the Lords) 
some of us representing Lowland constituencies were not unwilling to 
see the machinery of the Bill considerably modified in order 
that the measure might not be lost to crofting areas.
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Are Scottish members then, unreasonable in desiring that the government should 
call, or at any rate consent to, a conference consisting of members of both parties in 
both houses, in accordance with the terms of the Government's own plan for dealing 
with a situation arising from a deadlock between the two Houses of Parliament? By 
such means we are convinced a valuable measure could be passed even during the 
present session, accomplishing all, and more than all the items of the programme put 
forward by the present Prime Minister when he spoke for the Liberal Party at 
Inverness on October 21st 1905.
It is with that programme before us, and with the object of conciliation in view, that 
we have ventured to prepare the Crofter's Bill, introduced by Mr Cathcart Wason, 
and backed by 11 of our number. It is based on Sir George Trevelyan’s Bill of 1895, 
and is also indebted for some of its provisions to the Government Bill and to the 
English Act of 1907: while Sir Edward Tennant's, Lord Lovat's, Lord Camperdown's 
and many other private member's bills have received consideration. Flaws it 
undoubtedly contains, faults of drafting inevitably occur in any Bill prepared by 
private members, without the skill of a government draftsman. But these are of little 
importance in a measure avowedly brought forward, not as verbally inspired but to 
elicit comment, to invite amendment, to serve as a basis of discussion and to indicate 
broadly the lines upon which in our opinion compromise might hopefully be sought.
In one particular we go beyond the government proposals, and suggest facilities for 
the provision of dwellings and allotments for cottars, fishermen, and farm servants. 
This step it seems to us, is a most necessary one, especially if it is desired to enable 
men of these classes gradually to fit themselves for the occupancy of regular small 
holdings.
So far as the Lowlands are concerned we proceed along the lines of the Small 
Holdings Act and the Allotments Act of 1892. Both measures are useful and 
practical in aim. Unfortunately they have been allowed to remain dead letters. If 
amended in certain particulars and vitalised by the guidance of a strong central 
authority supplemented by local knowledge, we believe both might do much to arrest 
materially the depopulation of rural Scotland.
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We thoroughly approve the aims of the government Bill and appreciate the 
steadfastness with which it has endeavoured to attain them. But valuable years are 
running on, and it is clear that if those aims are to be achieved considerable 
modifications must be made in the machinery proposed. If our Bill shall indicate the 
way to a possible solution our labours will not have been in vain.
Thomas Glen Coats.
J.G. Weir. (Ross - shire)
Alpheus C. Morton. (Sutherland)
R. Laidlaw.
John D. Hope.




J. Cathcart Wason. (Orkney and Shetland) 
Norman Lamont.











BAILLIE, J E B - MP for Inverness - shire, 1895 to 1900 
BALFOUR, A J - Secretary for Scotland, July 1886 to March 1887.
BALFOUR, J B - Lord Advocate, 1881 to 1885 and January to July 1886.
BRAND, SIR DAVID - Chairman of the Crofters Commission, 1886 to 1908. 
BRYCE, J A - MP for Inverness Burghs, 1906 to 1918.
BURLEIGH, LORD BALFOUR OF - Secretary for Scotland, 1895 to 1903. 
CATHCART WASON, J - MP for Orkney and Shetland, 1900 to 1921.
CLARK, DR G B - MP for Caithness, 1885 to 1900.
COCHRAN PATRICK, R W - Permanent Under Secretary for Scotland, 1887 to 
1892.
CONACHER, H M - Secretary to the Board of Agriculture for Scotland.
COOK, SIR HENRY - Solicitor to the Congested Districts Board.
DALHOUSIE, EARL OF - Secretary for Scotland, March to July 1886.
DEWAR, J A - MP for Inverness - shire, 1900 to 1916; created Baron Forteviot in 
December 1916.
ELIBANK, ARTHUR MURRAY OF - Scottish Liberal Whip, 1905 to 1909; 
introduced Small Landholders (Scotland) Bill, 1911.
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FINLAY, R B - MP for Inverness Burghs, 1885 to 1892 and 1895 to 1906.
FORSYTH, J N M - Member of the Crofters Commission, 1902 to 1912.
FRASER, WILLIAM - Proprietor of the Kilmuir estate, North Skye, 1855 to 1892.
FRASER MACKINTOSH, CHARLES - MP for Inverness Burghs, 1874 to 1885, 
Inverness - shire, 1885 to 1892; member of Napier Commission.
GORDON, GEORGE - Elgin land valuer, Member of the Royal Commission 
(Highlands and Islands) 1892.
GORDON CATHCART, LADY EMILY - Proprietor of Benbecula, South Uist and 
Barra.
GRAHAM MURRAY, ANDREW - Secretary for Scotland, 1903 to 1905.
GRIEG, R B - Member of BoAS with special responsibility for agricultural 
education and live stock husbandry.
GUNN, WILLIAM - Factor on the Cromartie estates, 1867 to 1901.
HOSACK, WILLIAM - Oban land agent, member of the Crofters Commission, 1886 
to 1902.
IVORY, WILLIAM - Sheriff Principal of Inverness - shire.
KENNEDY, N J D - Chairman of the Crofters Commission, 1908 1912; Created 
Lord Kennedy 1912; Chairman of the Scottish Land Court
LOCHIEL, SIR DONALD CAMERON OF - MP for Inverness - shire, 1868 to 1885; 
member of Napier Commission; convenor of meetings of landowners in Inverness, 
1885 and 1892.
LOTHIAN, MARQUIS OF - Secretary for Scotland, 1887 to 1892.
LYELL, L - MP for Orkney and Shetland, 1885 to 1900.
MACCALLUM, REV MALCOLM - Church of Scotland Minister in Muckaim, 
Argyll - shire; member of Royal Commission (Highlands and Islands) 1892.
MACDONALD, ALEXANDER - Portree solicitor; factor for most of the Skye 
proprietors.
MACDONALD, ALLAN - Inverness solicitor; factor for the MacKintosh estates.
MACDONALD, J H A - Lord Advocate, July 1885 to January 1886 and August 
1886 to 1888.
MACDONALD, RANALD - Factor on the Gordon Cathcart estates.
MACDONALD, DR RODERICK - MP for Ross and Cromarty, 1885 to 1892.
MACFARLANE, D H - MP for Carlow, 1880 to 1885, Argyll - shire 1885 to 1886 
and 1892 to 1895; Knighted in 1894.
MACGREGOR, DR CHARLES - MP for Inverness - shire, 1892 to 1895.
MACGREGOR, R R - Secretary of the Congested Districts Board.
MACINTYRE, P B - Member of the Crofters Commission, 1886 to 1912.
MACKENZIE, ALEXANDER - Proprietor of Inverness newspapers the Celtic 
Magazine and the Scottish Highlander, activist in the crofters’ movement.
MACKENZIE, KENNETH (OF GAIRLOCH) - Liberal activist; Wester Ross 
proprietor; member of the Napier Commission.
MACKENZIE, WILLIAM - Principal Clerk of the Crofters Commission.
MACKINNON, PROF DONALD - Native of Colonsay; Professor of Celtic at 
Edinburgh University; member of Napier Commission.
MACKINNON WOOD, THOMAS - Secretary for Scotland, 1912 to 1916.
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MACKINTOSH, ANGUS - Former factor on the Gordon Cathcart estates and 
subsequently land manager for the Congested Districts Board.
MACLEAN, NEIL - Farmer at Nunton, Benbecula, BoAS Sub Commissioner.
MACLEOD, JOHN - MP for Sutherland, 1894 to 1900; member of the Royal 
Commission (Highlands and Islands) 1892.
MACLEOD, REGINALD - Scottish agent of the Conservative party; permanent 
Under Secretary for Scotland, 1904 to 1910; 27th Chief of the Clan MacLeod.
MACNEILL, MALCOLM - Clerk to the Napier Commission; President of the Local 
Government Board and hence member of the Congested Districts Board.
MACPHERSON, J IAN - MP for Ross and Cromarty, 1911 to 1936; Charman of the 
Scottish Land Enquiry Committee, 1912.
MACRAE, DONALD - Former schoolteacher in Easter Ross and Lewis, 
subsequently, full time official of the Highland Land League in the 1890s.
MALCOLM, GEORGE - Factor for the Ellices of Invergarry and Scretary of the 
Highland Property Association in the 1890s.
MUNRO, ROBERT - Lord Advocate, 1913 to 1916; Secretary for Scotland, 1916 to 
1922.
MUNRO FERGUSON, R C - MP for Ross and Cromarty, 1884 to 1885; Secretary 
for Scotland, 1922 to 1924; created Viscount Novar in 1920.
MURDOCH, JOHN - Former exciseman; proprietor of the Inverness newspaper the 
Highlander, activist in the crofters' movement.
NAPIER AND ETTRICK, LORD - Former Diplomat; Border landowner; Chairman 
of the Royal Commission on Crofting Conditions, 1884.
NICOLSON, ALEXANDER - Native of Skye; Sheriff of Kircudbright; mountaineer; 
Gaelic scholar; member of the Napier Commission.
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ROSE, ARTHUR - Director of Land Settlement at BoAS, assumed overall 
responsibility for Land Settlement in November 1920.
SHAW, DONALD - Edinburgh solicitor who acted for Vatersay, Kilmuir and 
Raasay land raiders.
SHAW, THOMAS - Lord Advocate, 1905 to 1909.
SHAW STEWART, M H - MP for East Renfrew, 1886 to 1906; member of the 
Royal Commission (Highlands and Islands) 1892.
SKENE, EDWARDS AND GARSON - Firm of Edinburgh solicitors who acted for 
Lady Gordon Cathcart and Major Duncan Matheson of Lewis.
RICHMOND AND GORDON, DUKE OF - Secretary for Scotland, July 1885 to 
January 1886.
SINCLAIR, JOHN - Secretary for Scotland, 1905 to 1912; created Baron Pentland in 
1909.
SUTHERLAND, ANGUS - MP for Sutherland, 1886 to 1894; Chairman of the 
Scottish Fisheries Board from 1894 and hence a member of the Congested Districts 
Board.
SUTHERLAND, JOHN - Oban Solicitor; member of the BoAS with special 
responsibility for small holdings.
TREVELYAN, SIR GEORGE OTTO - Secretary for Scotland, January to March 
1886 and 1892 to 1895.
WILSON, THOMAS - BoAS Senior Sub Commissioner for the West Highlands and 
Hebrides.
WRIGHT, SIR ROBERT - Chairman of BoAS, former Principal of the west of 
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